

MAINO DE MAINERI (CA. 1290–CA. 1368)  
ON WHETHER SOMETHING CAN  
COME TO BE OUT OF NOTHING:  
*QUESTIONES DE SUBSTANTIA ORBIS:*  
*QUESTIO UTRUM EX NIHILO POSSIT ALIQUID FIERI\**

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**T**HIS paper offers the edition of a *questio* written between 1315 and 1317 by the Italian master of arts and medicine, Maino de Maineri, entitled “*utrum ex nihilo possit aliquid fieri.*”<sup>1</sup> It is extant in a single manuscript, Florence, Biblioteca Nazionale, Conventi Soppressi J.3.6, fols. 96ra–99ra, along with eleven other *questiones*. The *questio* is chiefly concerned with the problem of natural substantial change; specifically: do the substances that are produced in nature come from something pre-existent or not? Maino wants to defend what he views as Aristotle’s moderate solution to this question—according to which substances are produced by the

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<sup>1</sup> Very little is known about Maino’s life. The most complete account is found in the introduction of an unpublished doctoral dissertation defended at the University of St. Andrews in 2006 by Caroline Proctor, “Perfecting Prevention: The Medical Writings of Maino de Maineri (d. c. 1368).” See also the entry by Margherita Palumbo, in *Dizionario biografico degli Italiani* 67 (2006), sub “Maineri, Maino”.

efficient causality of natural, external agents that educe them from the pure potency of matter—against two “extreme” alternatives: the “hiddenness of forms” theory (*latitatio formarum*) of Anaxagoras, following whom new forms are merely the manifestation of pre-existent forms in matter—and hence not new at all—and the “*ex nihilo*” view of the “three Laws.” Maino provides a competent defense of Aristotle’s theory, adducing a wide variety of texts by Aristotle and Averroes. The principal interest of the *questio*, however, lies elsewhere. It is to be found in the lengthy discussion Maino devotes to the views of an unnamed near-contemporary of his who advocated a position which he describes as “very similar” to that of Anaxagoras. This near-contemporary author was identified by Charles Ermatinger in 1969 as the Augustinian Friar James of Viterbo, who was active in Paris in the 1290s.<sup>2</sup> James defended an original version of the doctrine of seminal reasons.<sup>3</sup> Maino argues that Viterbo’s theory is just as wrongheaded as that of Anaxagoras. The numerous arguments he advances in support of this claim attest to considerable philosophical acumen. The purpose of this introduction is to present the *questio* and highlight the philosophical interest of Maino’s rebuttal of James of Viterbo’s views. Given that I am claiming that Maino is the author of our *questio*, a fact that is viewed as merely “highly probable” by Gianfranco Fioravanti, the scholar who has most recently examined the issue, I will devote the first part of the introduction to presenting my case in favour of this attribution. I will then provide a general outline of the *questio*’s overall structure and a summary of its contents, referring to the paragraph numbers in my edition as I do so. In Part III, I provide a sketch of James of Viterbo’s doctrine of seminal rea-

<sup>2</sup> See Charles Ermatinger, “John of Jandun in His Relations with Arts Masters and Theologians,” in *Arts libéraux et philosophie au Moyen Âge: Actes du quatrième congrès international de philosophie médiévale* (Montreal, 1969), 1175–84, at 1176. Mary Phelps, in “The Theory of Seminal Reasons in James of Viterbo,” *Augustiniana* 30 (1980): 271–83, presents James of Viterbo’s theory of seminal reasons and briefly examines two critiques of it, one by Bernard of Auvergne, the other by a writer to whom she referred as an “anonymous master of arts from Paris” (Maino de Maineri), at 280–83. For Bernard of Auvergne’s critique, see Antoine Côté, “Bernard of Auvergne on James of Viterbo’s Doctrine of Possibles: With a Critical Edition of Bernard’s *Reprobatio* of James’s *Quodlibet* 1, question 5,” *Augustiniana* 66 (2016): 251–84.

<sup>3</sup> For details, see *A Companion to James of Viterbo*, ed. Antoine Côté and Martin Pickavé, Brill’s Companions to the Christian Tradition 81 (Leiden and Boston, 2018), esp. chapters 5 and 6.

sons and present the main arguments Maino employs to rebut it. Finally, in part IV, I offer an assessment of Maino's criticism of Viterbo's theory.

## I

Our *questio* is the sixth of twelve questions occupying fols. 89v–108va in Florence, Biblioteca Nazionale (C.S.) J.3.6, the first question being preceded by a *principium*, or introduction, covering fol. 89ra–va.<sup>4</sup> Since I will be referring to many of these questions in the order in which they appear in the manuscript, it will be useful to list them all at the outset:

1. Utrum de corpore celesti possit esse scientia (fols. 89va–90rb);
2. Consequenter queritur utrum celum moveatur a se ipso (fols. 90rb–91rb);
3. Utrum celum sit animatum (fols. 91rb–92ra);
4. Utrum intelligentia movens orbem sit coniuncta orbi secundum esse, ut forma substantialis sue materie (fols. 92ra–93ra);
5. Utrum celum habeat materiam sit questio nostra (fols. 93ra–96ra);
6. Utrum ex nihilo possit aliquid fieri (fols. 96ra–99ra);
7. Utrum materia sit ens (fol. 99ra–vb);
8. Utrum materia sit intelligibilis per se (fols. 99vb–100rb);
9. Consequenter queratur utrum potentia sit de essentia materie (fols. 100rb–101ra);
10. Utrum substantia materialis sit per se divisibilis in partes eiusdem rationis (fols. 101ra–102rb);
11. Utrum dimensiones precedant formam in materia eedem numero in generato et corrupto (fols. 102rb–103rb);
12. Consequenter queritur utrum in eadem portione materie possint esse plures forme substantiales (fols. 103rb–108va).

<sup>4</sup> The *principium* has been edited by Gianfranco Fioravanti. See his “Il *Principium* di Maino de’ Maineri alle *Quaestiones super De substantia orbis*,” in «*Ratio practica*» e «*Ratio civilis*»: *Studi de etica e politica medievali per Giancarlo Garfagnini*, ed. Anna Rodolfi (Pisa, 2016), 207–23 (the edition starts at 216).

Scholars have tended to view these twelve questions as making up a single work.<sup>5</sup> A medieval reader had entitled the lot “Liber de corpore celesti et de iis que ad ipsum pertinent” in the upper margin of column “a” on fol. 89r, indicating that he believed it was one work. Charles Ermatinger, in a pioneering article published in 1959 the first part of which was devoted to the *Liber*, argued that it was a question-commentary on Averroes’s *De substantia orbis*.<sup>6</sup> Zdzisław Kuksewicz concurs, asserting that its author was Maino, but without providing arguments in favour of

<sup>5</sup> It is worth pointing out that the total number of questions on fols. 89va–108va is indeed twelve, not thirteen, as is sometimes suggested, e.g., in *Aegidii Romani Opera omnia I: Catalogo dei manoscritti (96-151) 1/2\* Italia (Firenze, Padova, Venezia)*, ed. Francesco del Punta and Concetta Luna (Florence, 1989), 128. The source of this confusion can be traced back to a mistake by the copyist of our *questiones* in the Florence manuscript. He thought that question 12 (namely “utrum in eadem portione materie possint esse plures forme substantiales”) ended at the bottom of fol. 104vb. He then had a new question start at the top of fol. 105ra, terminating at fol. 108va. This new *questio* was supposedly titled “Nunc restat dicere aliquid de forma generis et speciei utrum scilicet realiter different aut non.” That our scribe intended this to be the beginning of a new *questio* is seen by the pen-flourished initial “N” on “Nunc,” following the same style as the initials we find in the other questions. But of course the phrase “Nunc restat videre” does not mark the beginning of a new question at all; rather, it indicates that the author is turning his attention to a topic that he has previously raised *in the same question*, but that he had put off examining until this point of the discussion. In fact, this is exactly the case. At fol. 103rb, after presenting pro and con arguments, Maino explains that the problem of whether there can be a plurality of forms in the same portion of matter can be broken down into three “difficulties”: the first is about whether the forms of the elements remain in mixed substances; the second is about whether generic and specific forms are the same or different; and the third is about whether there is another soul in addition to the intellectual soul in man (“tres difficultates habemus pertractare in illa questione, quarum prima tractat de formis elementorum, utrum scilicet maneant in mixto vel non; secunda erit de forma generis et speciei, utrum sint eedem aut diverse; tertia erit de anima intellectiva, utrum preter ipsam sit ponere aliam formam in homine”). Thus, the phrase “Nunc restat videre” does not mark the beginning of a new question but simply introduces the second part of Maino’s discussion.

<sup>6</sup> Charles Ermatinger, “Notes on Some Early Fourteenth Century Scholastic Philosophers,” *Manuscripta* 3 (1959): 155–68. On question-commentaries as a literary form in arts faculties in the Middle Ages and how it differed from other types of commentaries, see Olga Weijers, “La structure des commentaires philosophiques à la faculté des arts: quelques observations,” in *Il commento filosofico nell’occidente latino (secoli XIII–XV)* (Turnhout, 2002), 17–41.

this attribution.<sup>7</sup> The most recent scholar to examine the matter, Gianfranco Fioravanti, while agreeing that our twelve questions contain a commentary on the *De substantia orbis*, denies that all of them are part of it.<sup>8</sup> According to Fioravanti, the commentary proper comprises only the first five questions, and the remaining seven are independent questions and might not even be by Maino.<sup>9</sup> Fioravanti's case in support of these claims appears to rest on the single fact that Maino at the end of question 5 (on fol. 96ra) writes "Et sic de materia celi et substantia eius dicta sufficient." <sup>10</sup> If we assume that the words "de materia celi et substantia eius" are Maino's way of referring to the *De substantia orbis*, then they indeed appear to signal that the author is concluding his commentary with those words. There is, however, no need to make that assumption. The author of the questions uses a similar formulaic expression to conclude all other *questiones* in the *Liber*, save questions 3 and 4. For instance, at the end of question 2 he writes "et sic ad istam questionem;" at the end of question 7 he writes "Et sic de ista questione;" and at the closing of question 12 he concludes "Et sufficient de ista questione." It is true that the formula he uses at the end of question 5 contains the additional words "de materia celi et substantia eius." But there is no reason to see this as an indication that Maino is thereby bringing his entire commentary to a close; quite the contrary: the topic of question 5, as we can tell from its title, is the matter of the heavens, and the author does discuss the substance of the heavens in it; indeed, as we will see shortly, he establishes that they are a simple substance, something he does not do in the previous four questions. What the words "Et hec de materia celi et substantia eius sufficient" at the end of question 5 suggest, then, is simply that Maino is concluding *that* question, not the entire treatise. But if the words "de materia celi et substantia eius" signal only the end of question 5, then it seems that we have no reason to think of the first four questions as necessarily being part of a commentary together with question 5. What is the relation, then, between the different

<sup>7</sup> Zdzisław Kuksewicz, "Maino of Milan, a Fourteenth Century Parisian Averroist," *Medioevo* 31 (2006): 337–75, at 338–41.

<sup>8</sup> Fioravanti, "Il *Principium* di Maino de' Maineri," 207.

<sup>9</sup> Fioravanti thus concurs with the description found in del Punta and Luna (see n. 5 above), according to which the first five questions make up an anonymous commentary on the *De substantia orbis*, while the remaining ones are an independent series of anonymous questions.

<sup>10</sup> Fioravanti, "Il *Principium* di Maino de' Maineri," 207.

questions making up the *Liber*? Do they, in whole or in part, make up a commentary on the *De substantia orbis*? And are they by Maino de Maineri?

A first step towards answering these questions is to note that questions 5, 6, and 9 are certainly by the same author. Thus, question 6 contains two unmistakable allusions to question 5. They occur in <101> of our edition, where the author refers to points that were discussed “in the question on the matter of the heavens” (“ut visum fuit in questione de materia celi”). This, as we will now see, is a reference to question 5. The first point the author of question 6 claims was established in the question on the matter of the heavens is that a power of infinite duration cannot reside in matter, since all enmattered forms have finite duration. This is indeed something Maino repeatedly emphasizes in question 5, for instance in the following passage:

Nam omnis talis forma est corruptibilis et per consequens habens talem formam est corruptibile. Unde ista ratio convinceret necessario celum esse corruptibile supposito quod esset compositum ex forma et materia; dico forma que reciperetur in materia mediantibus dimensionibus, quia talis forma corruptibilis est et non eterna et hoc intendebat Aristotelis in VIII *Physicorum* quando probavit quod primum principium non sit virtus in magnitudine finita, quoniam non haberet actionem infinitam et eodem modo celum si esset forma in materia divisibilis per divisionem materie, non haberet passionem infinitam, secundum quod dicit Commentator VIII *Physicorum*, commento 79 circa finem.<sup>11</sup>

The second reference in <101> concerns the doctrine that the first heaven, being a simple substance whose proper operation is to undergo motion, is capable of being moved eternally and may therefore be called a “mere potency.” The author notes that such a view might not follow from the assumption that the heavens are a composite of potency and act, “as was seen in the question on the matter of the heavens,” i.e., in question 5. For this reason, he continues, “it was said (sc. in that same question) that it was Aristotle’s view (*intentio*) that the heavens are a simple substance.” If we now turn to question 5, we see that the author did indeed defend the view that the heavens are a simple substance or a pure potency:

<sup>11</sup> Maino de Maineri, (Questio utrum celum habeat materiam), Florence, Biblioteca Nazionale (C.S.) J.3.6, fol. 94va.

Ad illa dico per ordinem. Ad primum dico quod celum circumscripta intelligentia non est actus informans potentiam nec potentia informata ab actu inherente illi potentie, ut figura cere, sed habet similitudinem cum actu informante et potentia informata. Unde est quodammodo medium inter potentiam informatam et actum informantem et est medium per abnegationem, etiam per adsimilationem. Et tu dices “ergo ponis medium inter potentiam et actum.” Dico quod verum est inter potentiam informatam et actum informantem, quoniam pono *substantiam simplicem* que non est forma inherens nec potentia cui forma inherat. Sed si accipias potentiam et actum large magis sic non pono medium inter potentiam at actum.<sup>12</sup>

The author acknowledges that this account appears contrary to some of Aristotle’s and Averroes’s assertions:

Amplius, quod celum sit substantia simplex videtur contra intentionem Aristotelis, secundo *Celi* circa principium; vult enim expresse quod celum est animatum, et Commentator ibidem intendit hoc. Unde in commento tertio secundi *Celi* Commentator dicit quod forma movens celum assimilatur forme naturali in eo quod dat huic corpori motum circularem et subdit “causam,” quia est in corpore quod movetur per ipsam et adsimilatur forme absolute, quia non dividitur per divisionem sui subiecti. Sic igitur patet ex intentione Commentatoris quod forma movens celum est faciens unum cum substantia celi. Unde parum post subdit Commentator quod in celo forma et formatum sunt idem numero.<sup>13</sup>

After a lengthy discussion, however, he concludes that it must nonetheless be attributed to Aristotle and Averroes:

Est ergo ratio illa qua Aristotelis et Commentator substentarentur ut puto **{b}** ad probandum celum esse substantiam corpoream simplicem, quoniam si esset substantia composita ex materia, dico corporali, ipsum esset finite actionis et esset generabile et corruptibile.<sup>14</sup>

Question 5, then, does assert that the heavens are a simple substance; and, as we have just seen, it also asserts that a power of infinite duration cannot reside in matter, since all enmattered forms have finite duration. The author of question 5 is therefore also the author of question 6. But then he

<sup>12</sup> Ibid.; my emphasis.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid., fol. 93vb.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid., fol. 95rb.

must also be the author of question 9. For we find in that question a reference to the doctrine Averroes is said to have defended in his Commentary to *De celo* I to the effect that prime matter may have an “infinite” (i.e., non-actualized) power towards the generation of some individual, which doctrine, the author of question 9 states, had been previously referred to “in the question of the matter of the heavens”:

Et pro tanto vult commentator primo *Celi*, ubi allegatum fuit supra in questione de materia celi, quod potentia accidentaliter ad aliquod generandum potest esse infinita.<sup>15</sup>

Averroes does in fact defend this theory towards the end of book 1 of his commentary,<sup>16</sup> and our author does discuss it at some depth in question 5:

Dicit quod potentia ad corruptionem sive sit essentialiter ordinata sive non (non) potest esse infinita nec tempore infinito, sed potentia ad generationem sive ad formam generandam si sit accidentaliter ordinata bene potest esse infinita et infinito tempore.<sup>17</sup>

In addition to the evidence I have just provided that questions 5, 6, and 9 are all by the same author, there is also independent evidence to suggest that all twelve questions collectively make up a commentary on the *De substantia orbis*. This is strongly suggested by the recurrent allusion throughout all questions to what is said “in illo libello/libro *De substantia orbis*.”<sup>18</sup> These allusions are found in most cases in the “in oppositum”

<sup>15</sup> Maino de Maineri, (Questio utrum potentia sit de essentia materie), Florence, Biblioteca Nazionale (C.S.) J.3.6, fol. 101ra.

<sup>16</sup> *Commentum super I De celo*, comm. 120 (ed. Francis James Carmody and Rüdiger Arnzen, *Averrois Cordubensis Commentum magnum super libro De celo et mundo Aristotelis*, Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie médiévales. Bibliotheca 4 [Leuven, 2003], 230).

<sup>17</sup> Maino de Maineri, (Questio utrum celum habeat materiam), Florence, Biblioteca Nazionale (C.S.) J.3.6, fol. 95va.

<sup>18</sup> Question 1, fol. 89va: “In illo libello *De substantia orbis*”; question 2, fol. 90rb: “In oppositum est Commentator in illo libro”; question 3, fol. 91va: “Sed celum prout essentia est corpus simplex, ut dicit Averrois in illo libro”; question 4, fol. 92ra: “[Q]uia intelligentia est perfectio orbis secundum Commentatorem in illo libro *De substantia orbis*”; question 5, fol. 93ra: “In oppositum est Averrois Commentator in illo libro *De substantia orbis*”; question 6, (25) below: “Oppositum est Commentator in illo libro . . .”; question 7, fol. 99ra: “[I]n illo libello *De substantia orbis*”; 99rb: “[I]n isto libello *De substantia orbis*”; question 8, fol. 99vb: “Oppositum arguitur auctoritate Commentatoris in illo libro”; question 9, fol. 100va: “In oppositum est



section of the questions, indicating that their author thought that the topic of each question related directly to material discussed in the *De substantia orbis*. In many cases, the reference is simply to “that book,” without any reference to the title; but in those cases, examination of the contexts shows that only the *De substantia orbis* could be meant. Here are a few examples.

In question 11 on whether the quantitative dimensions precede the form in matter, the author starts out by advancing arguments against dimensions preceding form before stating the opposing view, as follows:

In oppositum est Commentator in illo libello, in primo tractatu. Dicit enim quod dimensiones praecedunt. Primum enim quod existit in hoc subiecto, scilicet materia, sunt tres dimensiones, quae dicuntur corpus. Et post declarat quod sunt eedem numero in generato et corrupto, et illa est sua via in secundo *De generatione* et primo. Et Aristoteles videtur intendere et idem videtur velle in primo *Physicorum* et ubicumque loquitur de hac materia.<sup>19</sup>

Note the contrast between the way the author of the question talks about the *libellus* by Averroes and the two works of Aristotle: the latter are explicitly identified, the former is not; and it is not identified, because it is obvious in the author’s mind what book is intended, namely the *De substantia orbis*. And indeed, the thesis that the dimensions precede the form in matter is one Averroes defends against Avicenna in chapter 1 of the *De substantia orbis*.<sup>20</sup>

Another example is found in question 12, which is devoted to whether there can be a plurality of substantial forms in the same portion of matter:

In oppositum est Commentator in illo libro. Vult enim expresse quod in eadem portione materie non sunt vel possunt esse plures forme substantiales. Unde dicit Commentator in illo primo tractatu quod unam formam habere nisi unum subiectum impossibile est. Et idem vult contra Avicen-

Commentator in illo primo tractatu *De substantia orbis*”; question 10, fol. 101rb: “[I]n illo libro *De substantia orbis*”; question 11, fol. 101rb: “In oppositum videtur esse Commentator in illo libro *De substantia orbis*”; question 12, fol. 103rb: “In oppositum est Commentator in illo libro.”

<sup>19</sup> Maino de Maineri, (Questio utrum dimensiones precedant formam in materia eedem numero in generato et corrupto), Florence, Biblioteca Nazionale (C.S.) J.3.6, fol. 102rb.

<sup>20</sup> See Averroes, *De substantia orbis* 1 (ed. Juntina, vol. IX, fol., 4rb–vL).

nam in illo libro, primo tractatu, et primo *Physicorum* eodem modo. Et idem videtur velle Aristoteles in 7 *Metaphysice* illo capitulo.<sup>21</sup>

Again, we see the same contrast between works the author takes the trouble to identify—namely Averroes’s commentary on the *Physics* and Aristotle’s *Metaphysics*—and “that book,” namely the *De substantia orbis*, where the two positions identified in the passage are indeed to be found.<sup>22</sup>

The last example I will mention is our question 6, paragraph (25), which comes after a string of arguments purporting to show that something can come from nothing. Maino writes that the Commentator “in that book” is opposed to this view: “Oppositum est Commentator in illo libro et Aristoteles I *Physicorum*.” Note that Maino does not write here, as he did in the two previous examples, that the Commentator “says” (“dicit”) or “expressly intends” (“expresse vult”) “the opposite.” The reason for this is that Averroes does not expressly state the principle in the *De substantia orbis*, though he does say something in chapter 1 that directly entails it. He does this in the context of a brief discussion of the two types of change distinguished by Aristotle. Averroes notes that both types of change have in common the fact that each requires a “substrate receiving the change.” He then adds that it is also necessary that the being of the thing or quality produced by change be preceded by non-being, for “only what is not comes to be.”<sup>23</sup> It follows from the first of these statements that there can be no change *ex nihilo*, and while the second statement does talk about non-being preceding being, it is clear from the first statement that only “relative” non-being is intended, and not the absolute non-being presupposed by creation.

In conclusion, the systematic reference in all twelve questions to “that book” offers strong evidence that all questions were indeed part of the same sustained effort to think through issues raised either directly or indirectly by the *De substantia orbis*. Cross-references within those questions

<sup>21</sup> Maino de Maineri, (Questio utrum in eadem portione materie possint esse plures forme substantiales), Florence, Biblioteca Nazionale (C.S.) J.3.6, fol. 103rb.

<sup>22</sup> Averroes, *De substantia orbis* 1 (ed. Juntina, vol. IX, fol. 3vKL): “Si enim haberet formam, nullam aliam reciperet, nisi illa destructa: unum enim subiectum habere plusquam unam formam est impossibile.”

<sup>23</sup> Ibid. (ed. Juntina, vol. IX, fol. 3vI): “Est enim commune his duabus habere unum subiectum, recipiens transmutationem. Amplius necessarium est non esse praecedere esse rei genitae et corruptibilis, et omnino inhaere eius, quod fit non enim fit nisi illud quod non est.”

indicate that at least three of them (5, 6, and 9) are by the same author. What about the other questions? Is there any evidence to show that Maino de Maineri is the author of some or all of them? In his 1959 *Manuscripta* article, Ermatinger had tentatively suggested that the twelve *questiones* might be by Radulfus Brito.<sup>24</sup> Ermatinger remarked that there existed strong similarities between sections of the Florence manuscript and passages from a *principium* to a series of questions on book 3 of the *De anima* in Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana Vat. lat. 845 (though only the *principium* is found in the codex), which he thought at the time were also the work of Radulfus. In his 1969 article,<sup>25</sup> however, Ermatinger found the same *principium* together with the questions in Bologna, Biblioteca Universitaria 1625, and noted that their author was identified in the explicit of that codex by a fourteenth-century hand as “m. de m.”<sup>26</sup> Further research conducted by Ermatinger over the next few years (the detailed results of which were never published) ultimately led him to the conclusion that the author of the Florence questions was none other than Maino de Maineri. Thus, we read in the *abstract* of a presentation Ermatinger delivered at the Second Saint Louis Conference on Manuscript Studies, in 1975, that the *Tractatus de intentionibus secundis*, extant in Seville, Biblioteca Capitular y Colombina 5.6.12, which is explicitly attributed to one Maynus de Maynis in the *incipit*, “contained references identifying [Maino] as the author of the anonymous questions on the *De substantia orbis* of Averroes in Florence, Bibli. Naz. Centr. MS Conventi Soppressi I.III.6.”<sup>27</sup> One such reference is to be found on fol. 24v of the Seville manuscript, where Maino refers his readers to question 10 of the commentary on the *De substantia orbis*:

[Q]uod ad presens non pertinet declarare, sed memini declaravisse in meis questionibus de substantia orbis questione an substantia materialis

<sup>24</sup> Ermatinger, “Notes on Some Early Fourteenth Century Scholastic Philosophers,” 167.

<sup>25</sup> See n. 2 above.

<sup>26</sup> Ermatinger, “John of Jandun in His Relations with Arts Masters and Theologians,” 1177 n. 16.

<sup>27</sup> Charles Ermatinger, “Maino de’ Maineri in His Still Unstudied Role as Philosopher in Early XIVth Century Paris,” *Manuscripta* 20 (1976): 8–9. The attribution reads “Incipit tractatus de intentionibus secundis compositus in studio parisiensi per magistrum Maynum de Maynis.”

sit per se divisibilis in partes eiusdem rationis, et ideo qui super isto scire desiderat perfectius quod intelligi questionem illam studeat diligenter.

Maino is therefore the author of question 10. But if we assume that the Bologna questions on book 3 of the *De anima* are also by Maino—after all, how many other arts masters of the time can we think of whose initials were “m. de m.”?<sup>28</sup>—then we can identify Maino as the author of two further questions in the Florence manuscript, namely questions 7 and 8, for each contains an explicit reference to the questions on the *De anima*. Thus, in question 7, after having mentioned that according to some commentators of Aristotle the possible intellect must be “a certain actuality,” our author explains that he thinks this reading of Aristotle is incorrect “as I explained in my questions on book 3 of the *De anima*”:

Ad tertium dubium dico quod non sequitur quod materia sit idem quod intellectus, quoniam materia est potentia in genere sensibilibum et intellectus possibilis est potentia in genere intelligibilium. Unde secundum multos intellectus possibilis est quidam actus in se quamvis sit potentia ad species rerum materialium. Hoc tamen non puto fuisse intentionem Commentatoris nec Aristotelis, ut declaravi in meis questionibus tertii *De anima*.<sup>29</sup>

The explanation is found in question 4, “Utrum ad hoc ut intellectus omnia intelligat oportet ut sit immixtus.” There Maino contrasts Aristotle’s position regarding the “material” intellect’s relation to the body with that of Alexander of Aphrodisias:

[U]t visum fuit superius opinatus fuit Alexander quod intellectus possibilis esset una formarum materialium, et ex hoc statim sequitur quod non sit pura potentia. Volebat igitur Alexander quod intellectus noster possibilis non esset denudatus omnibus formis materialibus, cuius tamen oppositum vult Aristotelis. Et consequenter sue positioni (sc. positioni Alexandri) habebat ponere quod intellectus possibilis esset in se quidem

<sup>28</sup> One also finds in the Bologna manuscript a detailed refutation of James of Viterbo’s doctrine of *idoneitates*, the psychological counterpart of seminal reasons. Of course, this fact cannot count as proof that the questions on book 3 of the *De anima* are by the same author, but it shows, if we do accept that they are by Maino, that he devoted careful attention to the works of James.

<sup>29</sup> Maino de Maineri, (Questio utrum materia sit ens), Florence, Biblioteca Nazionale (C.S.) J.3.6, fol. 99va.

actus et non esset de genere potentie, cuius tamen oppositum videtur velle Aristotelis.<sup>30</sup>

And in question 8 of the Florence manuscript, in the context of a discussion focusing on how the species of a composite can direct (*ducere*) the intellect to the cognition of matter, Maino indicates that a solution to this and related problems is to be found in his questions on book 3 of the *De anima*; he even tells us where to find that solution, namely in the question regarding the “cognition of non being and being:”

[Q]uid igitur determinat speciem compositi ad hoc ut ducat magis in cognitionem materie quam compositi in quocumque instanti cum tamen ipsa ex sui natura sit nata ducere in cognitionem compositi primo difficile videtur. Vide solutionem istorum dubiorum in meis questionibus tertii de anima, et est in illa questione de intellectione non entis et privationis, nam sicut loquebar de specie ⟨entis⟩ respectu cognitionis entis et non entis, sic suo modo loquor de specie compositi respectu cognitionis compositi et materie ipsius.<sup>31</sup>

It turns out that we find just such a question in the *questiones* on *De anima* 3.15. It is entitled “Utrum privatio vel non ens intelligantur et quomodo intelligantur,” and Maino does provide the explanation in question:

Dicam ergo (...) quod species intelligibilis ducit intellectum nostrum in cognitionem entis et non entis secundum quem⟨dam⟩ ordinem, quoniam primo ducit in cognitionem entis et ex consequenti et secundo ducit in cognitionem non entis.<sup>32</sup>

All we need now in order to ascribe the authorship of question 6 confidently to Maino is a clear reference in any of questions 7, 8, or 10 to any of questions 5, 6 or 9—since each set of three is by the same author. We find just such a reference at the beginning of question 7 on whether matter is a being. The author starts out by reporting various arguments to the effect that matter is not a being, including Plato’s, who identifies matter and privation. Before stating his answer, the author remarks:

<sup>30</sup> Maino de Maineri, ⟨Questio utrum ad hoc ut intellectus omnia intelligat oportet ut sit immixtus⟩, Bologna, Biblioteca Universitaria 1625, fol. 147rb.

<sup>31</sup> Maino de Maineri, ⟨Questio utrum materia sit intelligibilis per se⟩, Florence, Biblioteca Nazionale (C.S.) J.3.6, fol. 100rb.

<sup>32</sup> Maino de Maineri, ⟨Questio utrum privatio vel non ens intelligantur et quomodo intelligantur⟩, Bologna, Biblioteca Universitaria 1625, fol. 163vb.

Opinio Platonis quod materia et privatio sunt idem fuit superius impro-  
bata, ideo transeo.<sup>33</sup>

Indeed, Plato's thesis that matter and privation are identical was disproved in question 6 (see <32> to <36> in the edition). In the four cases where our author uses the locatives "supra," "superius" or the past tense ("visum fuit") to indicate that a particular point has already been discussed previously, the reference has been found in an earlier question. This indicates not only that the same author wrote them, but that the order in which the questions are recorded in the Florence manuscript corresponds to the order in which they were intended by their author. If we agree that this is so, then we have the desired connection between questions 7, 8, 10 and 5, 6, and 9. We can safely conclude that they are by Maino de Maineri, including question 6, and that they make up or are part of a question-commentary on the *De substantia orbis*. Although the purpose of this introduction has been to establish that question 6 is by Maino and that the literary genre of the work of which question 6 is a part is indeed a question-commentary to the *De substantia orbis*, the question naturally arises whether questions 1 to 4, 11 and 12 are also part of it.<sup>34</sup> While I

<sup>33</sup> Maino de Maineri, <Questio utrum materia sit ens>, Florence, Biblioteca Nazionale (C.S.) J.3.6, fol. 99ra.

<sup>34</sup> It is worth mentioning that Maino appears to stand alone amongst thirteenth- and fourteenth-century commentators of the *De substantia orbis* in including a question on whether something can come to be out of nothing. The usual locus for discussing this issue for the scholastics was a commentary on Aristotle's *Physics*, book 1, or a commentary on the *De generatione et corruptione*, not the *De substantia orbis*. The number of fourteenth-century masters who devoted a question to this topic in their commentaries of *Physics*, book 1 is extensive; see Edith Sylla's "Introduction" to John Buridan, *Quaestiones super octo libros Physicorum Aristotelis (secundum ultimam lecturam)*, ed. Michiel Streijger and Paul J. J. M. Bakker (Leiden and Boston, 2015), cxviii–cxix for examples. For one prominent treatment of the question in commentaries on the *De generatione*, see Aegidius Aurelianensis, *Quaestiones super "De generatione et corruptione"*, ed. Zdzisław Kuksewicz, Bochumer Studien zur Philosophie 18 (Amsterdam and Philadelphia, 1993), 41–47. By contrast, I know of no commentary on the *De substantia orbis* that contains such a question. I have consulted the following commentaries and found no question singly devoted to the issue of whether something can come from nothing: Alvaro of Toledo, *Commentario al "de substantia orbis"*, ed. M. Alonso, S.J. (Madrid, 1941); Ferrandus of Spain, *Expositio et questiones in librum Averrois De substantia orbis*, Bologna, Biblioteca Universitaria 1625, fols. 14v–28r; John of Jandun [Ioannes de Ianduno (Jandunus), *In libris Aristotelis De Caelo et Mundo . . . , quibus adiecimus Averrois sermonem de*

have found no cross-references that would allow us to assert this categorically, a conjunction of factors speaks in favour of the common authorship of all twelve questions. These are the undeniable similarity of style throughout the commentary (admittedly a weak argument on its own), the complementarity of the questions (no two of which deal with the same topic), and, most importantly, the doctrinal unity and coherence of the work. One point that comes out very clearly from the commentary is its author's hostility to the idea of a real multiplicity of potential or actual forms in matter. That there can be no real multiplicity of potential forms in matter is of course what Maino seeks to establish through his discussion of Anaxagoras and James of Viterbo in question 6; that there can be no real multiplicity of *actualized* forms in matter is what he sets out to demonstrate in the longest of his *questiones*, question 12. Of course, these are two separate issues. One could argue that a philosopher may consistently subscribe to the theory of the plurality of actualized forms while denying the plurality of potential forms. But in the very question 6 where he rebuts James of Viterbo, Maino notes in passing (in <62>) that he also rejects the plurality of (actualized) forms in matter:

Amplius, aut adveniente forma substantiali corrumpetur precedens in materia, aut non. Si non, ergo plures forme substantiales simul erunt in materia, quod puto falsum.

One would have liked Maino here to add “ut videbitur infra,” but question 12 had not yet been written, so there was no reason for him to add these words. Indeed, in all the cases I have found where Maino refers to other questions in the *liber*, the reference has always been to an earlier question, not a later one. All in all, then, it seems safe to conclude that our twelve questions make up a question-commentary on the *De substantia orbis* and that they are by Maino de Maineri.

*Substantia Orbis, cum eiusdem Ioanni commentario ac questionibus*, (Venice, 1552), fols. 33r–66v; Walter Burley, *Expositio de substantia orbis*, ed. Marta Vittorini, *Medioevo* 36 (2011): 301–80 (the edition starts on 319); Henry Totting de Oyta, *Questiones et determinaciones notabiles circa de substantia orbis*, Erfurt, Bibliotheca Amploniana 2° 297, fols. 149ra–158rb; Theodoric of Magdeburg, *Quaestiones super “De substantia orbis,”* ed. Zdzisław Kuksewicz (Wrocław, 1985); Anonymous, Erfurt, Bibliotheca Amploniana 2° 297, fols. 187r–193r; and Pseudo-Ferrandus of Spain, Erfurt, Bibliotheca Amploniana 2° 346, fols. 89va–112rb.

There remains to say something about the date of composition of our commentary. The only one of the twelve questions in the Florence manuscript that can be dated with any precision is question 12, which we know must have been written between 1315 and 1317. We can infer this from our knowledge of two facts. The first fact is that Maino discusses and rebuts the views of an anonymous proponent of a real distinction between specific and generic forms that were shown to be the same as those found in a *questio* on the plurality of forms by John of Jandun (extant in Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana Vat. lat. 6768, fols. 227ra–230va) that cannot have been written before the early months of 1315.<sup>35</sup> The second fact is that, as Ermatinger established in his 1969 article, John of Jandun responded to Maino's criticisms in question 12 in a *second* question on the plurality of forms extant in Reims, Bibliothèque de la ville 493, fol. 166va, the *explicit* of which states that it had been completed on January 23, 1317.<sup>36</sup> Maino's question 12 must therefore have been penned sometime between those two dates. Of course, this tells us nothing about the dating of the other *questiones*. Maino could have delayed the completion of the commentary; there are, after all, many examples of works by scholastics that were written and rewritten over a course of years, especially works used for teaching purposes. But this, I submit, would have been unusual for a commentary of this nature, which represents a concentrated, one-time effort to come to terms with a cluster of topics raised by a specific work. There is good reason to believe that all twelve questions date from between 1315 and 1317. I now turn to the structure of our *questio* 6.

<sup>35</sup> That the views discussed by Maino are those defended by John in the Vat. lat. *quaestio*, was established by Ermatinger in his 1959 article (see "Notes on Some Early Fourteenth Century Scholastic Philosophers," 161). That John could not have disputed this *questio* before early 1315 follows from the fact, pointed out by Kuksewicz (see his "Maino of Milan," 338 n. 7), that John announced on 21 December 1314 that he would dispute a question on the plurality of forms. This *questio* was later incorporated into the printed editions of John's question-commentary on Aristotle's *Physics*, but it is an independent question. See Stuart MacClintock, *Perversity and Error: Studies on the "Averroist" John of Jandun* (Bloomington, Ind., 1956), 119.

<sup>36</sup> Ermatinger, "John of Jandun in his Relations," 1175.



## II

Our *questio* has the usual structure of a medieval disputation: arguments in favour of the view that something can be made out of nothing (<1> to <24>); arguments against (actually, Maino mentions only one, <25>); the author's solution (<26> to <94>), and his answers to the initial arguments (<95> to <140>). Although I will briefly talk about the replies to the questions, I will devote most of this introduction to Maino's solution.

The solution can be subdivided into three parts. The first two are clearly inspired by Averroes's discussion in his Commentary on *Metaphysics*, book 12.<sup>37</sup> From <26> to <50>, Maino presents and discusses the two "extreme" views mentioned above—the same two as those identified by Averroes in his Commentary—namely the proponents of the hiddenness of forms, and the ex nihilists. From <51> to <63> Maino presents what he holds to be the correct answer to the question at hand, namely Aristotle's who occupies the middle-of-the-road position, again following Averroes—although Averroes considers other "moderate" positions that Maino leaves out. The rebuttal of James of Viterbo follows in <64> to <94>, and it, of course, is Maino's personal contribution to the discussion. Since I will examine Maino's discussion of James in the next section, I will here provide an overview of only the first two parts of the solution.

Maino presents the two "extreme" views in <26> and <27>, and discusses the first—that of Anaxagoras—in <28> and <29>. According to Anaxagoras's so-called "hiddenness of forms" theory, all forms are present "occultly" in every portion of matter; the actualized form is only the manifesting of the pre-existing form.

Maino formulates two objections against the position. First, since infinitely many forms are capable of being generated out of a given portion of matter, it follows that the number of forms existing *in* each portion of matter has to be infinite. Since those infinitely many forms pre-exist eternally in matter, that means that they are present in matter simultaneously, violating Aristotle's and Averroes's prohibition against simultaneous infinities.<sup>38</sup>

<sup>37</sup> Averroes, *In XII Metaph*, comm. 18 (ed. Juntina, vol. VIII, fols. 304rE–305vI).

<sup>38</sup> The idea that there can be no simultaneous infinities is merely hinted at by Aristotle in *Metaphysics* 2.2 (994a2), where he declares that the sequence of causes of things cannot be infinite "in a straight line" (εις εὐθυωρίαν). εις εὐθυωρίαν is rendered literally by Michael Scotus and William of Moerbeke as "in directum." The idea that the sort of infinity Aristotle means to rule out by the expression "εις εὐθυωρίαν" is

We will see in the next section that Maino applies a similar argument to James's "incomplete actualities." Second, Maino thinks that Anaxagoras cannot escape the following dilemma (<29>): either something is educed from the potency of matter, or nothing is. If something, then something is generated that did not pre-exist; if nothing is educed—which is what Anaxagoras holds—then nothing has been generated, and this, all agree, is clearly an absurdity.

Maino's discussion of the other extreme—the *ex nihilo* view (<30> to <50>)—is more involved. He distinguishes two varieties of it: Plato's, and that of the "three Laws." He notes however that Plato's version is not a *bona fide ex nihilism*, for Plato in fact believed that everything comes from matter. But because he is held to have believed that matter was a pure privation, matter was viewed in this particular sense of the word as a kind of non-being. Quite other is the case of the "three Laws." To say that something is made out of nothing in this sense is to say that it is made "not out of something." The *ex* in *ex nihilo* is to be understood neither as referring to a natural order (what is produced does not come from nothing in the way in which old age comes "out of" [*ex*] youth), nor to a temporal order (what is produced does not come after nothingness) (<36>). Maino acknowledges that "production" (*productio*) out of nothing occurred at a finite distance in the past (*de novo*) according to faith, so in that sense it occurred after nothing.<sup>39</sup> Still, even the faithful (*fideles*) must recognize that what is produced *ex nihilo* at a finite distance in the past *could* have been so produced *ab eterno* (<37>). Switching from talk of eternal production to eternal creation, Maino then asserts in <39> that proponents of eternal creation (*creatio*) are faced with a difficult task, as the very idea of creation *ab eterno* appears to be contradictory. He lists arguments that have been used to show this, in <40>, <41>, and <42>. But then, reverting

that of simultaneously existing infinite multitudes (causes, in this case), however, is explicitly stated by Averroes, who glosses the passage as follows: "Et intendit per sensum rectitudinem, ut cause sint existentes insimul, quasi in una linea recta" (Averroes, *In VIII Metaph.*, comm. 5 [vol. VIII, fol. 30I]).

<sup>39</sup> Maino's clearest statement that he accepts the Christian doctrine of creation occurs in his Questions on the *De anima*, Bologna, Biblioteca Universitaria 1625, fol. 146ra: "Et tamen diligenter notandum circa dicta quod ego non laboravi usque modo nisi ad probandum quod anima intellectiva non sit generata nisi secundum quod generatum capitur in philosophia Aristotelis. Non intendo negare creationem. Absit. Immo si aliquas rationes fecissem hoc probantes, reputo eas sophisticas."

once again to the more neutral language of “production,” Maino exclaims in <43> that he himself sees no difficulty with the view that something eternal can be produced by an efficient cause *ab eterno*. For it is certain that Aristotle proved in *Physics* 8 that “first motion” is eternal and that it has an eternal efficient cause (<43>). This is not to say that Maino thinks all eternal things have an eternal efficient cause. Some do, and some do not. What the ones that do have in common is that they are accidents, or, more precisely, “successive,” as opposed to “permanent,” accidents (<46>), where a permanent accident is one that is wholly existent at every moment at which it exists. Maino’s contention, then, is that only eternal successive accidents, or, as he also calls them, accidents “in becoming” (*in fieri*), have an eternal efficient cause. By contrast, no eternal permanent accident and no eternal substance—since all substances are permanent beings (<46>)—have an eternal efficient cause (<45> and <46>). The rest of the section to <50> is devoted to defending this position against criticisms.

What now of Maino’s solution proper? In keeping with the practice of arts masters, Maino announces in <51> that he will explain what Aristotle and his Commentator would have answered to the question—rather than present his personal views.<sup>40</sup> And according to Maino, both Aristotle and Averroes would have denied that something can come from nothing (<51>). Maino constructs a series of arguments based on texts drawn from both authors in order to establish this conclusion (<51> to <56>). It is important to note, however, that Maino goes somewhat further than some of his contemporaries in his defense of this conclusion. In <38> Maino had noted that according to some creationists (*isti*), creation is to be understood not as a motion or transmutation, i.e., physical change, but rather as a “simple emanation.” The phrase “simple emanation” was coined by Peter of Auvergne, who used it in his questions on the *Metaphysics* as a description of creative causality, in contradistinction to natural causality.<sup>41</sup> But it was al-

<sup>40</sup> Maino’s attitude to Averroes is particularly reverential, as can be seen from <112> below. After noting that some authors accused Averroes of erring on the matter of whether the First cause has infinite force (*vigor*), Maino writes, “[N]on audeo Commentatorem negare sic expresse.”

<sup>41</sup> William Dunphy, “Two Texts of Peter of Auvergne on a Twofold Efficient Cause,” *Mediaeval Studies* 26 (1964): 287–301, at 291. Peter actually writes “. . . per simplicem educationem et emanationem.” For commentary on the significance and the sources, largely Avicennian, of Peter’s doctrine, see Étienne Gilson, “Notes pour

so employed by Maino's "socius" John of Jandun in a question on whether something can come from nothing in his *Questiones* on Aristotle's *Physics*. Jandun starts out by providing a wealth of arguments against, giving pride of place to Averroes's "beautiful argument" (*pulchra ratio*) according to which something's coming from nothing would require something to be changed without any change having occurred. Nevertheless, he ultimately concludes that one must absolutely hold with Christian faith that God made everything out of nothing, but he notes that the change involved in creation is to be understood as a "simple emanation."<sup>42</sup> Jandun then points out that philosophers were ignorant of this modality of change, since it cannot be observed or inferred from the senses, but can only be known through revelation and the authority of the sacred authors. Thus, the arguments of Aristotle and Averroes apply only to natural change, not to simple emanation.

They (sc. Aristotle and Averroes) prove sufficiently that it is absolutely impossible for something to be produced from nothing by a production that is change or natural transmutation. By a production that is creation and (is) supernatural, however, this is well possible.<sup>43</sup>

Turning now to Maino, we see that while he agrees with John of Jandun that nothing can come from nothing in the order of transmutative change (<51> to <56>), he thinks that the same holds true in the case of emanative change (<58> to <61>). Thus, after recalling Aristotle's principle that to every active power there must correspond a passive one, Maino explains that this principle is true "whether (the power acts) through motion or transmutation, or through simple emanation"; either way, he asserts, "never will anything come from nothing (<58>)."<sup>44</sup> Nor does Maino think much of the attempt by some creationists (*isti*) to show that Aristotle's principle

l'histoire de la cause efficiente," *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Âge* 37 (1962): 7–31; as well as William Dunphy, "On the Twofold Efficient Cause," *Mediaeval Studies* 28 (1966): 1–21.

<sup>42</sup> John of Jandun, *Quaestiones in libros physicorum Aristotelis* (Venice, 1488), fol. 23ra.

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*: "Probant enim sufficienter quod ex nihilo simpliciter non possit aliquid produci productione que est motus et transmutatio naturalis. Sed productione que est creatio et supernaturalis bene potest."

<sup>44</sup> Maino also critiques the concept of simple emanation in his questions on book 3 of the *De anima*. See Maino de Maineri, (Questio utrum anima intellectiva sit forma substantialis corporis), Bologna, Biblioteca Universitaria 1625, fol. 149ra.

is compatible with *ex nihilo* production ((59)). These authors—Maino now appears to be targeting Henry of Ghent—had distinguished between subjective passive power (i.e., existing *extra mentem*) and objective passive power (existing only in the mind), and claimed that while all natural active powers require a corresponding passive subjective power, a creative cause requires only an objective passive power.<sup>45</sup> Maino dismisses this attempt, however, arguing ((60)) that either the objective passive power stems from the agent, in which case it is identical with it, or else it stems from the thing to be produced, in which case, by hypothesis, it is nothing, and so nothing will be the passive power corresponding to God's active power, an obvious absurdity. It follows, then, according to Maino, that nothing can come from nothing in any of the ways recognized by philosophers or theologians. Of course, Maino, as we saw, assures us that he accepts the teaching of faith, and hence, *creatio ex nihilo*. Unlike Jandun, however, he refrains from giving us any indications of *how* creation from nothing is to be conceived.

Since all things in nature come from something pre-existing, it will be all the more important to understand correctly what that something is. That something, of course, is prime matter, and prime matter, Maino insists, is and always remains a *pure potency* ((62)). When a new form comes to be, the preceding one corrupts. Otherwise we would have a plurality of substantial forms in matter, something Maino holds to be impossible. One philosopher who held that matter does contain a plurality of forms was Anaxagoras, whose theory Maino has already disposed of (in (28) and (29)); indeed, Anaxagoras thought that matter contained an infinity of forms. But Maino signals that there is “another, newer, opinion which is in some way similar to the opinion of Anaxagoras ((64)),” namely James of Viterbo's.<sup>46</sup>

<sup>45</sup> Henry of Ghent, *Quodl.* VIII, q. 3 (Paris: Badius, 1518), fol. 304vR: “Quia non est potentia activa cui non respondet potentia passiva dicendum quod verum est vel obiective vel subiective. Utroque modo respectu agentis naturalis quod nihil agit nisi ex subiecta materia, obiective solum respectu agentis supernaturalis quod agit ex nullo subiecto. Non agit tamen nisi quod est natura et essentia aliqua potens esse obiectum et terminus factionis divinae in cuius essentia est ista potentia essentialiter in quantum essentia cuiuslibet creaturae in quantum est de se, est possibile esse et non esse.”

<sup>46</sup> Maino voices the same complaint—namely that James's theories do not differ from Anaxagoras's—in his questions on book 3 of the *De anima*, Bologna, Biblioteca Universitaria 1625, fol. 154va: “Amplius videtur confiteri opinionem Anaxagore qui ponebat inchoationes formarum. Et idem ponit ille doctor, nec differt ab opinione

Before turning our attention to Maino's discussion of James, a word must be said about the answers to the arguments (<95> to <140>). The focus in the answers is on rebutting the view that there existed philosophical arguments in favor of *ex nihilo* production. One standard philosophical argument ran as follows: a being that has infinite power can make something out of nothing; but Aristotle's and Averroes's prime mover is just such an agent, since it appears to follow from *Physics* 8.10 that the prime mover has infinite force (*vigor*); hence the prime mover can make something out of nothing. But Maino is adamant that neither Aristotle nor Averroes believed that the prime mover has infinite force; they only believed that the prime mover has the power to make itself exist for infinite duration (<98> to <100>).<sup>47</sup> John of Jandun agreed with Maino on this point, but then added that he believed from faith that God did have infinite power.<sup>48</sup> It is interesting to note that one does not find an equivalent *confessio fidei* in regard to divine power in Maino, as we can gather from the following passage of his questions on book 3 of the *De anima*:

Arguit enim Aristotelis quod primum non sit virtus in magnitudine infinita, quia non est illa dare, nec in magnitudine finita, quia virtus infinita, ut ait, non potest esse in magnitudine finita. Immo manifestum est quod non intellexit de virtute infinita {146va} in vigore, nam illud non creditur fuisse de intentione Aristotelis quod primum principium sit [in] infinitum in vigore, nam tunc moveret in instanti, ut patet consideranti, etiam quia hoc non potest investigari a philosopho naturali per aliquid prius nec per aliquid posterius. Intellexit igitur de infinitate durationis quod virtus infinita duratione non potest esse in magnitudine terminata.<sup>49</sup>

Maino's position is that since the matter of God's infinite power cannot be investigated by natural reason by the natural philosopher, "it ought not to be posited by him." He appears to say no more on the topic.

Platonis, nisi quod Plato ponebat animam preexistere omnia scientem."

<sup>47</sup> Maino expresses the same view in the questions on book 3 of the *De anima*, Bologna, Biblioteca Universitaria 1625, fol. 146rb–va.

<sup>48</sup> John of Jandun, *Quaestiones in libros Physicorum* (Venice, 1488), fol. 147ra: "Et sic diceret Aristoteles et Commentator ut mihi videtur. Sed secundum fidem et veritatem dico quod primum principium quod est deus, sive moveat immediate active sive non, est infiniti vigoris simpliciter. Et hoc non probo aliqua ratione, quia necque scio neque puto possibile secundum principia naturalia, sed sola fide sic assero et simpliciter confiteor."

<sup>49</sup> Maino de Maineri, Bologna, Biblioteca Universitaria 1625, fol. 146rb.

## III

As all of Maino's references to James of Viterbo's are to the latter's *Quodlibet* II, q. 5, dating from 1294, which asks whether there are seminal reasons in matter, it will be important, before examining Maino's case against James, to outline briefly James's doctrine of seminal ideas in *Quodl.* II, as well as to characterize the problem it was intended to resolve. There was widespread agreement among scholastics that it is composites that come to be, not the substantial form, nor, *a fortiori*, the matter which underlies change but is itself not subject to change.<sup>50</sup> This followed from their view that it is composites, secondary substances, that exist *per se*, not forms. To the extent that forms could be said to exist, it was only *per accidens*. The question "Where does the form come from?" was thus not considered to be a legitimate question; and the belief that it was necessary to provide an account of its provenance to allay the fear that forms might "come from nothing" was viewed as misguided. The only legitimate concern was showing that *composites* did not come from nothing; and they did not, according to the standard view of these same authors, since composites were seen as stemming from the potency of matter. This standard view was felicitously captured by Godfrey of Fontaines in one of his unedited disputed questions:

The form *per se* does not come to be because it does not have being *per se*; rather, only the composite (has being *per se*), and therefore only the composite comes to be *per se* and that composite does not come from nothing, at least from the point of view of the natural agent; therefore it comes from something. Nor must we enquire where the form comes from or how it comes to be, for *per se* it does not come to be; rather, we must enquire how that comes to be to whose character of being form belongs. Indeed, if we wanted to say that the form comes to be out of another sub-

<sup>50</sup> Thomas Aquinas, *De potentia* 3.8 resp.; Siger of Brabant, *Quaestiones in Metaphysicam* 7.8 (ed. Armand Maurer, [Louvain-la-Neuve, 1983], 457); Giles of Rome, *In secundum librum Sententiarum* 18.2 (Venice, 1581), 82; Godfrey of Fontaines, (Questio utrum in subiecto virtutis sit aliqua aptitudo quae transmutetur in actualitatem virtutis ita quod ipsamet fiat virtus completa), Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana Borghese 122, fol. 165va, and Bruges, Public Library 491, fol. 233ra; Henry of Ghent, *Quodl.* IV, q. 14 (ed. Gordon A. Wilson and Girard J. Etzkorn, *Henrici de Gandavo Opera omnia* 8 [Leuven, 2011]).

strate than the composite does, then we would be seeking for the form itself a per se making that is distinct from the making of the composite.<sup>51</sup>

Not all authors, however, agreed with this view. One of those who did not was James of Viterbo. While he agreed that it is composites that come to be, he disagreed that this meant that there was no need to account for the provenance of the form.

[I]t is not enough to say that a form is not from nothing because it is not the form but rather the composite that comes to be. For even though the form per se does not come to be just as it does not exist per se, but rather it comes to be in matter, which is for a composite to come to be; nevertheless, given that it is a thing and that it is a thing that is other than matter, one needs to determine whence it derives its being. For it does not derive the form from matter, which is different from it, nor does it derive it from the agent, for the agent does not induce anything from without, nor does it cause the form.<sup>52</sup>

James believed that there was only one possible answer to the problem of the provenance of the form, namely that it pre-existed in matter. For otherwise one was left with two equally unappealing options: one was to suppose that the form was induced from without by a giver of forms (which James likened to creation), the other was to say that it came from nothing:

<sup>51</sup> Godfrey of Fontaines, 〈*Questio utrum in subiecto virtutis sit aliqua aptitudo quae transmutetur in actualitatem virtutis ita quod ipsamet fiat virtus completa*〉, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Borghese 122, fol. 165va; Bruges, Public Library, 491, fol. 233ra: “[F]orma non fit per se, quia nec habet esse per se sed solum compositum et ideo solum compositum fit per se et hoc compositum non fit ex nihilo, saltem ab agente naturali; ergo fit ex aliquo. Nec debemus querere ex quo forma fit vel quomodo fit, quia non fit per se, sed debemus querere quomodo illud fit de cuius ratione essendi est forma, immo si vellemus dicere quod forma fiat ex alio subiecto quam compositum, tunc quereremus ipsi forme factionem per se aliam a factione compositi.”

<sup>52</sup> James of Viterbo, *Quodl.* II, q. 5 (ed. Ypma, 75.545–76.569): “Item non sufficit dicere quod non est forma de nihilo, quia non fit forma, sed fit compositum. Licet enim non fiat forma per se, sicut non existit per se, sed fiat in materia, quod est fieri compositum, tamen ex quo res aliqua est et alia res a materia, oportet assignare unde habet suam entitatem. Non enim habet eam a materia, quae est ab ea diversa, nec habet eam ab agente, quia agens nihil inducit ab extra, nec causat eam.”



[U]nless one assumes that the form pre-exists in matter in the aforementioned way, it seems to follow necessarily that the form is induced from without, as the proponents of the giver of forms stated; and thus, the form will receive its being through creation.<sup>53</sup>

The challenge for James was how to conceive of such a pre-existing form. He knew that he could not make it simply identical to the form in the actualized composite, for if they were strictly identical, then no change had occurred. At the same time, James couldn't make this pre-existing form a *part* of the actualized form, for he agreed with Aristotle that forms have no parts.<sup>54</sup> Nor, finally, could he make it an attenuated or diminished version of the full-fledged form since, again following Aristotle, he agreed with most scholastics that substantial forms were not susceptible to increase or decrease.<sup>55</sup> James's solution was to posit in matter what he called "beginnings of forms" (*inchoationes formae*), which he also called "incomplete actualities," "seminal reasons," or "aptitudes." In one respect the *inchoatio formae* was the same as the full-blown form, but in another respect it differed from it in the way imperfection differs from perfection or, as James would also say, it differed from it *modally*:

That such a beginning of form should be posited can be shown in many ways. First, from the words of the Commentator in his commentary on book 8 of the *Metaphysics*, where he writes as follows about the generation of the composite, which is a change from potency to act: "There is something that is first in potency and is then transferred from potency to act. The transfer does not bestow multitude on it but rather perfection in being." From these words one sees clearly that it is not because something is changed from potency to act by an agent that some new thing is acquired; rather, only a new mode of being (is acquired). If some new thing were acquired, then the transfer from potency to act would yield

<sup>53</sup> Ibid. (ed. Ypma, 75.545–48): "Nam, nisi ponatur quod forma praeexistat in materia modo iam dicto, necessario videtur sequi quod in generatione inducatur forma ab extra, sicut dixerunt ponentes datorem formarum; et ita forma habebit esse per creationem."

<sup>54</sup> The position is regularly attributed to Aristotle by the scholastics and can be inferred from what he says, but the statement is found in as many words ("Forma est res indivisibilis") in Averroes. See *In VI Phys.*, comm. 45 (fol. 274L) See also Jacqueline Hamesse, *Les Auctoritates Aristotelis*, Philosophes Médiévaux 17 (Louvain and Paris, 1974), 154 (no. 179).

<sup>55</sup> See Aristotle, *Categories* 5 (3b33–34).

multitude, for once the substantial change was completed, there would be more things than before it.<sup>56</sup>

Although I will not go into the detail of his arguments, James was adamant that potential forms were neither parts of full-fledged forms nor susceptible to increase or decrease.<sup>57</sup> In order to help characterize the non-standard nature of potential modes, he enlisted the help of Aristotle's theory of the four species of quality in *Categories*, chapter 8, and Simplicius's commentary thereto.<sup>58</sup> He explained that while substantial forms as such fell under the category of substance, substance belonged to the second species of quality from the point of view of its potential mode, and to the first species considered as an actual mode.

[T]he substantial form with respect to the thing to which it refers is in the category of substance; however, with respect to a certain mode, it is in the category of quality. Thus, substantial differences which depend principally on the form are called substantial qualities. Thus, in that way in which the substantial form can be said to pertain to the category of quality, it can be said that the substantial form, considered as an aptitude or in being in potency, pertains to the second species of quality; however, considered as being in act, it pertains more to the first species.<sup>59</sup>

<sup>56</sup> James of Viterbo, *Quodl.* II, q. 5 (ed. Ypma, 72.440–51): “Quod autem ponenda sit talis inchoatio formae, potest multipliciter ostendi. Primo quidem ex verbis Commentatoris, in VIII Metaphysicae, ubi loquens de generatione compositi, quae est transmutatio de potentia in actum, sic dicit: ‘Est igitur aliquod unum, quod primo est in potentia, post transfertur de potentia in actum. Translatio enim eius non largitur ei multitudinem, sed perfectionem in esse.’ Ex quibus verbis evidenter accipitur quod per hoc, quod aliquid transmutatur per agens de potentia in actum, non acquiritur aliqua nova res, sed solum novus essendi modus, Si enim acquireretur res nova, tunc translatio de potentia in actum largiretur multitudinem, quia, transmutatione completa, essent plures res quam ante transmutationem.”

<sup>57</sup> For his argument that a potential form is not a part of the actualized form, see *ibid.* (ed. Ypma, 72.426–33); for his argument that potential forms are not susceptible to intension or remission, see *ibid.* (ed. Ypma, 79.659–76).

<sup>58</sup> See *Simplicii magni doctoris scolia in praedicamenta Aristotelis*, (De qualitate), in Simplicius, *Commentaire sur les Catégories d'Aristote. Traduction de Guillaume de Moerbeke*, ed. Adriaan Pattin, *Corpus Latinum Commentariorum in Aristotelem Graecorum* 5/2 (Leiden, 1975), 332.17–346.21. For the Greek, see *Simplicii in Aristotelis Categorias commentarium*, ed. Karl Kalbfleisch, *Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca* 8 (Berlin, 1907), 242.4–252.20.

<sup>59</sup> James of Viterbo, *Quodl.* II, q. 5 (ed. Ypma, 79.683–94): “Quarta dubitatio est:

Finally, while James agreed with many scholastic authors that the potency of matter was distinct from matter itself, he went further than them in his understanding of this distinction. For James believed that a potential form in matter had to be numerically distinct (*ponit in numerum*) from matter itself. This seemed to him to follow straightforwardly from the fact that form and matter were two things (*res*) in the actualized composite:

Just as form in act is numerically distinct from matter, so that matter and form in act are two things out of which the composite in act is constituted, so the form in potency is numerically distinct from matter, so that matter and form in potency are two things out of which the composite in potency is constituted.<sup>60</sup>

It would be an understatement to say that Maino was not impressed by James's theory. After presenting it in some detail (<64> to <71>), he exclaims (<72>): "Sed illa positio mihi non placet." Maino's understanding of substantial change followed that of such thirteenth-century scholastics as Thomas Aquinas, Siger of Brabant, Giles of Rome, Henry of Ghent, or Godfrey of Fontaines. Like them Maino held that it is composites that come to be, not forms; and like them he believed that one need not worry that the composite might come from nothing, since it stemmed from matter (<93> and <139>). As far as Maino was concerned, James was providing a solution to a spurious problem. But on top of this, that solution itself was beset by insuperable philosophical difficulties, as he would attempt to show in <72> to <83>. Furthermore, despite James's claims that his doctrine aligned with the teachings of Averroes, Maino lengthily shows (<84> to

quia, si potentia importat rem quae est forma, cum talis potentia, quae dicit aptitudinem et praeparationem vel exordium, pertineat ad secundam speciem qualitatis, sequeretur quod forma substantialis sit in praedicamento qualitatis. Quod videtur inconueniens dicere. Ad hoc autem dicendum est quod forma substantialis quantum ad rem quam elicit est in praedicamento substantiae; quantum vero ad quemdam modum, est in praedicamento qualitatis. Unde et differentiae substantiales, quae principaliter sumuntur a forma, dicuntur qualitates quaedam substantiales. Eo igitur modo quo forma substantialis ad praedicamentum qualitatis pertinere potest, dicendum est quod forma substantialis, considerata ut in aptitudine vel in potentia, pertinet ad secundam speciem qualitatis; considerata vero ut in actu, pertinet magis ad primam."

<sup>60</sup> Ibid. (ed. Ypma, 71.403–8): "Sicut autem forma in actu ponit in numerum cum materia, ita quod materia et forma in actu sunt duae res ex quibus constituitur compositum in actu, sic forma in potentia ponit in numerum cum materia, ita quod materia et forma in potentia sunt duae res ex quibus constituitur compositum in potentia."

⟨93⟩) that James had severely misunderstood Averroes. I will now look at the main arguments Maino develops against the three salient features of James's theory I have just sketched: the modal distinction, the assimilation of modes to species of quality, and the existence of numerically distinct potential forms in matter.

To James's contention that forms in potency and in act are different modes of being of the same thing, Maino responds (⟨72⟩) as he believes any good Aristotelian would: by pointing out that those modes must be substances or accidents, since everything that exists is one or the other. He then shows that they cannot be either.<sup>61</sup> For suppose that a particular substance's mode is a substance. What substance could it be? Either that very substance of which it is the mode or a different substance. Both cases lead to problems. The first case is clearly unacceptable, Maino contends, because it entails that something is a mode of itself. The second case is also unacceptable because if we suppose that a particular substance's mode is a *different* substance, then since according to James every substance has a twofold mode of existence—potential and actual—the same question will arise about the modes of this second substance, and so on to infinity. The same argument applies, Maino goes on to add, to the second hypothesis, namely that a substance's mode is an accident: since accidents too have the same twofold mode of being, those modes must be accidents, which in turn will have modes, which will be accidents, and so on to infinity.

Another difficulty Maino finds with James's modal theory (⟨77⟩) has to do with the latter's contention that his theory of incomplete actualities represents the only way of accounting for change without appealing to creation. Maino denies that this is the case. Take the actual mode of some substantial form; that mode either pre-existed in matter or it didn't. If it did, then the very distinction between a potential and an active mode is pointless, and James's solution does not differ from Anaxagoras's; if it did not pre-exist, then it will have been created. So James cannot avoid an appeal to creation after all.

Maino also takes issue with James's identification of actualized forms with the first species of quality, and of potential forms with qualities of the second species. If we were to accept such identifications, he remarks, there

<sup>61</sup> Maino's argument here is very close to the one John of Jandun deploys against the theory that the substantial form that makes this man an animal is the same as, but modally distinct from, the substantial form that makes him a man. See John of Jandun, *Quaestiones super VIII libros physicorum Aristotelis* (Venice, 1551), fol. 100vb.

would be no substantial change, just alteration, which everyone agrees is false. Nor is James at liberty to respond that although the modes are species of quality the things that possess those modes are substances. This won't do, Maino reasons, because by James's own admission a thing becomes actual not because it becomes a substance but because it acquires an actual mode ((74)). This view seems all the more absurd, Maino concludes, since according to Aristotle's analysis in *Physics* VII, chapter 3, motion pertains only to the third species of quality, so-called affective qualities, not to the other three species.

Maino thinks that James's theory that numerically distinct potential forms existing in matter is even more problematic than his modal distinction. For one ((78)), it would entail, as Anaxagoras's theory of *latitudo formarum* had, that an infinite number of things belonging to the genus of substance and other genera would exist *simultaneously* in the same portion of matter. Maino's argument to show that James's theory has this implication is quite ingenious. He points out that according to philosophers an infinite number of substances can be generated out of any given portion of matter. But since according to James it belongs to the nature of matter to contain the incomplete actualities corresponding to all future actualizable forms, that means that those incomplete actualities must, so to speak, "already be there," co-existing in matter. But the problem this poses is that while the set of future generables is a potential infinite, the set of co-existing incomplete actualities would constitute an actual infinite. In fact, Maino goes on to argue, the number of things existing in matter would be "more than infinite"—violating the principle that nothing is greater than the infinite—since to the infinity of co-existing incomplete actualities, one would have to add (assuming infinite past time) the infinite number of things already corrupted in the same portion of matter.<sup>62</sup>

A second problem ((80)) with the thesis that incomplete actualities are numerically distinct from matter is that if the thesis is true, then either

<sup>62</sup> It is to be noted regarding Maino's claim that James's theory entails that the number forms in matter would be "more than infinite," that the same point had already been made by Simplicius in his commentary on the *Physics* in relation to Anaxagoras' view that "everything is in everything," namely that it entailed the existence of "something greater than the infinite" (τι τοῦ ἀπείρου μείζον). See Simplicius, *In Aristotelis Physicorum Libros Quattuor Posteriores Commentaria*, ed. Hermann Diels, *Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca* 10 (Berlin, 1895), 173.1. For commentary, see Richard Sorabji, *Time, Creation and the Continuum* (Chicago, 2006), 211 n. 5.

every generable will be generated, so that that there will be no future contingents, or there will be something idle in nature. Of course, Maino rejects both consequents. That James's theory does entail these consequents Maino proves as follows. According to James every generable pre-exists as an incomplete actuality in matter. Assuming future time is infinite, all those potential forms will eventually be actualized, in which case there will be no future contingents; but if one of those forms is not actualized, then there will be one thing in potency that will never be actualized; that potency will therefore be idle, contradicting Aristotle's claim that there is nothing idle in nature.

Additional problems arise once one realizes that the same forms could pre-exist, as Maino puts it, in "other portions of matter" (<81>). Maino, of course, means "other portions of *space*."<sup>63</sup> But then, if an incomplete actuality pre-exists in matter in one part of space, that same incomplete actuality must exist in every other part of space as well—since matter is the same everywhere. One sees at once to what sorts of difficulties such a position will lead. "Take my reality which is numerically one" Maino instructs us. According to James, that reality will pre-exist in matter; that means that it will pre-exist in every portion of matter, for there is no sufficient reason why it would exist only in one. If it pre-exists in all, then it must either be actualized in all—with the result that there will be an infinity (Maino says only "plurality") of individuals numerically identical to Maino—or not. If it is not actualized in all portions of matter, it is possible that these other potential forms that are identical to mine be actualized in future time, so that after my corruption in this portion of matter, the identical potential form in other portions of matter could come to be, an implication Maino evidently sees as preposterous. Maino concludes <81> by expressing his amazement at the fact that "such a master did not see these difficulties against his position," suggesting that James had been overly "confident in his ingenuity." As far as Maino is concerned, not only has James of Viterbo failed to provide a more plausible version of Anaxagoras's hiddenness of forms theory, but his own theory raises a whole new set of difficulties of which he appears to have been unaware. In Maino's

<sup>63</sup> Maino and James both follow Averroes in holding that prime matter, while inseparable from indeterminate dimensions, is distinct from determinate ones, that is, from extension, so that matter does not strictly speaking have parts.

mind, this just serves to confirm the fundamental truth of Aristotle's account of substantial change.

#### IV

Now that I have presented Maino's objections to James's theory, the question that naturally comes to mind is whether his criticisms are fair. Of the three objections I have examined, it is pretty clear that the first and the third are the most damaging to James's theory of seminal reasons. The first objection is tantamount to saying that there can be no such thing as a mode; if this is so, James's theory collapses. The third argues that if there were seminal reasons as James understands them, an impossibility would ensue, namely that there would be infinitely many of them existing simultaneously; and again, if true, this objection would be fatal to James's theory. Let us look at each in turn briefly.

Maino's strategy in his first objection was to argue that since everything has to be a substance or an accident and James's modes cannot be either, there can be no such thing as modes. The argument crucially relied on the principle "omne ens est vel substantia vel accidens." This is a metaphysical commonplace in the Middle Ages, invoked by philosophers of all stripes, so there seems to be some strength to the objection. Yet at the same time, many scholastics believed that there were features of reality that could not be captured by the substance/accident distinction. Although they did not agree about what those features were, it is interesting to note that a term they often resorted to denote them was the term "mode." One example is the account of the difference between nature and supposit provided by James's confrère Giles of Rome, a problem that elicited considerable interest on the part of the scholastics. At issue, in the words of one commentator, was the nature "of the relationship between an essence or quiddity (humanity), on the one hand, and that which has such a quiddity (a man) on the other."<sup>64</sup> Giles was of the opinion that the distinction was real, but not that it was a distinction of essences, let alone a distinction of concrete things. He argued that when the nature was instantiated in particular properties it acquired a new *mode*, by which the nature really differed

<sup>64</sup> John Wippel, *The Metaphysical Thought of Godfrey of Fontaines* (Washington, D.C., 1981), 227.

from itself qua not instantiated. The supposit was thus really different from the nature, Giles contended, but did “not bespeak a different essence.”<sup>65</sup>

Another example can be found in fourteenth-century debates about the significates of propositions. Since it was agreed that the proper significate of a proposition were not the things to which the terms making up a proposition referred, the question arose as to what that significate was. One famous solution was Adam Wodeham’s theory that the significate of a proposition is a *significabile per complexum* (think: state of affairs).<sup>66</sup> A lesser-known proponent of a similar solution was the Oxford calculator Richard Billingham who taught that the significate of a proposition was neither a thing nor a collection of things but the *mode* of the thing.<sup>67</sup> The details of these difficult theories need not concern us here; what is important to note is, first, that their proponents believed that modes were fea-

<sup>65</sup> The relevant passage, from Giles of Rome, *De cognitione angelorum*, q. 5 (ed. Damasius Trapp; cited in Wippel, *The Metaphysical Thought of Godfrey of Fontaines*, 234) is as follows: “Natura ex hoc quod subicitur esse et proprietatibus, alium modum acquirit et realem modum, per quem modum differt realiter a seipsa ut non est praedictis coniuncta. Iste tamen modus non dicit aliam essentiam a natura ipsa. Suppositum igitur quod dicit naturam cum tali modo, quem natura consequitur ex hoc, quod subicitur esse et proprietatibus, realiter differet a natura ipsa secundum se accepta. Non tamen dicit aliam essentiam ab ipsa natura.”

<sup>66</sup> See Adam Wodeham, *Lectura secunda in Librum Primum Sententiarum*, I, d.1, q.1 (ed. Gedeon Gál and Rega Wood [St. Bonaventure, N.Y., 1990], 180–208); English translation by Robert Pasnau in *The Cambridge Translations of Medieval Philosophical Texts*, vol. 3: *Mind and Knowledge* (Cambridge, 2002), 320–51. Gregory of Rimini would defend a similar view under the name of *complexe significabile*. It is useful to mention that although neither Wodeham nor Gregory referred to the *significabile per complexum* (or *complexe significabile*) as a mode, some authors did. One example is Albert of Saxony. Albert, writing about the significates of syncategorematic expressions, asserted that they “signify not some thing that is a substance or an accident, but rather signify the mode of a thing, which others call a complexly signifiable.” Albert of Saxony, *Questiones in librum Aristotelis de interpretatione* § 767, in *Questiones in artem veterem*, ed. A Muñoz-García (Maracaibo, 1988), 500: “Tertia conclusio: sincathegoremata non significant aliquam rem que sit substantia vel accidens, sed bene significant modum rei, quod ab aliis uocatur significabile complexe.”

<sup>67</sup> See his “Utrum idem Sortes et Sortem-esse,” ed. Michael J. Fitzgerald in *Richard Brinkley’s Theory of Sentential Reference*. “De significato Propositionis” from Part V of his “*Summa Nova de Logica*” (Leiden, 1987), 125–42. For context and philosophical discussion, see Laurent Cesalli, *Le réalisme propositionnel. Sémantique et ontologie des propositions chez Jean Duns Scot, Gauthier Burley, Richard Brinkley et Jean Wyclif* (Paris, 2007).



tures of extra-mental reality, while acknowledging that they were not amenable to the substance-accident scheme;<sup>68</sup> and second, that one of the arguments their opponents directed at them was the very one Maino directed at James, namely that the theory must be untenable since modes were neither substances nor accidents. Thus, in his response to Giles, Godfrey of Fontaines explained “that something that is a mode but is neither a substance nor an accident nor something absolute or relative is a pure fiction.”<sup>69</sup> And Marsilius of Inghen in the context of a discussion of the theory of complexly signifiabiles in his commentary on the *Sentences*, commented sarcastically, that it is “a theory so subtle that it defies the imagination of most people, particularly my own”; “for who, Marsilius then asked, can fathom that ‘that-God-is’ is, but that it is neither a substance nor an accident?”<sup>70</sup> Now, although there will be philosophers who will

<sup>68</sup> Wodeham acknowledged as much in his *Lectura secunda*: “Et non est dandum quod ‘homo est animal’ sit substantia, nec [quod] sit accidens...” *Lectura secunda*, I, d.1, q.1, a.1 §9 (ed. Gál and Wood, 195–96). Billingham as well was conscious of the fact that modes could not be accommodated within the substance-accident scheme, but he did not consider this a problem. For he believed that Aristotle had asserted in book 1 of the *De caelo* that everything that is, is either a substance, an accident, or “a path towards one or the other”; and of course, Billingham held that the mode fell under this third division. I must confess, however, that despite Billingham’s claims—and those of his editor—the assertion in question is to be found nowhere in book 1 of the *De caelo*, nor, as far as I have been able to establish, anywhere else in Aristotle. See “Utrum idem Sortes et Sortem-esse,” ed. Fitzgerald, 138.

<sup>69</sup> Godfrey of Fontaines, *Quodl.* VII, q. 5 (ed. Maurice de Wulf and Jean Hoffmans, *Philosophes Belges* 3, [Louvain, 1914], 307): “Item, dicere quod aliquid, quod scilicet non est purum non ens nec est etiam ens secundum rationem et in anima, sed extra animam, sit tantum modus quidam realis et non sit ens quod sit substantia vel accidens, nec sit ens absolutum nec respectivum, cum haec important divisionem entis per immediata, videtur fictio.”

<sup>70</sup> Marsilius of Inghen, *Quaestiones super quatuor libros Sententiarum*, I, q. 2, a. 3 (ed. Georg Wieland, Manuel Santos Noya, Maarten Hoenen, and Manfred Schutze [Leiden, 2000], 81): “Hic modus de significabilibus complexis distinctis a rebus incomplexis vel est adeo subtilis quod imaginationem communium excedit et presertim meam, vel fortassis est ex ignorantia logicae introductus. Fortassis enim nescientibus respondentibus assignare causam falsitatis propositionum falsarum ad significabilia complexa recurrerunt distincta contra incomplexa, quae nec ipsi nec alii intelligere potuerunt. Et sic metam effugere volentes ad inconceptibile pervenerunt. Quis enim concipiet, quod ‘Deum esse’ nec sit substantia nec accidens nec ista simul, et tamen est?”

share Marsilius's skepticism on this last point, the fact is that the theory of propositions espoused by Billingham, Wodeham, and others, to the extent that they all involve the positing of features of reality that are not amenable to the substance-accident scheme to account for the signification of propositions, is clearly not a metaphysically absurd theory; indeed, it is a theory that has continued to enjoy the support of many important philosophers (Frege, and Russell, at least at one stage of his career, are examples). Thus, the mere fact that the *significatum* of a proposition is not a substance or an accident cannot count as a decisive objection against the theory. The question is whether the same might hold true of Maino's objection to James's modes of being. After all, James could argue that although it is true that most things are substances or accidents, an exception must be made for modes, which are just one of those features of reality that do not reduce to either. It seems to me, however, that there is an important difference between the two cases. Propositional objects are dependent upon the things the propositions are about; making the significate of the proposition a mode, as Billingham does, is coherent with this fact. A Viterbian mode, by contrast, is supposed to account for what makes a form potential or actual; it strikes, so to speak, at the heart of reality. But making something as metaphysically "frail" as a mode the cause of this fundamental difference seems implausible to the extreme. And this just might be Maino's point, and it could partly explain his exasperation with Viterbo's theory: If there are cases where exceptions to the substance-accident scheme are warranted, the one James has in mind surely cannot be one of them.

What about the third objection, namely that the theory of potential modes implies an impossibility? Is this a fair criticism of James? What would be required for it to be so is for the potential forms in James's theory to be numerically distinct from one another, for if they are not, they cannot make up a multitude, finite or infinite. But are they? Certainly, Maino thinks they are, as we can gather from ⟨78⟩, where he writes "res distincte a materia etiam ponunt in numerum inter se, quia res diverse adinvicem et distincte." It is worth pointing out, however, that in the two passages of *Quodl.* II, q. 5 where James briefly discusses the topic of numerical distinctness,<sup>71</sup> he mentions only the numerical distinctness of po-

<sup>71</sup> James of Viterbo, *Quodl.* II, q. 5 (ed. Ypma, 71.396–13 and 84.844–51).

tential form from matter; he says nothing to the effect that forms are numerically distinct *from one another*. Of course, Maino's point might be that even though James does not explicitly state that the potential forms are numerically distinct, his theory implies it. But this belief does not square with James's comments in his second discussion of distinctness. There, James tells us that although the form in potency is other than matter *in one sense*, there is another sense in which it is identical with it, "for to be in potency is to be indistinctly." He then tells us that in the sense in which the potential form is other than matter, it is numerically distinct from it, but in the sense in which it is the same, it is not numerically distinct, "on account of its potential mode of being." James, therefore, despite his claims in the earlier passage, apparently does not want to say that the potential form is numerically distinct from matter *simpliciter*.<sup>72</sup> Unfortunately, he says little about how the two senses can be combined in a coherent fashion, so it is doubtful that his qualifications in the second passage are enough to save the day. Maino might simply counter that James cannot have it both ways: if he is going to make potential forms only modally distinct from actual ones, he will have to acknowledge that they enjoy the other hallmarks of actuality—including numerical distinctness. He cannot, faced with the problematic consequences of his position, resort to the subterfuge of invoking "another sense," which just turns out to apply to the case at hand, in which the potential forms are identical with matter. Thus, although Maino might not have been as charitable as he could have been and while he might not have taken into account all of James's relevant assertions, his criticism nonetheless points to real problems in James's theory. All in all, despite the boldness and ingenuity of James's doctrine of seminal reasons, it would seem that Maino had some legitimate reasons to cast doubt on its tenability.

<sup>72</sup> "Et haec forma in potentia, licet sit alia res a materia uno modo tamen, potest dici alio modo eadem res cum quia esse in potentia est esse indistincte. Actus enim est qui distinguit. Unde forma, ut est in actu, ponit in numerum cum materia, quia sunt duo principia compositi. Forma vero in potentia quodam modo ponit in numerum cum materia, in quantum dicit aliam rem ab ipsa, quodam modo autem non ponit in numerum cum ea, propter modum essendi potentialem, propter quem convenit cum materia et cum ipsa coincidit" (ibid., ed. Ypma, 84.844–51).

*Ratio edendi*

The most detailed, and recent, description of Florence, Biblioteca Nazionale, Conventi Soppressi J.3.6 is found in *Aegidii Romani Opera omnia I: Catalogo dei manoscritti (96-151) 1/2\* Italia (Firenze, Padova, Venezia)*, ed. Francesco del Punta and Concetta Luna (Florence, 1989), 122–32. Other descriptions can be found in Martin Grabmann, “Studien über den Averroisten Taddeo de Parma (ca. 1320),” in *Mélanges Mandonnet*, 2 vols., Bibliothèque Thomiste 14 (Paris, 1930), 2:331–52, esp. 333–37, reprinted in M. Grabmann, *Mittelalterliches Geistesleben*, vol. 2. (Munich, 1936), 239–60, (see 241–45 for the section dealing with our manuscript); Charles Ermatinger, “Notes on Some Early Fourteenth Century Scholastic Philosophers,” *Manuscripta* 3 (1959), 155–68; and, finally, in Paul Oskar Kristeller, *Iter italicum*, vol. 1 (London and Leiden, 1965), 161–62. Sections of Maino’s *questio* have been transcribed by Zdzisław Kuksewicz in his “Maino of Milan, a Fourteenth Century Parisian Averroist,” *Medioevo* 31 (2006). These transcriptions are found in nn. 51–54 and 58 of that article, and they correspond to sections <107> to part of <109>, and part of section <112> of the edition, respectively.

The text of Maino’s *questio* on fols. 96ra–99ra is of high quality, containing very few mistakes. Accordingly, I have made few editorial changes. Scribal self-corrections are not included in the apparatus. I have observed the usual conventions regarding orthography, punctuation, the capitalization of proper names (including “Philosophus” and “Commentator”) and the italicization of titles. Maino follows the practice common in his day of referring to the major and minor premises of arguments as “a” and “b,” respectively. I have systematically substituted for these the more usual “maior” and “minor,” respectively. The division of the question into paragraphs follows that suggested in the codex by means of *pieds de mouche*. All references to Averroes’s commentaries on Aristotle, save those on the *De anima* and the *De caelo*, are to the *editio Juntina secunda*, Venice, 1562, identified by volume in the notes.

⟨QUESTIONES DE SUBSTANTIA ORBIS⟩

⟨QUESTIO UTRUM EX NIHILO POSSIT ALIQUID FIERI⟩

- 5      ⟨1⟩ Arguitur primo quod sic. Agens infinite virtutis potest aliquid ex nihilo facere. Sed Deus gloriosus est huiusmodi. Ideo etc. Maior nota, quoniam agens infinitum in qualitate actionis potest aliquid producere ex infinita distantia que est inter ens et nihil. Et minor probatur primo ex intentione Aristotelis VIII *Physicorum*. Probat enim Aristoteles<sup>1</sup> quod primum principium non sit virtus in magnitudine. Et est vicinum sue rationis, quoniam in magnitudine finita non est virtus infinita.<sup>2</sup> Aut igitur intellexit de infinitate vigoris, aut de infinitate durationis. Non est dicere quod intellexerit de infinitate durationis, quoniam falsum diceret. Nam virtus celi est infinita duratione et tamen est in magnitudine finita; celum enim habet magnitudinem finitam. Non igitur intellexit de infinitate durationis. Intellexit igitur de infinitate vigoris. Primum igitur principium est infiniti vigoris.
- 10      ⟨2⟩ Idem videtur velle Commentator I *Celi*, ubi Aristoteles<sup>3</sup> probat quod corpus infinitum non potest movere corpus finitum. Unde Commentator<sup>4</sup> exponens dicit sic: “Iam enim declaratum est quod primum principium movet tempore infinito, quia utilitas huius motionis ⟨est⟩ continuatio et perpetuitas essendi, et concludit quapropter necesse est ut sit infinitum. Sed tamen declaratum est quod impossibile est ut tale movens sit corpus, quoniam moveret in non tempore.” Et idem Aristoteles<sup>5</sup> innuit VIII *Physicorum*. Et ex hoc est manifestum, quod primum habet vigorem infinitum. Nam si non haberet vigorem infinitum, dato quod poneretur corpus sive virtus in corpore, nunquam moveret in instanti; cum igitur Commentator dicat quod si primum esse virtus in corpore moveret in instanti, oportet quod sua virtus excedat virtutem mobilis in infinitum, ita quod nulla sit proportio.

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<sup>1</sup> Aristoteles, *Physica* 8.10 (266a10–267b26).

<sup>2</sup> Ibid. (266a24–b6).

<sup>3</sup> Aristoteles, *De caelo et mundo* 1.7 (275a14–275b3).

<sup>4</sup> *Commentum super I De celo*, comm. 65 (ed. Francis James Carmody and Rüdiger Arnzen, *Averrois Cordubensis Commentum magnum super libro De celo et mundo Aristotelis*, Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie médiévales, Bibliotheca 4 [Leuven, 2003], 128.68–72).

<sup>5</sup> Cf. Aristoteles, *Physica* 8.10 (266a10–267b26).

30        (3) Et hoc idem videtur intendere Commentator<sup>6</sup> in fine VII *Physicorum*  
 ubi expresse vult quod inter motorem et mobile, dico motorem abstractum,  
 nulla est proportio, et si aliquis eorum esset virtus in materia, moveret in  
 instanti. Videtur ergo quod primum principium sit infinitum in vigore  
 secundum intentionem Commentatoris.

35        (4) Idem videtur velle Commentator<sup>7</sup> in XII *Metaphysice* illa disgres-  
 sione Iohannes Grammaticus, ubi expresse dicit Commentator quod celum  
 habet motorem appropriatum a quo finis motus habet velocitatem determi-  
 natam, et est anima que est in orbe, ut ipse dicit, et habet motorem a quo  
 habet eternitatem, et est motor abstractus, nam si iste motor primus move-  
 40        ret immediate, ille motus esset in instanti, ut dicit ibi Commentator, et  
 loquitur de prima causa. Ecce quomodo vult expresse quod primum princi-  
 pium sit infinitum in vigore et habeat potentiam infinitam. Poterit igitur  
 aliquid producere ex infinita distantia. Et sic ex nihilo poterit aliquid fa-  
 cere.

45        (5) Et confirmo quod primum principium sit infinitum in qualitate actio-  
 nis, quoniam quod est illimitatum ad perfectiones generales et specificas  
 videtur esse infinitum in perfectione et vigore, nam si esset finitum, esset  
 limitatum ad perfectiones aliquas determinatas, ita quod non haberet alias.  
 Quod ergo in se illimitatum est ad omnem perfectionem generabilem et  
 specificam, tale videtur esse infinite perfectionis et per consequens infiniti  
 50        vigoris. Sed minor probatur, quia illa essentia que una existens includit  
 quicquid perfectionis simpliciter est in quocumque genere vel specie, talis  
 essentia est illimitata et per consequens infinite perfectionis. Deus enim  
 per suam simplicem essentiam est sciens et iustus et volens et omnia illa  
 que important perfectionem simpliciter.

55        (6) Amplius, probo per aliam rationem quod primum sit infiniti vigoris,  
 quia sicut se habet agens particulare equivocum ad finem sui particularis  
 effectus, sic se habet agens universale equivocum ad limitationem omnem  
 vel possibilem in quocumque effectus. Sed agens particulare equivocum  
 excedit finitatem sui effectus, et quoad hoc potest dici aliquo modo infinitum  
 60        secundum quid, quia non clauditur infra limites sui effectus sicut agens  
 univocum. Ergo similiter, Deus, qui est agens universale equivocum, ex-  
 cedit similiter omnem finitatem, si est possibile in quacumque etc., quare

<sup>6</sup> Averroes, *In VII Phys.*, comm. 35 (vol. IV, fol. 335D).

<sup>7</sup> Averroes, *In XII Metaph.*, comm. 41 (vol. VIII, fol. 324BF).

potest dici simpliciter infinitus, quia non clauditur infra quodcumque genus vel speciem alicuius generis.

65     (7) Amplius, adduco aliam rationem ad idem. Deus potest producere infinita in actu, vel successive. Ergo Deus est infinitus in vigore. Antecedens probatur. Nam si mundus est eternus, infinita producet, successive saltem. Et dato quod non sit eternus in rei veritate, tamen dicunt doctores nostre legis quod Deus potest conservare mundum in infinitum. Deus ergo potest  
70 infinita producere successive, et in hoc probata est maior, quoniam maior causat quamdam disiunctivam, et ad veritatem disiunctive sufficit alteram partem esse veram. Consequentiam ostendo. Nam si Deus produceret infinita in actu, nulli dubium quod esset infiniti vigoris, quoniam agens quod simul potest plura producere est maioris vigoris. Ergo si inveniatur agens  
75 quod possit infinita producere, illud est infiniti vigoris. Supposito etiam quod solum possit infinita producere in potentia, adhuc erit infiniti vigoris.

(8) Et ad evidentiam huius, notandum est quod “aliquod agens producere multa successive” potest dupliciter intelligi. Uno modo quod adveniente secundo cadat primum a sua causalitate, et sic consequenter. Et illo  
80 modo per “producere infinita in potentia” non possemus arguere agens habere vigorem infinitam, sed bene possemus arguere eum habere durationem infinitam, et illo modo celum est causa istorum successive, sic quod advenientibus posterioribus priora remaneant sub sua causalitate et sic “posse in plura” requirit maiorem vigorem et “in infinita” infinitum vigorem. Nam simile iudicium est acsi infinita produceret in actu quantum  
85 ad vigorem. Sed virtus vel potentia Dei est huiusmodi. Deus enim, si mundus est eternus, producet successive infinitas animas intellectivas, vel saltem posset secundum fidem nostram, et omnes iste remanebunt sub sua causalitate, quoniam erunt eterne. Ideo etc.

90     (9) Eodem modo, secundum fidem nostram Deus posset producere successive infinitos bonos et omnes istos conservaret in esse in eternum secundum quod generabuntur, et sic producet infinita successive, ita quod ultimo adveniente precedens non cadet a sua causalitate. Sed si quis posset probare quod Deus posset infinita secundum actum | producere physice  
95 loquendo, tunc esset ratio efficax. Sic igitur videtur quod primum sit infiniti vigoris et rationibus et auctoritatibus. Poterit igitur aliquid producere ex infinita distantia et sic ex nihilo.

63 infinitus] infinitum *cod.*

89 erunt] erant *cod.*

100 <10> Item, probatio Aristotelis<sup>8</sup> quod primum sit infiniti vigoris, quia motus potest velocitari in infinitum, ut patet VIII *Physicorum*. Ergo oportet esse virtutem que sit nata illam velocitatem producere et illa esset infinita in vigore.

105 <11> Preterea, virtus que continet independenter simul infinitum effectum est infinita. Sed Deus benedictus est huiusmodi. Ideo etc. Maior nota, quia effectus continetur in causa eminentiori modo vel formaliter. Et minor est manifesta, quoniam secundum intentionem Aristotelis infiniti effectus producentur in futuro et producti sunt, quos omnes continet in virtute prima causa et virtutes secundorum agentium. Ergo etc.

110 <12> Item, dicit Aristoteles,<sup>9</sup> I *Politicorum*, quod finis est appetibilis in infinitum. Sed Deus est finis. Ergo est appetibilis in infinitum. Ergo est infinitus, quia aliter esset appetitus frustra.

115 <13> Amplius, aut Deus est finitus, aut infinitus. Non finitus, quia tunc Deus haberet finem, quod est impossibile. Nam omne finitum habet finem et sic esset compositus ex fine et habente finem, et per consequens in genere, quod est falsum, quia est actus purus et tale non est in genere. Sic probant aliqui Deum esse infiniti vigoris.

<14> Item, quod primum sit infiniti vigoris. Actus non productus ad aliud, non ordinatus in alio, non receptus, nec aliquid aliud recipiens est infinitus in vigore. Deus est huiusmodi. Ideo etc.

120 <15> Amplius, totum ens est factum. Aut ergo ex aliquo, aut ex nihilo. Non ex aliquo passive, quoniam ante totum ens esset aliquod ens preter Deum, quod est falsum. Deus igitur, si produxit totum ens et non ex aliquo, ut probabo, relinquitur quod ex nihilo. Quod autem Deus produxit totum ens, dicit Commentator<sup>10</sup> in illo libro *De substantia orbis*. Dicit enim Commentator quod illi falsum dicunt qui dicunt unam causam moventem  
125 et non agentem, nam movens totum est agens totum, ut ipse dicit. Deus igitur est agens totum et non ex aliquo, quoniam non esset totum. Ergo ex nihilo.

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99 VIII] VII *cod.*

<sup>8</sup> Cf. Aristoteles, *Physica* 8.10 (266b16–20).

<sup>9</sup> Cf. Aristoteles, *Politica* 1.9 (1257b25–26).

<sup>10</sup> Averroes, *De substantia orbis* 2 (vol. IX, fol. 7A).



130 <16> Amplius, probo quod totum ens sit factum a Deo, quoniam quod  
 sibi <de>relictum est non ens ex se non habet necesse esse. Nam si ex se  
 esset necesse esse, sibi derelictum esset ens, ut videtur manifestum consi-  
 deranti. Sed totum ens citra Deum derelictum sibi est non ens. Totum ergo  
 ens est ab alio.

135 <17> Amplius, Deus est omnia potens. Credimus enim in Deum omni-  
 potentem. Potest igitur aliquid producere. Immo videretur quod esset ali-  
 qua diminutio in Deo si non posset aliquid facere, quoniam illa est quedam  
 perfectio, et si sibi deficeret, esset diminutus.

140 <18> Amplius, materia est aliquid productum, sed non est producta ex  
 aliquo. Ergo etc. Maior est manifesta, quia omne quod non habet causam  
 agentem est de se necesse esse, circumscripto quolibet alio, quia sicut nihil  
 potest incipere esse nisi per aliquod agens quod educit ipsum de potentia  
 ad actum et de non esse ad esse, ita nihil potest desinere esse nisi per ali-  
 quod agens deducens ipsum de esse ad non esse. Et sic omne quod non  
 habet causam agentem de se est necesse esse omni alio circumscripto. Sed  
 materia non est de se necesse esse omni alio circumscripto, quia de se non  
 potest esse sine forma, quare etc.

145 <19> Amplius, quod ordinatur per se ad finem dependentem ab agente  
 dependet ab agente, quia illud quod est ad finem non potest minus depen-  
 dere ab agente quam finis. Nam cum illud quod est ad finem dependet a  
 fine, a quocumque dependet finis, et illud quod est ad finem. Sed materia  
 150 ordinatur per se ad formam sicut ad finem, ut patet II *Physicorum*.<sup>11</sup> Ergo  
 cum omnis forma materialis dependeat ab agente, et materia dependebit ab  
 agente.

155 <20> Amplius, accidens potest generari distincte a subiecto. Ergo fiet ex  
 nihilo. Consequentia est manifesta, quia accidens est simplex. Et an-  
 tecedens probatur, quoniam sicut res potest esse, sic et generari. Sed acci-  
 dens potest esse sine subiecto, ut patet in sacramento, ergo et generari, et  
 illa ratio est probabilis quoquo modo.

<21> Et confirmo quod accidens possit esse sine subiecto, quia illa se ha-  
 bent per ordinem: esse, intelligere, et significare. Sed accidens potest

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146–47 dependentem . . . ad finem *iter. cod.*

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<sup>11</sup> Aristoteles, *Physica* 2.2 (194a27–b8).

160 significari sine subiecto, ergo et intelligi, et per consequens esse. Sic ergo  
et generari, et tunc generabitur ex nihilo.

(22) Amplius, illa tria agentia sunt ordinata: agens artificiale, naturale, et  
supernaturale, ita quod unum agens est perfectius alio, et unum minus de-  
bet supponere in sua actione quam alterum. Videmus autem quod agens  
165 artificiale supponit ens actu in sui actione et ens pura potentia supponitur  
ab agente naturali. Ergo agens supernaturale, scilicet Deus ipse, debet mi-  
nus supponere. Sed minus quam pura potentia est nihil. Ideo etc.

(23) Et confirmo. Nulla causa in sui actione supponit suum effectum, et  
est manifestum. Sed materia est effectus primi principii, quoniam Deus est  
170 causa omnium. Ideo etc.

(24) Amplius, quoddam ens fit ex quodam non ente, ut patet I *Physico-*  
*rum*.<sup>12</sup> Nam album fit ex hoc non albo quod est nigrum. Ergo ens simplici-  
ter fiet ex non ente simpliciter, et sic ex nihilo fit aliquid.

(25) Oppositum est Commentator in illo libro et Aristoteles I *Physico-*  
175 *rum*.<sup>13</sup> In hoc enim concordaverunt omnes qui de natura ⟨locuti sunt⟩ quod  
ex nihilo nihil fit.

(26) De illa questione sunt due vie extreme. Una est que attribuitur  
Anaxagore. Oppinabat enim iste quod generatio non est nisi de occulto  
formarum ita quod in qualibet portione materie erant omnes forme quam-  
180 vis occulte, et ideo iste videbatur negare generationem.

(27) Alia opinio est quod generatio est omnium rerum et quod talis ge-  
neratio est ex nihilo omnino, et ista est opinio Christianorum et Platonis et  
multorum aliorum.

(28) Sed opinio Anaxagore est impossibilis, quoniam secundum inten-  
185 tionem istius viri omnia erant eterna, quia illud cuius forma est eterna est  
eternum, nam corruptio non est nisi destructio forme in materia. Sed  
secundum istum omnes forme erant eterne in materia et in qualibet por-  
tione materie. Illud autem est eternum cuius forma est eterna, immo iam  
sequeretur quod in aliqua portione materie essent infinite, quia infinita  
190 sunt que generari possunt ex illa portione materie, et tamen omnes ille  
forme preexisterent in materia. Ergo in hac portione materie essent simul  
infinite forme et infinite forme substantiales, quoniam infinita individua de

<sup>12</sup> Aristoteles, *Physica* 1.8 (191b13–15).

<sup>13</sup> Cf. Averroes, *De substantia orbis* 1 (vol. IX, fol. 3vI); Aristoteles, *Physica* 1.8 (191b13–14).

genere substantie ex tali materia poterunt generari. Omnes igitur iste forme preexistent in materia et sic unum ens erit infinita entia.

195     (29) Amplius, quando generabitur hoc individuum, queram quid sit eductum de potentia materie, utrum aliquid aut nihil. Si nihil, ergo nihil est generatum; si aliquid, ergo illud non preexistebat, et ideo illa opinio negat generationem et corruptionem formarum materialium, quod est absurdum, quoniam materia est per quam res potest esse et non esse, ut patet I *Celi*,  
200     VII *Metaphysice* et I *Physicorum*.<sup>14</sup>

          (30) Alia est opinio | quam sustinent tres leges, ut dicit Commentator I *Celi*,<sup>15</sup> et est quod aliquid fit ex nihilo, et est opinio attributa Platoni, nam videtur sequi ad dicta ab eo. Ponebat enim Plato quod materia et privatio sunt unum et idem, ut habet videri I *Physicorum* circa finem.<sup>16</sup> Si igitur  
205     ponebat aliquid fieri ex materia, cum materia sit pura privatio secundum eum et privatio est non ens simpliciter, aliquid fiet ex nihilo. Tamen Commentator dicit I *Celi*,<sup>17</sup> ubi improbat dicentes mundum generatum et non corruptum, quod illa opinio est adeo extra naturam et “impossibilis et inopinabilis,” scilicet quod aliquid fiat ex nihilo, quod nullus antiquorum  
210     eam posuit et forte Plato non posuit eam ex intentione sed sequebatur ad dicta eius. Dicebat<sup>18</sup> enim quod materia et privatio erant idem, ut patet I *Physicorum*, et probabat<sup>19</sup> Plato suam positionem sic: dicit “quod est preter ens est non ens, sed materia est preter ens. Ideo etc.” Maior nota. Minor ostenditur, quia materia non est quid nec quale nec quantum, et sic de aliis  
215     categoriis. Ideo etc.

          (31) Amplius, credebat<sup>20</sup> Plato quod materia et privatio erant idem, quia sunt coniuncta secundum subiectum. Arguebat enim: que sunt idem subiecto sunt idem simpliciter.<sup>21</sup>

220     (32) Sed illa opinio Platonis in hoc quod ponit materiam esse idem privationi, est falsa et impossibilis, quod probo. Nam illa non sunt idem es-

<sup>14</sup> Aristoteles, *De caelo et mundo* 1.12 (283b4–5). Cf. *Auctoritates Aristotelis*, ed. Jacqueline Hamesse, *Philosophes Médiévaux* 17 (Louvain/Paris, 1974), 162 (39); *Metaphysica* 7.7 (1032a20–22). Cf. *Auctoritates Aristotelis*, 129 (170). Cf. Aristoteles, *Physica* 1.9 (192a25–34).

<sup>15</sup> *Commentum super I De celo*, comm. 102 (ed. Carmody & Arnzen, 196.46–48).

<sup>16</sup> Cf. Averroes, *In I Phys.*, comm. 66 (vol. IV, fol. 39FG).

<sup>17</sup> *Commentum super I De celo*, comm. 102 (ed. Carmody & Arnzen, 204.76).

<sup>18</sup> Cf. Averroes, *In I Phys.*, comm. 66 (vol. IV, fol. 39FG).

<sup>19</sup> Cf. *Ibid.*, comm. 30 (vol. IV, fol. 20E).

<sup>20</sup> Cf. *Ibid.*, comm. 66 (vol. IV, fol. 39FG).

<sup>21</sup> Cf. *Ibid.*

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225 sentialiter quorum unum corrumpitur quantum ad id quod est, reliquo remanente. Sed materia non corrumpitur, ut probatum est I *Physicorum*,<sup>22</sup> saltem quantum ad suam essentiam. Sed privatio corrumpitur quantum ad id quod est, nam privatio est ut terminus a quo in generatione; sed materia est ut subiectum; sed terminus a quo incipit motus semper corrumpitur et terminus ad quem generatur et subiectum remanet in utroque terminorum transmutationis. Ideo etc.

230 <33> Amplius, nos dicimus quod materia appetit formam ut turpe bonum et femina masculum, ut patet I *Physicorum*.<sup>23</sup> Sed privatio semper imaginatur ad maleficium, ut patet in eodem primo.

<34> Rationes eius non valent. “Quod est preter ens est non ens” (<30>) verum est si sit preter ens universaliter. Sed materia non est preter ens universaliter, sed solum preter ens actu. Unde non substantia actu nec qualitas, et sic de aliis, sed omnia hec in potentia.

235 <35> Ad aliam (<31>) dico quod illa que sunt idem subiecto non oportet quod sint idem secundum essentiam, quoniam nos videmus quod omnia predicamenta sunt idem subiecto et tamen non sunt idem essentialiter.

240 <36> Tamen lex nostra ponit quod aliquid fit ex nihilo, non per illum modum qui imponitur Platoni. Non enim ponit fides quod materia sit idem privationi. Dicunt tamen quod materia producta est et non ex aliquo, et eodem modo celum. Nec est intelligendum “ex nihilo” ut “ex subiecto” ita quod nihil recipiat aliquid, quoniam hoc implicaret contradictionem. Nec est intelligendum “ex nihilo” ita quod li “ex” dicat aliquem ordinem nihili ad aliquid, quo modo nos dicimus quod ex mane fit meridies et ex puero fit senes, quoniam tunc sequeretur quod nihil prederet natura vel tempore aliquid, quod falsum est. Si enim ponamus quod omnia sunt facta ab eterno a prima causa ex nihilo, tunc est manifestum quod nihil non prederet aliquid secundum tempus. Si autem dicas quod nihil prederet natura, quia productum ex sua natura primo est nihil quam aliquid, istud est impossibile, quia quod inest alicui ex se et ex natura naturam non destruit. Sed esse nihil et non ens naturam rei tollit, et ideo nihil debet dici non ens ex se. Cum igitur dicimus aliquid fieri ex nihilo, intendimus “ex nihilo,” id est “non ex aliquo” sive “nullo presupposito,” nec est intelligendum quod li “ex” dicat ordinem naturalem nec temporalem, ut est manifestum presupposito quod illa productio fuerit ab eterno. Et dato quod illa productio fuerit

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<sup>22</sup> Aristoteles, *Physica* 1.9 (192a27–31).

<sup>23</sup> Ibid. (192a22–23).

de novo, adhuc li “ex” non dicit ordinem naturalem, nec temporalem. Quod non naturalem ostensum est primo, et eodem modo potest modo ostendi.

260 <37> Quod etiam non temporalem ostendo. Quia dato quod illa productio fuerit de novo, ut ponit fides, tamen potuit esse ab eterno. Ergo non est necessarium quod li “ex” dicat ordinem temporis, quia si hoc esset necessarium, illa productio non potuisset fuisse ab eterno, quod tamen negant fideles. Etiam dato quod fuerit de novo, tamen ante productionem illam non fuit tempus, et ideo inter nihil et aliquid non fuit proprie prioritas temporis.

265 <38> Etiam est notandum quod non intendunt isti quod aliquid fiat ex nihilo presupposito ex parte facti per motum et transmutationem, sed solum per quamdam simplicem emanationem, quam ipsi vocant creationem. Quidam autem philosophorum dixerunt hinc fuisse ab eterno, ut imponitur  
270 Avicenne, et quidam legis nostre ponunt hoc fuisse possibile. Alii dicunt quod illa creatio fuit de novo et non ab eterno.

<39> Sed illi qui ponunt creationem fuisse ab eterno sive posse fuisse, habent difficile contra se, quoniam hoc videtur implicare contradictionem. Que autem implicant contradictionem Deus facere non potest, ut istimet  
275 confitentur.

<40> Sed probo quod hoc implicat contradictionem. Nam illa creatio sive productio nullo presupposito quam ponis ab eterno habuit aliquam mensuram. Aut igitur mensura fuit instans, aut tempus. Si dicas quod mensura productionis istius fuerit tempus, ergo oportet quod prius tempore sit creatio illa et creans ipsum quam res creata et producta, et tunc sequitur quod  
280 creatum non fuit ab eterno. Si autem dicas quod illa productio mensuratur instanti, accipiam illud instans et instans in quo sum modo et dicam inter quelibet duo instantia est tempus finitum. Ergo est tempus finitum in quo res producte inceperunt esse, quod tamen est contra positum. Dicunt enim  
285 illud productum esse productum ab eterno et illa ratio probat quod nihil potuerit esse productum ab eterno, nec ex aliquo nec ex nihilo.

<41> Amplius, confirmo rationem factam: aut productio illa quam ponis ab eterno est simul cum re producta ita quod verum est dicere quod res simul fit et facta est, aut prius duratione fit et posterius facta. Si dicas quod  
290 prius duratione fit et posterius facta est, ergo non fuit eterna illa res producta, cuius oppositum concedunt. Si simul fit et facta est, aut hoc est ve-

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288 eterno] externo *cod.*      288–89 simul *iter. cod.*

rum pro quolibet instanti, aut pro uno tantum. Si pro quolibet instanti, ergo  
 verum est dicere modo in hoc instanti de eo quod ab eterno est productum  
 quod in hoc instanti producitur et productum est, quod videtur falsum, nam  
 295 quod est ab eterno productum non modo producitur, ut videtur. Si autem  
 dicas quod hoc habet verum pro aliquo instanti precise, queram de illo  
 instanti, quoniam illud instans comparatum ad quodlibet posterius includit  
 tempus finitum. Ergo tempus durationis illius rei non fuit infinitum, et per  
 consequens illa res ab eterno non fuit producta, et ille rationes probant  
 300 nihil esse productum ab eterno, nec ex aliquo nec ex nihilo, et ideo forte  
 iste rationes concludunt plus quam debent. Non enim forsitan est impos-  
 sibile aliquid esse productum ab eterno, sicut lumen in medio ab eterno  
 productum est, supposito quod corpus luminosum fuerit eternum, et ideo  
 quia iste rationes forte plus probant, ideo bonum est eas dissolvere.

305 (42) Quidam tamen hoc simpliciter credunt esse impossibile, scilicet  
 quod aliquid sit productum ab eterno, quoniam Aristoteles<sup>24</sup> in XII *Meta-*  
*physice* dicit quod cause efficientes velut prius | existentes facte sunt, que  
 vero ut ratio, simul. Videtur ergo velle quod causa efficiens sit prius facto,  
 nec potest exponi de prioritare nature solum et non temporis, quoniam hoc  
 310 est contra intentionem Aristotelis. Nam dicit ibi Aristoteles “que vero ut  
 ratio, simul,” id est causa formalis est simul. Modo certum est quod causa  
 formalis etiam est prius natura creato. Non ergo in hoc est differentia inter  
 causam efficientem et formalem. Quando igitur dixit quod “cause effi-  
 cientes velut prius sunt etc.,” videtur intendere quod sunt prius tempore;  
 315 “que vero ut ratio, simul,” videtur intendere quod causa formalis est simul  
 tempore, et in hoc differunt efficiens et forma. Nullum ergo est efficiens  
 ab eterno. Etiam Aristoteles ubicumque describit<sup>25</sup> causam efficientem  
 semper dicit quod est unde principium motus. Sed omne tale efficiens  
 precedit factum tempore, quoniam omnis motus tempore mensuratur et si  
 320 ita esset, rationes facte superius essent pro illa positione, nec oporteret eas  
 dissolvere.

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318 unde] unum *cod.*

<sup>24</sup> Aristoteles, *Metaphysica* 12.3 (1070a21–22).

<sup>25</sup> Cf. Aristoteles, *De generatione et corruptione* 1.7 (324b13–14); *Metaphysica* 1.3 (983a30); *Physica* 2.3 (194b29–32).

325 (43) Sed sine dubio hoc ego non bene video, quoniam certum est quod  
 motus primus est eternus secundum Aristotelem et est probatum VIII *Phy-*  
*sicorum*,<sup>26</sup> et certum est quod ab eterno habuit causam efficientem, quo-  
 niam motus ex se non habet esse, sed ab alio. Et eodem modo illuminatio  
 diaphani illa est ab eterno, et certum est quod habet causam efficientem. Et  
 eodem modo lumen in diaphano ab eterno et ab eterno habuit causam  
 efficientem. Et ideo dicere quod causa efficiens de necessitate sit prius  
 tempore facto, hoc non video, sed bene verum est quod in hiis que sunt  
 330 facta per motum et transmutationem divisibilem tempore mensurabilem  
 oportet quod efficiens sit prius tempore facta re, quoniam res facta in tem-  
 pore mensurante motum per quem fit adhuc non habet esse, sed efficiens  
 in toto illo tempore habet esse. Efficiens igitur in talibus prius est tempore  
 re facta.

335 (44) Ad auctoritatem XII *Metaphysice* “cause efficientes velut prius  
 etc.” ((42)) dico quod est dictum ab Aristotele pro tanto, quoniam cause  
 efficientes prius sunt naturaliter et causa hec non est efficiens aliquid in-  
 trinsecum rei facte, sed “causa formalis est simul,” id est intrinseca rei  
 facte, sic potest exponi quod quando Aristoteles dicit “efficiens est unde  
 340 principium motus,” accipitur motus large pro quacumque transmutatione  
 tam divisibili quam indivisibili. Et tu dicis “Aristoteles videtur velle VIII  
*Physicorum* quod omnem transmutationem indivisibilem precedit transmu-  
 tatio divisibilis.” Dicam quod verum est de hiis que sunt de novo. Si autem  
 sunt ab eterno, non oportet, sicut est illuminatio, nam illuminatio diaphani  
 345 est effectus quem sol ab eterno produxit et talis effectus esset etiam pro-  
 ductio entium si fuit ab eterno, secundum intentionem plurium philosopho-  
 rum. Unde etiam Aristoteles in VIII *Physicorum* dicit<sup>27</sup> quod nihil prohibet  
 quorundam eternorum esse alteram causam et videtur loqui de causa effi-  
 ciente.

350 (45) Unde non bene video quin movens ab eterno fuerit causa produc-  
 tiva motus si motus fuit eternus, quia nulli dubium quod motus quantum  
 ad se totum habet causam efficientem. Est enim eiusdem rationis in toto et  
 in parte. Et eodem modo illuminatio quam facit sol in medio diaphano si  
 est eterna habuit ab eterno causam efficientem, quia illuminatio eiusdem  
 355 nature est in toto et in parte, et ideo si in parte habet causam efficientem,

<sup>26</sup> Aristoteles, *Physica* 8.6 (259b32–260a1).

<sup>27</sup> Ibid. (259a7–8; 260a1). Cf. Averroes, *In VIII Phys.*, comm. 48 (vol. IV, fol. 389AC).

ut omnes concedunt, sequitur utique quod et tota illuminatio ab eterno habebit causam efficientem. Et supposito quod sol ab eterno quievisset et diaphanum idem fuisset, certum est quod illuminatio fuisset eadem numero, sicut motus primus est idem numero et illa illuminatio indivisibilis est nulli dubium. Et ideo credo quod in accidentibus non sit impossibile aliquod eternum unum numero habere causam efficientem, sed in substantiis forte esset impossibile, et hoc innuit Commentator in XII *Metaphysice* in illo loco “Iohannes Grammaticus.”<sup>28</sup> Et posset assignari ratio. Nam omnis substantia eterna ex se necesse est. Sed quod ab alio habet esse ex se non est necesse. Substantia igitur eterna ex se esset necessaria et tamen ab alio haberet perpetuitatem et necessitatem, quod est impossibile, ut patet in fine primi *Celi et Mundi*.<sup>29</sup> Quod enim ex se est possibile ab alio perpetuari non potest si sit substantia.

(46) Et tu dices: “Eodem modo dicam de accidentibus sic arguendo: omne accidens eternum ex se est necesse et per consequens ab alio non habet esse.” Ego dico quod accidens eternum si sit permanens, ex se necesse est esse, et ideo propositio habet veritatem in omnibus permanentibus sive sint substantie sive accidentia, nam talium entitas non est in fieri et ideo si eterna sunt ex se, sunt necessaria et ab alio non habent esse sed de accidentibus successivis. Dico quod non est verum quod omne eternum ex se sit necessarium nisi isto modo quod non est principium positivum ad corruptionem, sed nihilominus, quia suum esse est in fieri, dependet ab agente et eodem modo illa quorum esse suum est in agi, sicut illuminatio diaphani. Tota igitur causa quare substantie non possunt esse necessarie et habere esse effective ab alio est quia suum esse est permanens et non in fieri nec in agi, et ideo si poneres substantiam cuius esse est permanens et non in fieri nec in agi esse ab alio effective, ab alio oporteret quod haberet esse prius non esse secundum tempus. Sed vel oporteret dicere quod substantia toto eterno est in fieri vel in produci, et sic suum esse non esset de numero permanentium, quod videtur falsum, quoniam esse cuiuslibet substantie est permanens; etiam cum esse substantiarum sit permanens, si po-

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365 ex se] non *add. cod.*

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<sup>28</sup> Cf. *In XII Metaph.*, comm. 41 (vol. VIII, fol. 324B).

<sup>29</sup> Aristoteles, *De caelo et mundo* 1.12 (284a4–7).



neremus aliquam substantiam esse effective ab alio, hoc non esset propter aliud, nisi quia in se haberet possibilitatem ad non esse, et ideo ab alio reduceretur ad esse, et per consequens illa potentia ad non esse esset otiosa  
 390 tempore infinito, quia nunquam reduceretur ad actum si illud est eternum. Sumus igitur inter duo: vel dicere quod esse substantiarum non est permanens sed est in fieri vel in agi sicut esse motus et illuminationis medii diaphani, vel dicere quod non habet causam efficientem ab eterno. Quod enim aliquod eternum unum numero habeat causam efficientem, non est nisi  
 395 quia suum esse est in fieri, nam causa quare aliquid universaliter habet causam efficientem est vel quia habet potentiam ad non esse positivam, quod impossibile est reperi in aliquo eterno, quia illa esset otiosa tempore infinito, vel quia suum esse est in fieri vel in produci et illa causa invenitur in eternis, sicut patet de motu et illuminatione diaphani. Quod autem esse  
 400 substantiarum sit in produci vel in agi eo modo quo dicimus de motu vel de illuminatione diaphani, credo quod homo sani capitis non diceret.

⟨47⟩ Aliqui tamen volentes sequi verba legis propter consuetudinem dicunt quod in quolibet instanti temporis eterni verum est dicere substantiam produci et productam esse, sicut verum est dicere medium diaphanum  
 405 illuminari et illuminatum esse in quolibet instanti temporis, adhuc supposito quod corpus luminosum quievisse ab eterno et diaphanum esset eodem modo.

⟨48⟩ Sed illud non est bene rationale, ut videtur de substantia, quamvis posset sustineri de aliquibus accidentibus quorum esse est adeo debile  
 410 quod solum est in produci et in fieri. Cogita bonam determinationem ad probandum hoc esse impossibile, scilicet aliquam substantiam eternam in quolibet instanti produci et productam esse. Dicit enim adversarius quod esse substantiarum et omnium eternorum preter principium hoc modo est in produci sicut de illuminatione respectu diaphani.

⟨49⟩ Rationes autem que probant quod aliquod eternum non possit produci effective dissolvam, quia ego non puto hoc impossibile, saltem in  
 415 accidentibus quorum esse consistit in fieri et produci, sicut patet de illuminatione et de motu et accipio illuminationem gratia exempli. Quando ergo queris de mensura talis illuminationis (⟨40⟩), dico quo sicut illuminatio fuit ab eterno, sic etiam instans fuit eternum quod fuit mensura talis illuminationis, et si talis illuminatio fuit eadem numero toto eterno, quod  
 420 forsitan contingeret si sol ab eterno quievisset et diaphanum illuminatum, tunc enim illuminatio fuisset eadem numero et per consequens nunc quod est mensura talis illuminationis fuisset idem numero et esset nunc stans et  
 425 non fluens, quia nunc fluens non est possibile esse unum toto tempore

eterno, immo nunc fluens continue est aliud et aliud, et ideo si illuminatio est una et indivisibilis, nunc fluens non poterit esse mensura eius, sed erit nunc permanens quod quidem nunc potest coexistere toti tempori et pluribus partibus temporis. Si autem illuminatio sit alia et alia, tunc nunc mensurans erit aliud et aliud et tunc instans fluens erit mensura eius et sicut dico de illuminatione sic intelligo de omnibus aliis productionibus indivisibilibus si ponantur ab eterno. Si autem illa productio sit divisibilis, sicut est motus primus, tunc mensura eius erit totum tempus, quia productio illa durat toto tempore, quamvis hoc non sit proprie dictum, quia nullum infinitum proprie habet mensuram, et ideo motus primus qui est divisibilis cum sit infinitus proprie non habet mensuram. Nam sola finita sunt mensurabilia, et ideo si motus primus est mensurabilis, hoc est solum ratione suarum partium.

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⟨50⟩ Ad secundam rationem (⟨41⟩) patet ex dictis. Volo enim quod in quolibet instanti temporis eterni verum est dicere quod medium illuminatur et illuminatum est et eodem modo de aliis productionibus si que ponantur ab eterno, sed quamvis hoc sit rei veritas, aliter loqui debemus, quia hoc non videmus in aliis productionibus; immo videmus quod prius res producitur et post habet productum esse, ita quod non est verum quod in quolibet instanti producitur et producta est, et ideo in illa productione eterna non est hoc dicendum, et dato quod ita sit sentiendum, sic ergo patet quomodo sustinere possumus aliquam productionem fuisse ab eterno physice loquendo, quoniam hoc non est impossibile, saltem in accidentibus et in accidentibus quorum esse est in successione quadam, sicut est motus, vel in accidentibus quorum esse est in agi et in produci, sicut illuminatio, sed in substantiis forsitan non est possibile physice loquendo etiam in accidentibus permanentibus, nec intelligo quod tales productiones quas pono ab eterno sunt nihilo presupposito sed sunt ex aliquo. Opinionem legis nostre que ponit quod ex nihilo fiat aliquid modo supradicto tam in substantiis quam in accidentibus non intendo improbare, quoniam virtus divina hoc potest indubitabiliter.

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⟨51⟩ Sed ego dicam ad questionem quod diceret Aristoteles et Commentator eius quod ex nihilo nihil potest fieri, quod probare possumus rationibus Aristotelis I *Physicorum*,<sup>30</sup> quia omne quod fit est substantia vel accidens; sed accidens fit ex aliquo et substantia etiam. Ideo etc. Maior nota: substantia et accidens sufficienter dividunt ens. Et minor est mani-

<sup>30</sup> Cf. Aristoteles, *Physica* 1.8.

465 festa, nam accidentia fiunt ex aliquo, quia non habent esse nisi in aliquo, et ideo non fiunt nisi in aliquo, et ideo non fiunt nihilo presupposito, et patet inducendo; hoc idem patet in substantiis tam animatis quam inanimatis, tam perfectis quam imperfectis, quod omnes fiunt ex aliquo et non fiunt nihilo presupposito.

(52) Secunda ratio Aristotelis: omnia que fiunt vel fiunt transfiguratione vel compositione vel ablatione vel alteratione; sed omnia hec fiunt ex aliquo. Ideo etc. Maior et minor patent (vide Aristotelem I *Physicorum*).<sup>31</sup>

470 (53) Commentator<sup>32</sup> addit tres in eodem I *Physicorum*: prima est si aliquid fieret ex nihilo, tunc erit dare quod motus erit sine subiecto; hoc est impossibile, ergo et primum. Falsitas consequentis videtur nota et consequentia etiam, quia ponis aliquam factionem sive transmutationem sine subiecto. Sequitur etiam quod accidens erit sine subiecto, quoniam talis  
475 transmutatio quam ponis ex nihilo est accidens, ut videtur, et non habet subiectum in quo recipiatur. Non enim recipitur in agente, quia non est actio immanens, nec recipitur in forma producta sive reproducta, quoniam productio prior naturaliter et via generationis reproducta, et ideo res producta non potest esse eius subiectum, et ideo remanebit talis transmutatio  
480 et tale accidens sine subiecto, quod falsum est et impossibile, nam accidentia non sunt entia nisi quia entis, ut patet IV *Metaphysice* et in VII;<sup>33</sup> unde inherere physice loquendo ponitur de essentia accidentis.

(54) Amplius, sequitur sic dicendo quod transmutatio erit in nihilo et in privatione, quod est absurdum. Ponis enim quod nihil subicitur tali.

485 (55) Sequitur etiam: transmutatio non erit, quoniam destruis subiectum transmutationis et tamen erit transmutabile, ut res producta.

(56) Amplius, si aliquid fieret ex nihilo, aut per se, aut per accidens; non per se, quia illud ex quo fit aliquid per se manet in re producta et nihil non manet in aliquo etc.; nec per accidens, quia per accidens reducitur ad per se, et ideo oportebit ponere aliquid ex quo fiat per se, quod tamen non faciunt.  
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(57) Dicunt tamen aliqui quod illud per accidens reducitur ad per se ex parte agentis, quia est dare per se agens, sed non ex parte subiecti.

<sup>31</sup> Aristoteles, *Physica* 1.7 (190b5–10).

<sup>32</sup> Averroes, *In I Phys.*, comm. 60 (vol. IV, fol. 35M–36E).

<sup>33</sup> Aristoteles, *Metaphysica* 4 (1007a20–1007b4); 7.1 (1028a32–33). Cf. *Auctoritates Aristotelis*, 128 (160).

495 <58> Contra, quia potentie active correspondet passiva, IX *Metaphy-*  
*sice*.<sup>34</sup> Sunt enim correlativa, et ideo si est dare causam activam et poten-  
 tiam activam, erit etiam dare potentiam passivam sibi correspondentem.  
 Unde quecumque potentia activa sit, sive per motum et transmutationem,  
 sive per simplicem emanationem, semper refertur ad potentiam passivam,  
 ut videtur, et ideo quocumque modo nunquam fiet aliquid ex nihilo; vel  
 500 oporteret dicere quod nihil haberet potentiam passivam, quod est falsum,  
 et hoc est ultimum ad quod potest deveniri in probando illam materiam  
 quod ex nihilo fiat aliquid, quoniam esset potentia activa sine passiva sibi  
 correspondente, quod videtur implicare contradictionem.

505 <59> Verum isti dicunt quod duplex est potentia passiva, scilicet subiec-  
 tiva et obiectiva; dicunt igitur quod isti potentie active que facit aliquid ex  
 nihilo correspondet potentia passiva, non quidem subiectiva et receptiva  
 sed magis obiectiva, et ita potentia passiva nihil aliud est nisi res possibilis  
 produci que nondum producta est.

510 <60> Sed semper est dubium, quia quando dicis res possibile produci, vel  
 istud possibile se tenet ex parte agentis et tunc est idem quod potentia ac-  
 tiva, vel se tenet ex parte facti seu fiendi et tunc istud possibile nihil est  
 ante rei productionem, quia non habet aliquod fundamentum et tunc se-  
 quitur quod nihil erit potentia passiva respectu potentie active, quod est  
 falsum.

515 <61> Est tamen intelligendum de modo secundum quem fit aliquid ex  
 aliquo tanquam ex subiecto et non ex nihilo; communiter enim dicitur et  
 bene quod ultimum subiectum ex quo fiunt omnia que fiunt est ens in po-  
 tentia | pura vel secundum (quod) est pura in sui natura, nam si tale subiec-  
 tum ultimum esset ens actu, sequeretur quod forme substantiales omnes  
 520 essent accidentales, nam forme accidentales recipiuntur in ente actu, ut pa-  
 tet a Commentatore in II *De anima* et forme substantiales in ente in pura  
 potentia, et ideo si materia esset ens actu, cum ipsa sit receptiva formarum  
 substantialium, sequitur quod forme substantiales erunt accidentales.

525 <62> Amplius, aut adveniente forma substantiali corrumperetur pre-  
 cedens in materia, aut non. Si non, ergo plures forme substantiales simul

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509 possibile] possibilis *cod.*

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<sup>34</sup> Cf. *Metaphysica* 5.13 (1021a14–16); *Auctoritates Aristotelis*, 126 (137).

erunt in materia, quod puto falsum. Et dico “in eadem portione materie,”  
 quia unum ens esset plura entia et oporteret quod precedens forma cor-  
 rumpatur, quia generatio unius est corruptio alterius, I *De generatione*.<sup>35</sup> Si  
 autem confitearis quod precedens corrumpitur, tunc remanebit sola materia  
 530 que est ens pura potentia et ideo illud ex quo fit aliquid est ens pura poten-  
 tia et dico “ex quo fit aliquid” tanquam ex subiecto ultimo.

(63) Sed secundum quod dicebatur superius Anaxagoras aliter opinatur.  
 Dicitur enim quod iste voluit quod omnes forme prexisterent in materia  
 ante earum generationem, sed latentur secundum quod diceremus si modi-  
 cum de auro esset mistum cum multo plumbo non appareret et tamen reali-  
 535 ter esset ibi, sicut imaginabat Anaxagoras. Unde generans secundum eum  
 non faciebat nisi deoccultare quod primo erat occultum. Et illa opinio ut  
 dictum fuit superius est impossibilis et superius improbata, nam illa poten-  
 tia destruit generationem et corruptionem in entibus. Ponit etiam infinitum  
 540 in actu, ut patet consideranti.

(64) Sed omissa illa opinione recitabo breviter aliam opinionem magis  
 novam que aliquo modo similis est opinioni Anaxagore. Opinatur<sup>36</sup> enim  
 iste quod forma quelibet materialis habet duplex esse, scilicet esse poten-  
 tiale et esse actuale. Dicit<sup>37</sup> autem quod ista esse sunt diversi modi ipsius  
 545 forme et non dicunt diversas res. Dicit<sup>38</sup> etiam quod istud esse potentiale  
 est de secunda specie qualitatis et esse actuale est de prima specie qualita-  
 tis et addit quod forma quantum ad utrumque esse tam actuale quam po-  
 tentiale differt essentialiter a materia. Unde dicit<sup>39</sup> iste quod sicut forma  
 sub esse actuali est aliud a materia et numerata contra materiam, sic etiam  
 550 quantum ad esse potentiale forma est aliud a materia et numerata contra  
 materiam. Opinatur<sup>40</sup> igitur iste quod forma quantum ad unum modum es-

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541 breviter] naturam *add. cod.*

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<sup>35</sup> Aristoteles, *De generatione et corruptione* 1.3 (318a23–25). Cf. *Auctoritates Aristotelis*, 167 (7).

<sup>36</sup> Iacobus de Viterbio, *Disputatio secunda de quolibet [=Quodl. II]*, q. 5 (ed. Eelcko Ypma [Würzburg, 1969], 70.385–86).

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.* (70.387–88).

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid.* (79.691–94).

<sup>39</sup> *Ibid.* (71.403–8).

<sup>40</sup> *Ibid.* (76.570–73).

sendi preexistat in materia, scilicet sub esse potenciali ita quod forma sub illo modo essendi est una res distincta et numerata contra materiam, et quantum ad alium modum essendi forma generatur, scilicet quantum ad esse actuale. Materia enim secundum istum hominem quantum ad suam naturam immediate nihil potest recipere ab agente sed bene ab agente supernaturali, et ideo iste vocat materiam secundum se potentiam obedientialem.<sup>41</sup> Sed ab agente naturali secundum istum nihil recipitur nisi mediante potentia naturali que est de secunda specie qualitatis, et illa potentia naturalis nihil aliud est nisi met natura forme sub esse potenciali tantum. Fundamentum autem istius positionis ipse accipit ex quibusdam dictis Commentatoris et Simplicii in *Predicamentis*.<sup>42</sup> Nam Commentator, VIII *Metaphysice*,<sup>43</sup> ut dicit iste,<sup>44</sup> sic dicit: “Est ergo aliquod unum quod primo est in potentia et post transfertur de potentia in actum et talis translatio non largitur multitudinem sed perfectionem.” Et ex hoc plane patet quod generans formam non inducit in materia que primo non esset ibi realiter, sed solum inducit formam quantum ad istum modum essendi, scilicet quantum ad esse actuale. Si enim agens induceret formam quantum ad suam naturam, tunc generans largiretur multitudinem essentialium, quoniam largiretur naturam novam et rem novam que primo non erat, scilicet formam, cuius oppositum videtur dicere Commentator. Non enim largitur multitudinem sed perfectionem.

(65) Item,<sup>45</sup> in eodem VIII *Metaphysice*<sup>46</sup> Commentator distinguit de materia uno modo ut est potentia totum compositum et sic est idem quod genus et significatur nomine generis, alio modo ut est pars eius cuius est materia et hoc modo non significatur nomine generis nec predicatur de eo cuius est materia. Patet ergo quod materia uno modo idem est quod genus. Modo certum est quod genus significat aliquod compositum, et illud non erit nisi compositum ex materia prima et forma sub esse potenciali et illo modo materia est potentia totum compositum. Unde sicut est dare compo-

<sup>41</sup> Cf. Iacobus de Viterbio, *Quodl.* II, q. 5 (ed. Ypma, 69.334–35).

<sup>42</sup> Cf. *Simplicii magni doctoris scolia in praedicamenta Aristotelis*, (De qualitate), in Simplicius, *Commentaire sur les Catégories d’Aristote. Traduction de Guillaume de Moerbeke*, ed. Adriaan Pattin, *Corpus Latinum Commentariorum in Aristotelem Graecorum* 5/2 (Leiden, 1975), 331–36.

<sup>43</sup> Averroes, *In VIII Metaph.*, comm. 15 (vol. VIII, fol. 224A).

<sup>44</sup> Cf. Iacobus de Viterbio, *Quodl.* II, q. 5 (ed. Ypma, 72.444–46).

<sup>45</sup> *Ibid.* (74.493–507).

<sup>46</sup> Averroes, *In VIII Metaph.*, comm. 6 (vol. VIII, fol. 214IK).

situm in actu ex duobus principiis, scilicet ex materia et forma sub esse actuali, ita est dare compositum in potentia ex materia et forma sub esse potenciali.

585 (66) Item,<sup>47</sup> potentia et actus sunt differentie valde opposite et circueunt totum ens et quamlibet speciem entis, et ideo in qualibet specie entis erit potentia et actus. In forma igitur asini (accipio gratia exempli), erit potentia et actus, et sic erit dare asinum in potentia qui erit eiusdem speciei cum asino in actu; hoc autem non esset nisi asinus in potentia mihi denotaret aliud quam materiam solum, et ideo asinus in potentia dicit aliquem compositum ex materia et alia re et non est aliud nisi forma asini sub esse potenciali.

590 (67) Item,<sup>48</sup> esse potentiale est medium inter ens actu et non ens simpliciter, et ideo oportet quod participet naturam istorum, quia participat naturam extremorum. Modo nulli dubium quod illa differunt a materia, scilicet esse actuale et non esse simpliciter; ergo medium quod participet naturam istorum etiam differt a materia; esse ergo potentiale differret a materia, quod probandum erat.

595 (68) Item,<sup>49</sup> Commentator in XII dicit<sup>50</sup> quod opinio Aristotelis est quod verum agens quod fuit in potentia educitur ad actum et ista transmutatio aliquid aliter assimilatur creationi et aliquid aliter latitationi formarum. Creationi assimilatur, quia materia transfertur de potentia ad actum; latitationi assimilatur, quia illud quod fuit in potentia efficitur in actu. Ergo vult quod illudmet quod primo fuit sub esse potenciali post efficitur sub esse actuali; alias enim non assimilaretur latitationi, ut videtur. Et eodem moto iste fundat suam positionem in quibusdam dictis Simplicii<sup>51</sup> in *Predicamentis* in secunda specie qualitatis que est naturalis potentia, etc. Vide ibi Simplicium.

600 (69) Etiam,<sup>52</sup> nisi sic dicatur non poterit evitari creatio. Ex quo enim nihil de forma preexistit in materia, immo sola materia quantum ad suam essentialiam, talis forma ex nihilo generabitur. Dicimus enim quod anima

<sup>47</sup> Iacobus de Viterbio, *Quodl.* II, q. 5 (ed. Ypma, 83.799). See Averroes, *Averrois Cordubensis Commentarium Magnum in Aristotelis De Anima Libros, Liber Primus*, ed. F. S. Crawford (Cambridge, Mass., 1953), 10.20–21.

<sup>48</sup> Iacobus de Viterbio, *Quodl.* II, q. 5 (ed. Ypma, 65.213–14).

<sup>49</sup> Cf. *Ibid.* (76.577–85).

<sup>50</sup> Cf. Averroes, *In XII Metaph.*, comm. 18 (vol. VIII, fols. 303rE–305vI).

<sup>51</sup> Simplicius, *Scolia in Praedicamenta Aristotelis*, 339.33–34; *passim*, 331–46.

<sup>52</sup> Iacobus de Viterbio, *Quodl.* II, q. 5 (ed. Ypma, 75.545–48).

intellectiva creatur nonobstante quod habeat subiectum in quo recipiatur. Et ideo propter hoc non evitabis creationem.

615 <70> Sed tu dices:<sup>53</sup> “non est simile, quia anima intellectiva non educitur de potentia materie per motum et transmutationem, sicut est de aliis formis, et ideo adhuc evitabitur creatio, quoniam ad hoc ut evitetur creatio sufficit quod productum educatur de potentia materie per motum et transmutationem.”

620 <71> Si sic, dicatur contra: quoniam accipiam ultimum instans de quo educitur et inducitur forma substantialis, certum est quod ibi non est motus et transmutatio in illo instanti; ergo statim videbitur quod forma substantialis creabitur. Si autem dicatur quod forma substantialis educitur de potentia materie per generationem que est transmutatio quedam, contra: quia illa generatio idem est quod forma substantialis et idem iudicium est de generatione et forma acquisita per generationem. In hoc maxime | stat virtus positionis istius viri, quamvis plures alias rationes adducat ad roborandum positionem suam et plura alia que omitto gratia brevitatis.

625 <72> Sed illa positio mihi non placet. Primo de hoc quod dicit quod forma habet duplex esse, scilicet potentiale et actuale, in quantum esse actuale et potentiale sunt modi essendi formarum. Istud non videtur naturale, nam queram de istis modis essendi utrum sint substantia vel accidens. Non potest dici quod sunt substantia, quia aut essent met forma cuius sunt modi, aut alia substantia; non met forma cuius sunt modi, quia idem non est modus sui ipsius; etiam sequeretur quod ista esse essent idem substantialiter; quecumque enim uni et eidem numero substantialiter sunt eadem inter se sunt eadem, et isti modi essent idem substantialiter in forma cuius sunt modi. Essent igitur idem inter se. Si ponas quod sunt substantia que est met forma, nec potest dici quod sint alia substantia, quia quelibet forma substantialis secundum eum habet istud duplex esse, et ideo queram de illa ut de prima et procedam in infinitum, ita quod oporteret ponere in eodem infinitas substantias, quarum natura esset modus alterius, quod puto falsum. Etiam isti modi non possunt esse substantia propter aliud, quoniam istemet dicit<sup>54</sup> quod forma sub istis modis est in prima et secunda specie qualitatis, quoniam sub esse actuali est de prima specie, sed sub esse potenciali est de secunda specie, et ideo non potest ponere quod isti modi essendi sunt substantie. Si autem dicas quod isti modi essendi sint acci-

<sup>53</sup> Iacobus de Viterbio, *Quodl.* II, q. 5 (ed. Ypma, 75.552–56).

<sup>54</sup> Ibid. (79.691–94).



650 dentia, tunc queram de istis accidentibus, quoniam accidentalis secundum  
 eum habet duplex esse: potentiale et actuale, quia pari ratione habet hoc  
 ponere de accidentibus et de substantiis, et tunc queram de illis aliis modis  
 essendi utrum sint substantie aut accidentia et procedam in infinitum.  
 Oportebit enim ponere in eodem infinitas formas substantiales vel acciden-  
 tales.

655 <73> Amplius, cum iste ponat istos modos essendi de genere qualitatis  
 sive formam quamlibet sub istis modis esse de prima vel secunda specie  
 qualitatis, sequetur quod omnia generabilia et corruptibilia ut sic erunt de  
 genere qualitatis. Nam secundum istum res aliqua non generatur nisi quan-  
 tum ad esse actuale, et illo modo corrumpitur etiam quantum ad esse  
 potentiale, et ut sic est res, ipse sunt de genere qualitatis, ut istemet con-  
 fitetur. Non erit igitur transmutatio nisi in qualitate, quod est contra Philo-  
 sophum, II *Physicorum* et I *De generatione*.<sup>55</sup>

660 <74> Si autem dicat quod transmutatio dicitur esse in substantia, quia res  
 illa que est sub modo illo est substantia, istud non valet, quia res illa non  
 acquiritur secundum se ut substantia est, sed acquiritur ut sub modo et ut  
 sic est de genere qualitatis. Nam si istud sufficeret, possem dicere quod  
 quando generatur album quod ibi est transmutatio in substantia, quia res  
 665 sub albedine est substantia. Cum igitur ille modus reponat rem in prima  
 vel secunda specie qualitatis ut sic res generetur, sequetur utique quod res  
 generetur et corrumpatur quecumque ut de prima vel secunda specie quali-  
 tatis, quod videtur absurdum ex hoc etiam quod in prima et secunda specie  
 qualitatis non est motus, ut patet VII *Physicorum*,<sup>56</sup> sed solum in tertia.

670 <75> Et confirmo, quia secundum istum, nihil novum invenitur in ter-  
 mino transmutationis nisi modus, nam tota illa realitas preexistebat, et ideo  
 modus ille est ratio formalis terminandi motum et transmutationem quam-  
 libet, quod videtur etiam impossibile ex alio, quoniam ratio terminandi  
 motum et transmutationem debet esse maioris entitatis quam motus vel  
 675 transmutatio. Motus autem et transmutatio sunt verae res, ut patet et con-  
 fitetur iste. Ergo illi modi erunt vere res et sic substantia aut accidens, et

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666 generetur] generatur *cod.*      674 vel] ut *cod.*

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<sup>55</sup> Cf. *Physica*, III.1, 200b30–34; *De generatione et corruptione* 1.4 (319b14–17).

<sup>56</sup> Cf. Aristoteles, *Physica* 7.3.

680 procedatur ut primo et oporteret istum confiteri secundum viam suam quod  
 isti modi non sunt substantia nec accidens secundum quod substantia et  
 accidens dicunt mihi res, sed possunt esse modi substantiarum et acci-  
 dentium, et hoc videtur negare Philosophus qui ens verum reale divisit in  
 substantiam et accidens sive in decem categorias.

685 <76> Etiam est multum improbabile quod dicit quod substantia aliqua  
 quantum ad suum esse actuale et potentiale sit per se in genere qualitatis in  
 prima vel secunda specie, quia tunc unum et idem esset per se et essentia-  
 liter in diversis predicamentis, quod videtur falsum, nam coordinationes  
 predicamentorum sunt impermixte, ut patet I *Posteriorum*.<sup>57</sup> Etiam non  
 videmus quod eadem res sit in diversis speciebus eiusdem predicamenti,  
 quia unum specie esset diversa specie, quod apparet falsum. Unde nun-  
 quam unum et idem posset esse homo et bos nec albedo et nigredo, ergo  
 690 multo minus unum et idem numero vel specie poterit esse diversa secun-  
 dum genus. Iste tamen habet confiteri quod eadem res sit in diversis spe-  
 ciebus eiusdem predicamenti, quoniam non est dubium quod ad qualitates  
 de tertia specie est motus et tamen ponit quod res non acquiritur nisi sub  
 esse actuali et sub illo esse est per se in prima specie, ergo unum et idem  
 695 erit per se in prima specie et in tertia et sic unum specie erit diversa specie.

<77> Amplius, cum iste credat evitare creationem,<sup>58</sup> ostendo quod non  
 evitat, quia queram de isto modo quem vocat esse actuale: aut preexistebat  
 quocumque modo, aut non. Si nullo modo preexistebat et habet esse post  
 non esse, ergo creabitur, nam illud cuius entitas nullo modo preexistit in  
 700 materia, et habet esse post non esse, illud creari dicitur secundum istum.  
 Modo nulli dubium quod iste modus est aliquid preter materiam et dato  
 quod non sit res aliqua, tamen aliquid est secundum eum. Ergo si nullo  
 modo preexistebat, creabitur, et quamvis ibi non sit res creata, tamen ibi  
 erit modus creatus. Si autem dicat quod ille modus preexistat sub alio  
 705 modo, procedam in infinitum.

<78> Amplius, sequetur quod infinite res de genere substantie et de aliis  
 generibus erunt simul in eadem portione materie. Hoc videtur impossibile.  
 Ideo etc. Consequentiam ostendo. Nam signata hac portione materie ve-  
 rum est dicere secundum intentionem philosophorum quod infinite sub-  
 710 stantie secundum numerum possunt ex illa portione materie generari et

<sup>57</sup> Cf. Aristoteles, *Analytica Posteriora* 1.15 (78b8–11). *Les Auctoritates Aristotelis*, 317 (68). See also Robert Andrews, “Boethius dicit: A Compilation of *Sententiae* Ascribed to Boethius,” [http://rrp.stanford.edu/boethius\\_dicit.shtml](http://rrp.stanford.edu/boethius_dicit.shtml)

<sup>58</sup> Cf. Iacobus de Viterbio, *Quodl.* II, q. 5 (ed. Ypma, 65.208–17).

tamen omnium istarum formarum realitas preexistit in tota materia ita quod quelibet istarum ponit in numerum contra materiam; dico “in numerum,” quia res distincte a materia etiam ponunt in numerum inter se, quia res diverse adinvicem et distincte. Sequitur igitur quod infinita distincta et diversa erunt simul in eadem portione materie, immo plura quam infinita, quoniam omnia quondam corrupta in hac portione materie realiter et distincte sunt in materia ista et simul et ista sunt infinita.

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(79) Amplius, omnia generanda realiter et distincte sunt in materia et ista sunt infinita, et ideo plura quam infinita, etiam de qualibet specie infinita sunt generabilia | et generata et de qualibet specie cuiuslibet generis; et dico de hac portione materie signata. Quod autem sint infinita in hac portione materie diversa contra se invicem numerata, etiam plura quam infinita in hoc instanti simul, non video sub quocumque esse. Unde Commentator, II *Metaphysice*,<sup>59</sup> <dicit> quod in universo habente situm non est possibilis processus in infinitum, nec per se nec per accidens.

(80) Amplius, sequetur quod omne generabile generabitur vel quod erit aliquid otiosum per tempus infinitum, quorum utrumque est impossibile. Falsitas consequentium patet. Non enim omne generabile generabitur, et dato quod omne corruptibile corrumpatur (I *Celi* Aristoteles et Commentator),<sup>60</sup> otiosum etiam non est in natura tempore infinito; in natura enim nihil est otiosum (in eodem I *Celi* et III *De anima* et II *Metaphysice*).<sup>61</sup> Sed consequentiam probo. Accipiam aliquod generabile sicut antichristum, gratia exempli. Aut igitur generabitur, aut non. Si sic, habetur propositum. Sic etiam dicam de quolibet alio generabili et sic omnia generabuntur, quod est falsum. Si dicas quod antichristus non generabitur unquam in futuro et tamen in materia est naturalis potentia ad eius generationem distincta a naturali potentia ad generationem cuiuslibet alterius individui, sequitur quod illa potentia erit otiosa per tempus infinitum, quoniam illa potentia est otiosa que ad actum non reducitur, quia potentia ordinatur ad actum sicut ad finem, et unumquodque est frustra nisi suum finem attingat, ut patet II *Physicorum*.<sup>62</sup>

<sup>59</sup> Averroes, *In II Metaph.*, comm. 6 (vol. VIII, fol. 31D).

<sup>60</sup> Aristoteles, *De caelo et mundo* 1.12 (283a24–25); Averroes, *Commentum super I De celo*, comm. 137 (262.39–40).

<sup>61</sup> Aristoteles, *De caelo* 1.4 (271a33); *De anima* 3.9 (432b21). See Averroes, *In II Metaph.*, comm. 1 (vol. VIII, fol. 28K). See also *Les Auctoritates Aristotelis*, 120 (62); 177 (33).

<sup>62</sup> Cf. Aristoteles, *Physica* 2.6 (197b22–23).

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(81) Amplius, ego arguam inquisitive: accipiam meam realitatem que  
 est una numero. Modo dicis quod illa realitas mea que est una numero  
 preexistebat in materia tanquam res distincta contra materiam; aut ergo in  
 745 qualibet portione materie, aut in una tantum. Non est dicendum in una tan-  
 tum, quoniam qua ratione in una, eadem ratione in alia. Aut ergo in nulla,  
 aut in omnibus; non in nulla, quia tunc illa realitas esset separata, quod  
 non diceret; ergo relinquitur quod mea realitas que est una numero pre-  
 existebat in diversis portionibus sub tali esse potenciali. Modo queram  
 750 quando illa realitas fuit reducta ad actum de esse potenciali in materia mea  
 quam habeo, ista eadem realitas numero existens sub esse potenciali in aliis  
 portionibus materie fuit reducta ad actum in eis, aut non. Si dicas quod sic,  
 tunc sequitur quod erunt plures alii homines habentes eandem realitatem  
 mecum numero, quod est falsum. Si dicas quod talis res sub esse potenciali  
 755 non fuit reducta ad actum in aliis portionibus materie, aut ergo illa realitas  
 met remanebat in aliis portionibus materie, aut corrumpebatur. Si dicas  
 quod talis realitas sub esse potenciali corrumpebatur, hoc non poterat esse  
 nisi per adventum esse actualis et sic sequetur primum quod realitas que  
 est eadem numero erit deducta ad actum, modo sub diversis portionibus  
 760 materie. Si dicas quod corrumpitur in aliis portionibus materie et tamen  
 non oportet quod adveniat eis actus, sufficit autem quod adveniat alicui alii  
 portioni materie; si dicas sic, sequetur quod realitas mea in aliis portio-  
 nibus erit sine esse potenciali et actuali, quoniam realitas in se corrumpi non  
 potest secundum istum.<sup>63</sup> Si autem dicas quod mea realitas eadem numero  
 765 adhuc est sub esse potenciali in aliis portionibus, tunc sequetur quod poterit  
 generari aliquis habens eandem realitatem numero mecum, et sic quod erit  
 corruptum poterit idem numero regenerari et etiam in eadem portione ma-  
 terie, quia me corrupto in mea portione materie remanebit mea realitas sub  
 esse potenciali, et ita realitas sub esse potenciali fiet adhuc sub esse actuali,  
 770 et sic generatum et corruptum habebunt eandem realitatem numero, immo  
 eadem res infinities generabitur et corrumperetur, quod puto falsum, et miror  
 quomodo talis magister non vidit hec difficilia contra suam positionem,  
 sed credo quod confisus proprio ingenio talia dixit.

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749 potenciali] in materia mea quam habeo utrum ista eadem realitas numero *add. cod. sed cancel. per "vacat"*

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<sup>63</sup> Cf. Iacobus de Viterbio, *Quodl.* II, q. 5 (ed. Ypma, 78.652–58).

775 (82) Amplius, ipse non ponit materiam primam subiectum generationis,  
immo compositum ex materia et tali realitate in potentia, quod tamen est  
contra Aristotelem in I *De generatione* et I *Physicorum*.<sup>64</sup>

780 (83) Amplius, si forma sub esse potenciali sit numerata contra materiam,  
tunc ex materia et forma sub tali esse fiet unum et per se unum si sit forma  
substantialis. Modo non est querenda causa quare ex duobus fiat unum nisi  
quia hoc est potentia et illud actus, ut patet II *De anima*.<sup>65</sup> Illa ergo ex qui-  
bus debet fieri unum oportet quod unum sit in potentia et aliud sit actus. Si  
igitur ex istis duobus fiat unum, scilicet ex materia et forma sub tali modo,  
oportebit quod alterum illorum sit actus, non materia, ergo forma, quod  
785 tamen non est verum secundum istum. Alias multas rationes iste adducit  
contra se et eas dissolvit ut placet sibi. Omitto propter brevitatem.

(84) Rationes et auctoritates in quibus substantantur non procedunt.  
Quod enim Commentator dicit quod generans non largitur multitudinem  
etc.,<sup>66</sup> hoc dixit Commentator, quoniam non debemus imaginari secundum  
quod quidam antiquitus imaginabantur, scilicet quod generans generet  
790 formam distinctam a materia et deinde eam reponat in materia, quoniam  
tunc forma in subsistentia esset primo distincta a materia et sic poneret in  
numerum contra materiam quantum ad subsistentiam, et talem multitu-  
dinem generans non largitur nec generat formam distinctam a materia,  
immo generat formam in materia sive compositum quod primo fuit in po-  
795 tentia passiva materie et sic largitur materie perfectionem, quoniam mate-  
ria perficitur per formam, et non multitudinem.

(85) Vel potest dici quod pro tanto dixit quod non largitur multitudinem,  
quia de quibuscumque verum est dicere quod generata sunt, verum fuit  
dicere quod possibilia erant generari, quoniam possibilia educi de potentia  
800 passiva materie, quia non sit impossibile fieri et pro tanto dixit hoc Com-  
mentator. Unde Commentator in IV *Physicorum*,<sup>67</sup> capitulo de loco circa  
finem, dicit quod materia aque et forma aque dicitur sed diversimode,

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798 quibuscumque] quocumque *cod.*      sunt] fuit *cod.*

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<sup>64</sup> Aristoteles, *De generatione et corruptione* 1.5; *Physica* 1.6–9.

<sup>65</sup> Cf. Averroes, *In Aristotelis De Anima Librum Tertium*, ed. Crawford, 139.42–48.

<sup>66</sup> Averroes, *In VIII Metaph.*, comm. 15 (vol. VIII, fol. 224A).

<sup>67</sup> Averroes, *In IV Phys.*, comm. 49 (vol. IV, fol. 146L).

quoniam forma aque dicitur aqua in actu et materia, dicitur aqua in poten-  
tia, non ergo vult quod aqua in potentia sit aliud a materia et ideo accipias  
805 auctoritatem pro auctoritate.

⟨86⟩ Ad aliam, Commentator dicit quod materia ut est potentia totum est  
idem quod genus et predicatur de eo cuius est genus; genus autem signifi-  
cat compositum aliquod et non aliud nisi compositum possibile.

⟨87⟩ Sed illa ratio est mirabilis. Iste enim videtur intendere ex dicto  
810 Commentatoris quod genus significet mihi compositum ex materia et for-  
ma sub esse potenciali, ita quod animal mihi significat compositum ex ma-  
teria et anima in | potentia; animal ergo significabit mihi compositum  
potentiale et sic non poterit de composito actuali predicari, scilicet de  
Sorte vel de homine. Non enim est verum quod compositum in actu sit  
815 compositum in potentia et quod homo sit animal in potentia sive composi-  
tum ex corpore et ex anima sub esse potenciali.

⟨88⟩ Unde credo quod animal significat mihi compositum ex materia et  
forma in actu in quantum genus predicabile de suis speciebus, quod materia  
ut est totum compositum in potentia est idem generi, sive genus non est ita  
820 superficialiter capiendum ut iste accipit, sed dico quod Commentator in-  
tellexit per materiam ut est totum compositum in potentia totum composi-  
tum in actu acceptum, tamen sub modo confusiori et imperfectiori  
appropinquante magis nature materiali propter suam imperfectionem. Sicut  
animal significat aggregatum ex corpore et anima in actu, nulli dubium  
825 sane mentis, hoc tamen est sub modo confusiori et imperfectiori quam sig-  
nificant species, et hoc voluit Commentator.

⟨89⟩ Quod autem additur quod potentia et actus circueunt<sup>68</sup> quodlibet  
ens et quamlibet speciem, certe ego volo quod est verum dicere de  
quolibet ente quod est in potentia vel actu sive potentia vel actus et in istis  
830 entibus materialibus verum est dicere quod est in actu et in potentia, sicut  
est verum dicere quod est homo in actu et potentia homo, etiam homo  
potentia et homo actu non proprie differunt nec sunt idem specie, nam  
homo potentia nihil aliud est nisi materia realiter, et homo actu est  
compositum ex materia et forma. Modo ipsa non est proprie eadem  
835 secundum speciem cum composito nec etiam alia secundum speciem,  
quoniam materia non est species; potest tamen materia ista dici diversa  
realiter a composito ex materia et forma ratione partis, et illo modo dicam  
quod potentia tale et actu tale sunt in eadem specie, non tamen ut ille dicit.

<sup>68</sup> Iacobus de Viterbio, *Quodl.* II, q. 5 (ed. Ypma, 74.508–11).

840 (90) Quod autem addit quod esse potentiale est medium inter ens actu et non ens simpliciter, istud est dictum a Commentatore primo *Physicorum*<sup>69</sup> et loquitur ibi de materia et hoc non est aliud dicere nisi quod materia tale medium est nec est intelligendum quod sit medium per compositionem, sed potest dici medium per abnegationem.

845 (91) Unde quod dicis quod ens actu et non ens differunt a materia, certe dicam quod verum est. Ergo esse potentiale quod est medium inter ista differret a materia, quia medium participat naturam extremorum. Ista ratio mihi videtur mirabilis, quia istud esse potentiale quod est medium est met natura materie et ideo concludis quod idem differat a se ipso vel supponis quod debes probare, quoniam tu supponis esse possibile quod est medium  
850 esse aliud preter materiam et hoc supposito, das modum per quem differt, et hoc est petere sive supponere propositum. Etiam si esse potentiale non sit medium per compositionem, non concludet ratio quod si materia differret ab extremis quod propter hoc differat ab illo, nam homo est medium per abnegationem inter asinum et capram et Deum et diabolum, et tamen  
855 non oportet quod si aliquid differat a Deo et a diabolo quod propter hoc differat ab homine, nam illud quod differret ab utroque poterit esse idem quod homo, et sic est in proposito.

(92) Ad auctoritatem Commentatoris in XII *Metaphysice* ((68)), dicam quod magis est ad oppositum quam ad propositum, nam opinio Aristotelis  
860 est quod agens transmutans materiam non congregat inter duo distincta, sed extrahit quod fuit in potentia ad actum. Assimilatur autem creatori in hoc quia nihil preexistit in materia realiter de forma, sed differt a creatore, quia creatori non correspondet potentia passiva. Assimilatur autem latitationi, quia illud quod primo fuit in potentia obiective modo est in actu; assimilatur ergo latitationi in hoc quod differt a creatore. Differt autem a  
865 creatore, quia creatio nihil presupponit ex parte facti de cuius potentia factum educatur per actionem agentis et illud quod fit ab agente naturali aliquid presupponit ex parte facti de cuius potentia factum educitur et in hoc assimilatur latitationi, quia dicentes latitationem ponebant totum compositum preexistere sub esse actuali, tamen occulte. Aristoteles autem  
870 solum posuit de toto composito materiam preexistere, que materia est compositum in potentia, et ideo opinio Aristotelis fuit media inter latitationem ponentes et creationem dicentes. Non enim posuit res simpliciter preexistere quantum ad materiam et formam earum, quod faciunt latitantes,

<sup>69</sup> Averroes, *In I Phys.*, comm. 70 (vol. IV, fol. 41E).

875 nec posuit eas simpliciter ex nihilo produci, quod faciunt creantes, sed po-  
 suit viam mediam, scilicet quod de toto composito sola materia preexistit,  
 de cuius potentia totum compositum educitur ratione forme. Sed si opinio  
 quam ponit iste esset vera, tunc non esset aliud nisi ponere latitationem,  
 immo maiora sequerentur inconuenientia quam ad positionem Anaxagore,  
 880 secundum quod potest esse manifestum ex dictis.

(93) Ad aliam, quando additur quod non poterit evitari creatio, dico  
 quod immo; et quando probatur: “quia nihil preexistit de forma etc.,” dico  
 quod ad evitandum creationem sufficit quod preexistat aliquid de eo quod  
 producitur. Modo, quod producitur est compositum, et ideo sufficit quod  
 885 preexistat aliquid de composito, scilicet materia, sed ratio concludit quod  
 ad minus forma creabitur, quia nihil preexistet de forma: ego possum di-  
 cere quod forma non generatur nisi per accidens, ut dicunt plurimi, com-  
 positum autem per se primo, et ideo dicam quod ad evitandum creationem  
 sufficit quod preexistat aliquid de composito, scilicet materia.

890 (94) Aliter potest dici quod dato quod forma generetur per se primo, ut  
 dicunt alii, adhuc evitabitur creatio, quoniam creatio non habet subiectum  
 in quo recipiatur et de cuius potentia educatur, sed generatio formarum na-  
 turalium sic, et quando dicitur quod anima intellectiva creatur et tamen ha-  
 bet subiectum in quo recipitur, hic potest dici quod anima intellectiva  
 895 habet subiectum in quo recipitur, non tamen habet subiectum de cuius po-  
 tentia educatur nec per motum divisibilem precedentem nec per transmuta-  
 tionem indivisibilem. Unde non est verum dicere quod anima intellectiva  
 cum creatur educatur de potentia materie, sed verum est dicere cum creatur  
 quod in materia inducitur et non educitur. Unde creando infunditur et in-  
 900 fundiendo creatur, sed in ultimo instanti transmutationis divisibilis prece-  
 dentis verum est dicere quod forma naturalis de potentia materie educitur  
 et etiam generatio que est idem quod forma de potentia materie educitur, et  
 non est verum dicere quod solum forma inducatur, sicut fuit de creatione.

(95) Ad rationes. Ad primam ((1)) credo dicendum quod primum princi-  
 905 pium non est infiniti vigoris, quia philosophus non habet plus ponere de  
 primo principio quam possit per motum investigari; sed per motum non  
 potest investigari primum esse infiniti vigoris, nam ad hoc quod virtus ali-  
 qua moveat per tempus infinitum sufficit quod sit infinita in essendo et in-  
 fatigabilis in operando.

910 (96) Et confirmo: nam si primum principium esset infinitum in vigore,  
 posset velocius movere, et sic primum | principium haberet admixtionem



915 potentie, et hoc expresse intendit Commentator<sup>70</sup> in II *Celi* ubi probat Aristoteles quod motus celi non habet tarditatem que fit ex debilitate et senectute nec velocitatem que fit ex iuventute et est in capitulo de regularitate motus celi. Ibi expresse dicit<sup>71</sup> quod potentie separatorum a materia non sunt infinite in vigore, quoniam non haberent proportionem ad sua mobilia et sic moverent in instanti, ut ipse arguit, et sequeretur quod non esset aliqua multitudo in separatis si essent infiniti vigoris. Quod declarat, quoniam intelligentia Saturni movet per tempus infinitum sicut totius et quodlibet eorum est infinitum in vigore. Non ergo differunt in potentia motoris, ut dicit, nec differunt in tempore motoris, et ideo non haberent diversitatem nec proportionem. Et concludit quod potentie eorum aliquo modo sunt infinite et alio modo non sunt infinite sed finite. Idem dicit proprie Commentator in *De substantia orbis*,<sup>72</sup> nam non attribuit intelligentiis nisi  
920 infinitatem durationis et non vigoris, ut patet ibi.

(97) Amplius, si Deus esset infiniti vigoris, actiones agentium particularium essent frustra, nam sine agentibus particularibus posset Deus quod potest cum eis. Tunc ponatur in esse, quia possibili posito in esse non debet sequi impossibile. Si autem ponatur in esse, tunc agentia particularia erunt otiosa, quia perdent proprias operationes et qui tollit ab entibus proprias operationes tollit ab eis proprias formas. Non igitur Deus est infiniti  
930 vigoris.

(98) Ad rationes que probant oppositum. Ad primam (<1>) dico quod Aristoteles in VIII *Physicorum*,<sup>73</sup> quando dicebat quod virtus infinita non est in magnitudine finita, intellexit de infinitate durationis et non vigoris. Quod ego ostendo, quia demonstratio illa si argueret solum de infinitate vigoris, tunc non probaret nisi de primo principio, quod tamen videtur falsum, nam Aristoteles de aliis intelligentiis nunquam adduxit aliam demonstrationem ad probandum quod non sunt virtutes in magnitudine nisi  
940 illam. Unde illa fuit communis omnibus intelligentiis. Unde in XII *Metaphysice* cum ipse adduxit eandem demonstrationem ad probandum quod motor celi non sit virtus in magnitudine, statim subdit Aristoteles:<sup>74</sup> “Utrum autem talem substantiam abstractam sit ponendum unam vel

<sup>70</sup> Averroes, *Commentum super II De celo*, comm. 38 (340.15–17).

<sup>71</sup> Ibid. (342.78–343.80).

<sup>72</sup> E.g., Averroes, *De substantia orbis* 3 (vol. IX, fol. 9F–10A).

<sup>73</sup> Aristoteles, *Physica* 8.10 (266a24–26).

<sup>74</sup> Aristoteles, *Metaphysica* 12.8 (1073a14).

plures perscrutandum.” Unde vult expresse quod demonstratio illa probet  
 945 universaliter de motore celi ipsum non esse in magnitudine. Si autem in-  
 telligeret Aristoteles de infinitate vigoris, certum est quod illa demonstra-  
 tio non esset de aliis intelligentiis a prima, et sic perscrutatio Aristotelis  
 non fuisset sufficiens.

950 (99) Unde est intentio Aristotelis quod virtus infinita in duratione non  
 potest esse in magnitudine finita, quoniam talis virtus moveret in instanti,  
 ut dicit etiam Commentator,<sup>75</sup> et causa est quia virtutes in materia secun-  
 dum quod magis durant sunt maioris vigoris, ut patet ad sensum, et ideo si  
 esset aliqua virtus que duraret per tempus infinitum, oporteret quod habe-  
 ret vigorem infinitum. Unde in talibus virtutibus facta additione ad tempus  
 955 agendi vel recipiendi actionem fit additio vigoris, ut patet in VII *Physi-*  
*corum* circa finem.<sup>76</sup> Bene ergo intellexit de infinitate durationis et non vi-  
 goris. Et contra: celum est habens magnitudinem finitam et est infinite  
 durationis, etiam habet operationem infinitam.

960 (100) Hic potest dici quod celum non est virtus prima; etiam sua opera-  
 tio non est actio sed passio, et ideo potest esse eternum et habere magnitu-  
 dinem finitam, sicut videmus quod materia eterna est et habet quantitatem  
 finitam, tamen sua operatio est passio et non est prima virtus. Quando ergo  
 Aristoteles dixit<sup>77</sup> quod in magnitudine finita non est virtus infinita in du-  
 ratione, intellexit de virtute cuius operatio est actio et de virtute prima. Et  
 965 sive sit virtus prima sive non, dummodo sua operatio sit actio sive moveret  
 active, nunquam poterit esse virtus in magnitudine finita, quia oporteret  
 quod talis virtus esset infiniti vigoris et per consequens quod esset in  
 magnitudine infinita; quoniam in corporibus componit, secundum quod  
 additur virtus, additur corporeitas.

970 (101) Aliter potest dici quod Aristoteles bene dixit quod virtus infinita in  
 duratione non potest esse in magnitudine etc., id est non potest recipi in  
 materia mediante magnitudine, nam omnes tales forme sint finite duratio-

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945 non esse *inv. cod.*

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<sup>75</sup> Averroes, *In VIII Phys.*, comm. 79 (vol. IV, fol. 426J); *In XII Metaph.*, comm. 41 (vol. VIII, fol. 324D).

<sup>76</sup> Non inveni. Cf. Aristoteles, *Physica* 7.5 (250a25–27).

<sup>77</sup> Cf. Aristoteles, *Physica* 8.10 (266a24–26).

nis, ut patet per inductionem et fuit superius declaratum de materia celi,<sup>78</sup>  
 et tunc instantia de celo non est ad propositum, quia celum non est forma  
 975 in materia habente magnitudinem; est enim substantia simplex cuius ope-  
 ratio est movere passive, et ideo bene potest esse eternum, immo forte ce-  
 lum est potentia simplex cui repugnat corruptio, et ideo supposito quod  
 celum esset compositum ex potentia et actu, forte demonstratio Aristotelis  
 non concluderet, ut visum fuit in questione de materia celi,<sup>79</sup> et propter hoc  
 980 dicebatur quod intentio Aristotelis fuit quod celum sit substantia simplex.

⟨102⟩ Et tu dices: “Ergo non obstante illa demonstratione potero dicere  
 quod Deus erit substantia simplex habens magnitudinem finitam, sicut ce-  
 lum.” Potest dici quod Philosophus relinquebat pro manifesto hoc non  
 posse esse, quia tunc primum principium esset per se mobile, cuius oppo-  
 985 situm demonstratum erat, quia probatum erat quod erat devenire ad mo-  
 vens immobile per se. Et quia aliquis potuisset imaginari primum moveri  
 per accidens et per se movere sicut anima animalis, ideo Aristoteles voluit  
 ostendere ipsum esse omnino separatum a magnitudine, ita quod non esset  
 perfectio alicuius potentie habentis magnitudinem mediante magnitudine.

990 ⟨103⟩ Sed hic occurrit dubitatio difficilis. Una est quod virtus infinite  
 durationis abstracta a materia non movet in non tempore et tamen si esset  
 virtus in magnitudine, id est in materia habente magnitudinem, moveret in  
 non tempore.

995 ⟨104⟩ Et respondet Commentator<sup>80</sup> VIII *Physicorum* 79 commento, quod  
 si posuerimus virtutem infinitam in duratione in magnitudine, id est in  
 materia habente magnitudinem, sequeretur quod illa virtus esset infiniti vi-  
 goris. Nam in talibus virtutibus si sunt active specialiter secundum ad-  
 ditionem in vigore est additio in duratione et econverso, et secundum  
 additionem in duratione est additio in magnitudine ceteris paribus. Et ideo  
 1000 si aliqua virtus in materia duraret per tempus infinitum, oporteret quod  
 suus vigor esset infinitus et sua magnitudo infinita, et ideo moveret in  
 instanti, quia sine proportionem moveret virtutem mobilis alicuius.

⟨105⟩ Sed dicit Commentator<sup>81</sup> quod si esset virtus separata sicut est du-  
 rationis infinite, non potest dici finita nec infinita, quia finitum et infinitum

<sup>78</sup> Maino de Maineri, “Questio utrum celum habeat materiam,” Florence, Biblioteca Nazionale (C.S.) J.3.6, fol. 94va.

<sup>79</sup> Ibid.

<sup>80</sup> Averroes, *In VIII Phys.*, comm. 79 (vol. IV, fol. 425M).

<sup>81</sup> Ibid. 79 (vol. IV, fol. 427E); *In I Phys.* comm. 15, (fol. 13B).

- 1005 quantitati congruunt, et ideo sola actio eorum erit infinita et illa separata  
erunt nec finita nec infinita, et ideo non sequetur quod illa separata mo-  
veant in tempore, quia in hiis non potest | intelligi “una potentia maior  
1010 proportio potentie motive ad motum erit sicut proportio velocitatis ad ve-  
locitatem motus. In existentibus autem non in corpore non est proportio,  
cum proportio est solius magnitudinis ad magnitudinem vel eorum que in-  
sunt magnitudini eo quod insunt ei, et haec manifesta sunt per se ut ipse  
1015 dicit. Hec sunt quasi verba Commentatoris, sed hic Commentator obscurus  
est, nam illud non videtur verum quod vigor separatorum non sit finitus  
nec infinitus, et alibi dicit oppositum, unde in II *Celi* ubi allegatum est su-  
perius, dicit<sup>82</sup> quod sunt finite uno modo et infinite alio modo, et loquitur  
de virtutibus separatis et idem in libello *De substantia orbis* quod sunt fi-  
niti vigoris et infinite durationis.
- 1020 <106> Et ideo aliqui dicunt quod Commentator in illo loco non loqueba-  
tur ex intentione. Sed istud est malum de Commentatore. Certum est quod  
ipse ex intentione movet dubitationem illam et ex intentione solvit. Unde  
non loquitur dubitando, ut patet ibidem.
- 1025 <107> Et ideo aliter dicitur quod primum principium de quo loquitur  
principaliter quod est separatum potest dupliciter considerari: uno modo ut  
finis motus; alio modo ut agens motum. Et similiter intelligo de aliis: si  
accipiatur ut movens active, sic habet vigorem finitum et debet dici finiti  
vigoris, sed si consideretur ut finis, sic non debet dici vigoris finiti vel in-  
finiti, nam vigor proprie debetur separatis ut moventia active.
- 1030 <108> Sed istud est omnino extra intentionem Commentatoris, quia ipse  
ponit rationem ad probandum proportionem, quia finitum et infinitum sunt  
solum in corporibus; modo, certum quod intelligentie, ut moventes sunt,  
non sunt in corporibus. Ergo sic non habebunt vigorem finitum nec infi-  
nitum, ut Commentator loquitur in VIII *Physicorum*,<sup>83</sup> secundum materiam  
1035 subiectam; modo, certum est quod ibi consideratur prius motor ut movens  
active et non ut finis, et ideo ut sic loquebatur ibi de primo motore.

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1016 II] III *cod.*

1034 ut] et *cod.*

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<sup>82</sup> Averroes, *Commentum super II De celo*, comm. 38 (343.89).

<sup>83</sup> Averroes, *In VIII Phys.*, comm. 79 (vol. IV, fol. 427E).

1040 <109> Et ideo aliter dico cum Commentatore quod virtutes separate non  
 debent dici finite nec infinite in vigore, eo modo supple quo virtutes in  
 corpore sunt finite vel infinite in vigore, nam virtutes corporales sic dicun-  
 tur finiti vigoris quod finitati vigoris correspondet finitas temporis et qualis  
 1045 est proportio in vigoribus eadem est in temporibus mensurantibus et  
 magnitudinibus, et infinitati vigoris correspondet infinitas temporis et  
 magnitudinis. Et per illum modum vult dicere Commentator quod vigor  
 separatorum non est finitus nec infinitus, quia finitati vigoris non cor-  
 1050 respondet finitas temporis, nec est proportio in temporalibus que est in  
 vigoribus. Non ergo possunt dici vigoris finiti eo modo quo illa inferiora  
 corporalia, quia tempus durationis earum est infinitum et non finitum, nec  
 possunt dici vigoris infiniti eo modo quo ista inferiora dicuntur vigoris in-  
 finiti, nam aliquid hic inferius existens habens vigorem infinitum si esset  
 1055 aliquid tale, tempus durationis eius excederet tempus durationis cuiuslibet  
 alterius finiti vigoris in infinitum. Sed dato quod poneres aliquid separa-  
 tum infiniti vigoris, tamen tempus durationis eius non excederet tempus  
 durationis alicuius alterius finiti vigoris, quia omnia separata dato quod  
 sint vigoris finiti per vigorem finitum durant infinitum; immo, si finitum et  
 1060 infinitum eodem modo essent in separatis et corporalibus, sequeretur quod  
 omnia separata essent vigoris infiniti, quia tempus correspondens eorum  
 actionibus esset infinitum et tunc sequeretur quod non moverent sua mobi-  
 lia in determinata velocitate, quod tamen est falsum. Immo, si stella ad-  
 deretur orbi, non moveret orbem nisi cum fatigatione et pena, ut patet II  
 1065 *Celi* ab Aristotele et Commentatore.<sup>84</sup> Et illo modo intellexit Commenta-  
 tor, quod non debent dici finiti vigoris vel infiniti secundum quod propor-  
 tionantur finitati temporis et infinitati eius, sed quoniam sint finiti vigoris  
 secundum quod proportionantur velocitati et tarditati motus non intendit  
 Commentator. Et in illa expositione quam nunquam audivi declarabatur  
 1065 anima mea et illam expositionem accepi ex dictis Commentatoris in fine  
 VIII *Physicorum*.

<110> Ad auctoritatem Commentatoris I *Celi et mundi* et Aristotelis VIII  
*Physicorum* (<2>), iam solutum est. Nam dato quod non sit infiniti vigoris  
 sed solum durationis, supposito quod esset virtus in magnitudine, sequere-

<sup>84</sup> Aristoteles, *De caelo* 2.12 (293a10, secundum translationem Michaelis Scoti);  
 Averroes, *Commentum super II De celo*, comm. 71 (407.9–408.14). Cf. Averroes *In*  
*VIII Phys.*, comm. 79 (vol. IV, fol. 426L).

1070 tur quod moveret in instanti, quoniam sequeretur quod esset infiniti vigor-  
 1075 ris, ut visum est.

1075 <111> Ad tertiam auctoritatem Commentatoris VIII *Physicorum* circa  
 finem (<3>), ubi dicit<sup>85</sup> quod non est proportio motorum abstractorum ad  
 sua mobilia et si aliquod esset in materia moveret in instanti, dicendum  
 1080 quod Commentator intellexit non esse proportionem naturalem inter mo-  
 motorem et mobilia, que proportio attenditur penes tempus, quia quodlibet  
 movet tempore infinito. Et illam proportionem negavit idem Commentator.  
 Et ideo si aliquod eorum esset virtus in materia, cum moveat tempore infi-  
 1085 nito, sequeretur utique quod esset infiniti vigoris et sic moveret in instanti,  
 nam talis proportio est in virtutibus in materia, quod secundum additionem  
 temporis additur virtus et vigor. Et ideo si aliquid moveret tempore infi-  
 nito, esset per infinitum vigorem. Sed talem proportionem negaret Com-  
 mentator in motoribus. Sed tamen non intendit quin ibi sit proportio que  
 attenditur penes velocitatem et tarditatem motus, non intendit, ut patet  
 consideranti eius dicta.

1085 <112> Ad aliam (<4>), XII *Metaphysice*, dicunt aliqui<sup>86</sup> quod Commenta-  
 tor male dixit ibi et ideo se corrigit in libello *De substantia orbis*, tamen  
 non audeo Commentatorem negare sic expresse. Ista auctoritas videtur im-  
 plicare duo difficilia. Primum est quod primum sit infiniti vigoris. Nec un-  
 1090 quam vidi auctoritatem magis expressam ad hoc probandum. Secundo,  
 difficile videtur in auctoritate quod primum principium non moveat pri-  
 mum celum immediate effective. Ponit enim Commentator motorem ap-  
 propriatum a quo habet velocitatem terminatam et illa videtur esse intentio  
 Aristotelis et Commentatoris II *Celi* capitulo de duabus difficilibus ques-  
 1095 tionibus. Dicit enim Philosophus<sup>87</sup> quod quedam sunt que attingunt suam  
 perfectionem et suum bonum sine actione (et intelligere videtur motorem  
 celi), et alia unica actione, et alia pluribus actionibus, ut ipse dicit. Motor  
 igitur primus attinget suum bonum sine actione aliqua, et sic non movebit  
 celum effective sed solum in ratione finis, et illud videtur velle Aristoteles  
 1100 in XII *Metaphysice*; dicit<sup>88</sup> enim semper quod primum movet ut appetibile  
 et tale movet solum in ratione finis.

<sup>85</sup> Averroes *In VIII Phys.*, comm. 79 (vol. IV, fol. 426J).

<sup>86</sup> Cf. Thomas Wylton, "Utrum essentia divina sit perfectio divina intensive," ed. Elzbieta Jung-Palczewska, *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Âge* 64 (1997): 364.

<sup>87</sup> Aristoteles, *De caelo et mundo* 2.12 (292a22–24).

<sup>88</sup> Aristoteles, *Metaphysica* 1.7 (1072a26–27).

1105 <113> Et posset confirmari, quia quod movet effective movet propter  
 aliquid melius, quia movet propter finem, et finis est melior hiis que sunt  
 ad finem. Sed nihil est melius primo principio; optimum enim est eorum  
 que sunt in natura, scilicet Deus, in prohemio *Metaphysice*.<sup>89</sup> Et ad hoc est  
 auctoritas Commentatoris allegata in XII *Metaphysice* quod celum movere  
 a duplici motore: ab uno habet eternitatem et ab alio habet determinatam  
 velocitatem, et si primum moveret immediate, primum celum iam moveret  
 in instanti, et hoc dicit ibi Commentator.<sup>90</sup> Et ex hoc sequitur etiam quod  
 1110 sit infiniti vigoris. Propter illa dicunt aliqui quod Deus non movet effective  
 primum celum, sed solum in ratione finis.

1115 <114> Sed contra hoc arguitur primo auctoritate Commentatoris in XII  
*Metaphysice*. Dicit enim Commentator<sup>91</sup> quod qui dicunt substantiam pri-  
 mam priorem motore totius falsum dicunt. Quelibet enim substantiarum  
 abstractarum principium est substantie sensibilis secundum | motorem et  
 secundum finem. Primum igitur principium non solum movet in ratione  
 finis, sed etiam in ratione efficientis.

1120 <115> Amplius, Aristoteles in XII *Metaphysice* investigat naturam ab-  
 stractorum per naturam motuum, quod non faceret nisi primum esset  
 principium effectuum. Unde si primum non moveret effective, nunquam  
 posset per motum investigari, ut videtur, et ista est demonstratio apud  
 multos. Si teneatur istud quod primum moveat effective, tunc oportet alias  
 rationes dissolvere et exponere auctoritatem.

1125 <116> Ad auctoritatem “Commentator dicit in XII quod celum movere a  
 duplici motore etc.,” potest dici quod Commentator intellexit de aliis moti-  
 bus a motu primo, quia alii motus habent motorem appropriatum preter  
 primum a quo habent velocitatem determinatam et a primo habent eter-  
 nitatem. Et si intelligatur de primo motu, tunc dicam quod non intellexit  
 Commentator quod habeat duos motores realiter differentes, sed voluit  
 1130 dicere quod motor primus consideratus ut efficiens motum causat, motor  
 appropriatus secundus ut finis causat, separatus magis; et talis motus  
 primus habet velocitatem determinatam a Deo ut movens effective et a

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1108 et] etiam *cod.*    1114 motore] motorem *cod.*    1131 secundus] sed *cod.*

<sup>89</sup> Cf. Aristoteles, *Metaphysica* 1.2 (983a8–10).

<sup>90</sup> Averroes, *In XII Metaph.*, comm. 41 (vol. VIII, fol. 324A).

<sup>91</sup> *Ibid.*, comm. 44 (vol. VIII, fol. 327H).

1135 primo habet eternitatem ut finis motus, nam quia primum se intelligit in infinitum et se desiderat in infinitum pro tanto movet per tempus infinitum.

⟨117⟩ Et si dicas: “Unde est quod Commentator addit quod si primum moveret immediate, quod moveret in instanti?” Dico ad presens quod Commentator non vult ex hoc habere quod primum sit infiniti vigoris, nec etiam quod primum non moveat immediate, quia contradiceret sibi.

1140 ⟨118⟩ Propter quod est intelligendum quod primum principium potest dupliciter considerari: uno modo secundum quod finis est omnium motuum celorum; alio modo potest considerari ut efficiens motum primum. Modo, quando Commentator dixit quod si primum moveret immediate, moveret in instanti, dico quod verum est si primum consideratum ut finis  
1145 motuum celorum moveret immediate, moveret in instanti. Nam primum consideratum ut finis non potest movere ut efficiens, et si moveret effective, ut sic, moveret in instanti, quia primum principium ut finis non habet proportionem vigoris cum mobilibus, quia, ut sic, proprie non habet vigorem, nec finitum nec infinitum. Nam ipsum consideratum quantum ad  
1150 suam essentiam absolute est finis, sed ipsum consideratum quantum ad vigorem est agens et, ut sic, proportionatur mobili. Et ideo non sequitur quod primum sit infiniti vigoris. Non sequitur etiam quod primum moveat solum in ratione finis.

1155 ⟨119⟩ Ad auctoritatem II *Celi* (⟨112⟩) quod quedam attingunt suum bonum sine actione etc., dico quod illa ratio non plus probat de primo principio quam de aliis intelligentiis, nam per illa que attingunt suum bonum sine actione, ipse intellexit omnia separata, ut exponit Commentator ibi.<sup>92</sup> Voluit ergo Aristoteles quod quedam attingunt bonum suum sine actione, id est sine motu eis inherente, cuius oppositum est de orbibus, sed  
1160 quoniam habeant aliquam aliam actionem, scilicet movere celum, hoc non intendebat ibi Aristoteles, nec Commentator. Etiam bene possunt habere illam operationem que est intelligere se vel etiam primam intelligentiam. Nam de tali actione non intendebat Commentator in II *Celi*, et quando dicitur quod Aristoteles in XII semper dicit quod primum movet ut appetibile, et sic solum movebit in ratione finis, dicendum quod nolebat ex  
1165 hoc negare eum movere effective, sed forte relinquebat pro manifesto primum principium movere effective ex illo quod dictum fuit in VIII *Physicorum*.

<sup>92</sup> Averroes, *Commentum super II De celo*, comm. 62 (392.10–14).



1170 <120> Ad aliam “quod movet effective movet propter aliquid melius”  
 ((113)), ego dicam quod primum principium ut finis melius est se ipso ut  
 efficiens. Et si dicatur: “Primum ut intellectum, est finis; et ut intelligens,  
 est efficiens; ergo primum erit nobilius ut intellectum quam ut intelligens,  
 quod videtur falsum,” dicam quod primum principium ut intellectum non  
 1175 debet dici finis ita quod esse intellectum sit ratio formalis quare dicitur,  
 sed bene consequitur ad ipsum de necessitate ut finis; hoc tamen non est  
 ratio finis. Sed dico quod primum principium consideratum quantum ad  
 suam essentiam finis est, et ad hoc ut sit finis, necessario requiritur quod  
 sit intellectum et desideratum ipsum; tamen consideratum quantum ad  
 suum vigorem, habet rationem efficientis et ad hoc est necessario requisi-  
 1180 tum esse intelligens. Quia igitur primum quantum ad essentiam nobilius  
 est se ipso quantum ad vigorem, potest dici quod primum ut finis est nobi-  
 lius se ipso ut efficiens.

<121> Aliter potest dici ei quod primum ut intellectum et intelligens est  
 nobilius se ipso ut intelligens tantum. Modo dicam quod principium pri-  
 1185 mum ut finis non solum est intellectum, verum etiam et intellegens, nam in  
 ipso idem est intelligens et intellectum. Primam solutionem credo maiorem.  
 Si quis vellet tenere quod primum principium movet solum in ratione  
 finis, tunc haberet solvere rationes probantes oppositum. Dicit enim Com-  
 mentator<sup>93</sup> in XII *Metaphysice* quod quelibet substantiarum abstractarum  
 1190 est principium substantie sensibilis secundum motorem et secundum finem,  
 unde falsum dicunt dicentes substantiam primam priorem motore  
 totius. Potest dici quod Commentator ex hoc solum voluit habere quod  
 primum principium esset finis motus et hoc intendebat cum dixit quelibet  
 substantiarum abstractarum est principium substantie sensibilis secundum  
 1195 motorem, quia movet in ratione finis et secundum finem, quia non solum  
 est finis motus, verum etiam est finis substantie mobilis, et ideo qui diceret  
 primam causam esse priorem motore totius falsum diceret; verum est si  
 diceret eam esse priorem motore in ratione finis, quoniam ipsa prima causa  
 movet in ratione finis.

1200 <122> Et ad aliud ((115)), quando dicitur “si non moveret effective, non  
 posset investigari per motum,” ego nego. Sufficit enim quod moveat in  
 ratione finis, et per motum specialiter investigatur diurnum, quia istius motus  
 maxime finis est.

<sup>93</sup> Averroes, *In XII Metaph.*, comm. 44 (vol. VIII, fol. 327H).

1205 <123> Ad alias rationes (<14>) “actus non productus etc.,” ego dico quod illa maior est falsa simpliciter. Bene verum est quod illa arguunt perfectionem aliquam in Deo, sed non vigorem infinitum.

<124> Ad aliam (<5>) dicam quod dato quod primum sit illimitatum ad perfectiones generales et speciales specificas, tamen non est infinitum in vigore, quoniam illa non sunt infinita ad que primum est illimitatum.

1210 <125> Ad aliam (<6>) concedo quod agens naturale equivocum non claudatur infra habentes sui effectus, non tamen propter hoc est infinitum, quia non habet effectum infinitum. Ideo etc.

1215 <126> Ad aliam (<7>) dico quod primum principium potest producere infinita successive, sed non simul; ideo non oportet quod sit infinitum. Quod autem additur quod adveniente posteriori primum non cadit a sua causalitate etc., dico quod hoc est extra philosophiam, quoniam adveniente posteriori prima non remanent in eternum, immo generantur et corrumpuntur successive.

1220 <127> Ad aliam—“motus potest velocitari in infinitum” (<10>)—dico quod non intendit Aristoteles quod sit potentia posita ad velocitatem motus in infinitum, quoniam potentia illa esset otiosa, sed intendit quod si esset movens quod posset velocitare motum in infinitum, quod motus etiam posset velocitari in infinitum.

1225 <128> Ad aliam (<11>) dico quod primum principium habet simul effectum infinitum non isto modo quod simul possit producere in infinitum sed solum successive, et tale non oportet quod sit infinitum, nam isto modo celum habet effectum infinitum. Unde ego dico quod per vigorem finitum, si illud duret per tempus infinitum, | potest producere effectus infinitos successive etsi non simul.

1230 <129> Ad aliam (<12>) dico quod finis appetitur in infinitum ubi finis non habet terminum, sicut Aristoteles ad litteram loquitur de pecunia,<sup>94</sup> quia denarii non habent certum terminum nec divitie, et ideo appetuntur in infinitum; sed non est ita de ultimo fine nostro, scilicet de Deo.

1235 <130> Vel arguitur “finis desideratur in infinitum;” hoc est verum facta hypothesi quod finis sit infinitus, et ideo si Deus esset infinitus appeteretur in infinitum.

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1232 nec] et *cod.*

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<sup>94</sup> Cf. Aristoteles, *Politica* 1.9 (1257b28–29).

1240 <131> Ad ultimam (<13>) dico quod Deus non debet dici finitus quia habeat finem, sed pro tanto dicitur finitus, quia non extendit virtutem mobilis in infinitum, sed habet determinatam proportionem ad suum mobile in tantum quod si stella adderetur orbi, non posset movere sine fatigatione et pena, ut dicit Aristoteles II *Celi* et Commentator.<sup>95</sup>

1245 <132> Ad aliam principalem (<15>) dico quod totum ens non est factum. Ad probationem, Commentator dicit<sup>96</sup> quod qui dicunt naturam causam agentem et non moventem, falsum dicunt, nam movens totum est agens totum. Potest dici quod ipse intendebat agens, id est conservans.

<133> Aliter potest dici quod movens totum in ratione finis est agens totum motum, quia est causa efficiens motus totius, scilicet primi motus, cuius oppositum intendunt dicentes primam substantiam esse priorem motore totius, dico motore effective.

1250 <134> Ad confirmationem “quod sibi derelictum est non ens etc.” (<16>) dico quod verum est si sibi derelictum sit non ens, quia in se habeat principium passivum corruptionis, sicut sunt substantie materiales, vel quia suum esse fit in fieri vel fluxu, sicut est motus primus, et illud quod sic sibi derelictum est non ab alio habet esse effective, sed quod sibi derelictum est non ens solum quia indiget alio tanquam fine conservante non oportet quod ab alio habet esse, et illo modo intelligentie et celum sibi derelicta sunt non entia.

1260 <135> Ad aliam (<17>) dicam quod Deus est potens omnia possibilis ex natura rei, et fieri aliquid ex nihilo non est possibile ex natura rei, nec propter hoc dicendum est quod diminutio fit in Deo.

<136> Ad aliam rationem (<18>) dico quod materia ex se necesse est esse per privationem esse efficientis, sed bene indiget forma qua sustentatur, neque oportet quod forma si dependeat ab agente quod propter hoc materia dependeat ab agente ad minus effective.

1265 <137> Ad aliam “accidens generatur etc.” (<20>) dico quod accidens generatur non distincte a subiecto, quia non habet esse distinctum a subiecto. Et tu dicis “in sacramento etc.:

1270 <138> Ad aliam “accidens potest intelligi sine subiecto etc.” (<21>) dico quod accidens non potest intelligi primario sine subiecto, sicut nec esse. Ita etiam primario significari non potest sine subiecto. Sed secundario in-

<sup>95</sup> Aristoteles, *De caelo et mundo* 2.12 (293a10, secundum translationem Michaelis Scoti); Averroes, *Commentum super II De celo*, comm. 71 (407.9–408.14). Cf. Averroes *In VIII Phys.*, comm. 79 (vol. IV, fol. 426L).

<sup>96</sup> Averroes, *De substantia orbis* 2 (vol. IX, fol. 7A).

tellectus potest percipere essentiam accidentis esse aliam a subiecto et distinctam et ut sic imponetur sibi nomen abstractum. Sed ex hoc non sequitur quod possit esse sine subiecto. Etiam non sequitur quod possit intelligi primario sine subiecto: immo nunquam intelligitur accidens quin cointelligatur subiectum. Unde per nomen abstractum de genere accidentis non intelligo accidens nullo modo intelligendo subiectum, sed intelligo essentiam inherentem subiecto, ut res distincta a subiecto. Nam si inherere subiecto est de essentia accidentis, non possum intelligere accidens quin intelligamus inherentiam, et per consequens subiectum, sed bene possum intelligere accidens et inherentiam ut res diversa a subiecto et non per nomen abstractum.

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⟨139⟩ Ad aliam dico quod forma ex aliquo generatur, quoniam ex materia et non ex nihilo.

⟨140⟩ Ad ultimam (⟨22⟩) dico quod “agens supernaturale supponat minus” non oportet ex parte facti sed ex parte agentis, quoniam omnia agentia naturalia supponunt agens supernaturale et non econverso. Sic ad illam questionem.

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1280 inherentiam] inherentia *cod.*

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