

THE *QUESTIONES ANTE LITTERAM DE UNIVERSALIBUS*  
OF THE COMMENTARY ON THE *ISAGOGE*  
ATTRIBUTED (?) TO JOHN PAGUS:  
SCIENCE AND UNIVERSAL IN THE  
PROLOGUE OF THE COMMENTARY\*

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IN a two-part article published in this journal,<sup>1</sup> we studied and edited the second series of questions (the *Questiones circa litteram de uniuersalibus*, according to our appellation) of the commentary on the *Isagoge (Scriptum super librum Porfiri)* in Padua, Biblioteca Universitaria 1589, fols. 3ra–22va, and Vatican City, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana Vat. lat. 5988, fols. 63ra–81va, dealing with the well-known questions on genera and species that Porphyry raises at the outset of his work. In the present study and edition we proceed backward to the first series of questions on universals contained in this *Isagoge* commentary, the *Questiones ante litteram de uniuersalibus* (again, according to our appellation), another substantial and very rich contribution to the subject from the arts faculty of the University of Paris between 1230 and 1260.

\* The “doctrinal study” is translated from the French by Samuel Dishaw. We wish to thank the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC) for the financial support granted to the research which led to this article.

<sup>1</sup> Claude Lafleur and David Piché, with the collaboration of Joanne Carrier, “The *Questiones circa litteram de uniuersalibus* and *Expositio littere secunde partis prohemii* of the Commentary on the *Isagoge* Attributed (?) to John Pagus (I. Introduction and Doctrinal Study): The Ontological Status of Universals,” *Mediaeval Studies* 76 (2014): 149–68, and “The *Questiones circa litteram de uniuersalibus* and *Expositio littere secunde partis prohemii* of the Commentary on the *Isagoge* Attributed (?) to John Pagus (II. Principles of the Edition and Edition),” *Mediaeval Studies* 77 (2015): 1–43.

To locate the text presented here within the entire commentary on Porphyry's *Isagoge* of which it is a part, we once more use the following outline,<sup>2</sup> which refers to the folios of the witnesses, *P* (Padua, Biblioteca Universitaria 1589)<sup>3</sup> and *V* (Vatican City, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana Vat. lat. 5988),<sup>4</sup> as well as the paragraph numbers of our edition and the page and line numbers of the *Isagoge* in *Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca*, for the original Greek text,<sup>5</sup> and in *Aristoteles Latinus*, for Boethius's Latin translation.<sup>6</sup>

Prologus (*P* 3ra–6vb; *V* 63ra–66rb; ed. §§1–130)<sup>7</sup>

Introducio (ed. §§1–52)

**Questiones ante litteram de uniuersalibus** (ed. §§53–129)

Primo enim queritur utrum de uniuersalibus scientia possit esse.

Secundo queritur, dato quod sic, que sit illa, utrum rationalis aut methaphysica.

Tertio, utrum illa scientia sit una uel plures.

Quarto, utrum omnes alie scientie subalternentur isti scientie.

De causis operis (ed. §130)

<sup>2</sup> The outline presented in Lafleur, Piché, and Carrier, “*Questiones circa litteram de uniuersalibus* (I),” 151, has been adapted here, with boldface indicating the subject of the present study and edition.

<sup>3</sup> See the thorough description by Heine Hansen, *John Pagus on Aristotle's Categories: A Study and Edition of the “Rationes super Praedicamenta Aristotelis,”* Ancient and Medieval Philosophy I, 45 (Leuven, 2012), 22\*–29\*.

<sup>4</sup> The Vatican manuscript has been well described by Karen Elisabeth Dalgaard, “Peter of Ireland's Commentary on Aristotle's *Perihermeneias*,” *Cahiers de l'Institut du Moyen Âge Grec et Latin* 43 (1982): 3–8; and Michael Dunne, “Introduction,” in *Magistri Petri de Ybernia Expositio et quaestiones in librum Aristotelis Perymerneas seu De interpretatione (ex cod. Vaticano latino 5988)*, ed. Michael Dunne . . . , Philosophes médiévaux 34 (Louvain-la-Neuve, Louvain, and Paris, 1996), viii–xiv.

<sup>5</sup> *Porphyrii Isagoge et in Aristotelis Categorias commentarium*, ed. Adolf Busse, *Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca* 4.1 (Berlin, 1887), cited as CAG 4.1:page.line.

<sup>6</sup> *Categoriarum Supplementa: Porphyrii Isagoge, translatio Boethii, et Anonymi Fragmentum uulgo uocatum “Liber Sex Principiorum,”* ed. Lorenzo Minio-Paluello and Bernard G. Dod, *Aristoteles Latinus* [henceforth AL] 1.6–7 (Bruges and Paris, 1966), cited as AL 1.6:page.line.

<sup>7</sup> For the edition, with French translation, of §§1–9 and 13, see Claude Lafleur, with the collaboration of Joanne Carrier, “Une figure métissée du platonisme médiéval: Jean le Page et le Prologue de son Commentaire (vers 1231–1240) sur l'*Isagoge* de Porphyre,” in *Une philosophie dans l'histoire. Hommages à Raymond Klibansky*, ed. Bjarne Melkevik and Jean-Marc Narbonne, *Zétésis: Textes et essais* 3 (Paris and Québec, 2000), 105–60, at 142–56. §§10–12, 14–52, and 130 are still unedited, and §§53–129 are edited in the second part of this article.

- Lectio 1 (CAG 4.1:1.3; AL 1.6:5.2; P 6vb–10rb; V 66rb–69ra; ed. §§131–260)<sup>8</sup>
- Diuisio libri Porfirii (ed. §§131–34)
  - Expositio littere prime partis et secunde partis prohemii (ed. §§135–37)
  - Notabilia (ed. §§138–53)
  - Questiones circa litteram de uniuersalibus (ed. §§154–255)
    - Primo quidem queritur utrum uniuersalia sint.
    - Secundo queritur utrum sint aliquid nature aut pure intentiones in intellectu existentes.
    - Tertio queritur, dato quod sint quid nature, utrum sint singularibus coniuncta aut a singularibus separata.
    - Quarto queritur utrum uniuersalia sint corporalia aut spiritualia et a corporibus elongata.
    - Quinto queritur utrum sint perpetua aut corruptibilia.
    - Sexto et ultimo queritur utrum hec uniuersalia sint principia producendi res in esse ad modum ydee uel exemplaris.
  - Expositio littere secunda circa primam partem secunde partis prohemii (ed. §§256–260)
- Lectiones 2–3: De genere (CAG 4.1:1.18; AL 1.6:6.1; P 10rb–13ra; V 69ra–71vb)
- Lectiones 4–5: De specie (CAG 4.1:3.22; AL 1.6:8.17; P 13ra–16vb; V 71vb–75ra)
- Lectio 6: De differentia (CAG 4.1:8.8; AL 1.6:14.15; P 16vb–20rb; V 75ra–77ra)
- Lectio 7: De proprio (CAG 4.1:12.13; AL 1.6:19.18; P 20rb; V 77ra–78ra)
- Lectio 8: De accidente (CAG 4.1:12.24; AL 1.6:20.7; V 78ra–vb)
- Lectio 9: De communibus ... (CAG 4.1:13.10; AL 1.6:21.2; V 78vb–79va)
- Lectio 10: De propriis generis et differentie ... (CAG 4.1:14.14; AL 1.6:22.17; V 79va–81rb)
- Lectio 11: De communibus differentie et speciei ... (CAG 4.1:18.11; AL 1.6:27.10; V 81rb–va)

*P* contains what seems at first glance to be the entire *Isagoge* commentary, but starting from the exegesis of “De proprio” (*Lectio 7*) on fol. 20rb it ceases to present a developed text parallel to the Vatican witness, offering instead what is obviously a completely different and condensed commentary. *V* is thus, to our knowledge, the only manuscript to have preserved the entirety of this commentary (though strictly speaking, it is only a quasi-complete witness, because the equivalent of a folio—corresponding to the end of *Lectio 6* and the beginning of *Lectio 7*—is omitted in *V* between fols. 75v and 76r).

<sup>8</sup> Lafleur, Piché, and Carrier, “*Questiones circa litteram de uniuersalibus* (II),” 5–43, where §§154–255 and §§256–60 are edited. §§131–53 are still unedited.

We have discussed in the earlier article the date (ca. 1260), title (*Scriptum super librum Porfirii*), and authorship of the *Isagoge* commentary whose unknown author introduces his second series of questions—that on the “letter” of the Porphyrian questions regarding genera and species (Porphyry, *Isagoge*, ed. Busse [CAG 4.1], 1.9–14; *transl. Boethii*, ed. Minio-Paluello and Dod [AL 1.6], 5.10–15)—by the turn of phrase “Circa litteram incident sex querenda” (§154).<sup>9</sup> The author introduces the first set of questions (a sort of preamble to the division of the text of the *Isagoge*) with the phrase “Unde, antequam ulterius diuidatur, oriuntur quatuor disputanda. Primo enim queritur . . .” (§53 [edited below]; *P*, fol. 5ra; *V*, fol. 64vb). The “Unde” here is directly linked to the ultimate paragraph of the introduction to philosophy with which the commentary begins; this paragraph emphasizes the intention of Porphyry’s *Isagoge*, that of making manifest the science of the five universals (i.e., the five predicables):

. . . per ipsum [= librum Porfirii] enim manifestantur **uniuersalia** que erant ignota in aliis libris logices. . . . Intentio istius libri est manifestare quid sit genus, quid species et sic de aliis: et quia unumquodque istorum **uniuersale** dicitur, dicimus quod hec scientia est de **uniuersalibus** quinque (§52; *P*, fol. 5ra; *V*, fol. 64vb).<sup>10</sup>

Hence the appellation *Questiones ante litteram de universalibus* for the introductory set of epistemological questions on universals edited below after the doctrinal study.

#### DOCTRINAL STUDY

In the prologue of the commentary on Porphyry’s *Isagoge* by the author to whom we refer as Ps.-*Pagus*,<sup>11</sup> there are four questions concerning the

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, 5.3.

<sup>10</sup> istius *V* : huius *P*; est . . . unumquodque *V* : *om. P*; quod *V* : quod quod *P*; quinque *P* : i. *V*.

<sup>11</sup> Concerning the supposed attribution of the *Isagoge* commentary contained in *P*, fols. 3ra–22va, and *V*, fols. 63ra–81va, to the arts master John *Pagus* (*Iohannes Pagus*), we again refer the reader to our article, Lafleur, Piché, and Carrier, “*Questiones circa litteram de uniuersalibus* (I),” 152–55. For reasons of convenience, we shall use the name “Ps.-*Pagus*” to designate the author of the *Isagoge* commentary which we are here studying. On the arts master *Iohannes Pagus*, see Olga Weijers, *Le travail intellectuel à la Faculté des arts de Paris: textes et maîtres (ca. 1200–1500)*.

notions of science and universals, as well as the way they are linked. These questions are as follows (§53):

1. Can there be a science of universals?
2. If so, which science is this: metaphysics or logic?
3. Is this one science or more?
4. Are all other sciences subalternated to the science of universals?

We will examine how our arts master handles each of these four questions.

1. The first question calls for us to consider (a) what epistemic parameters Ps.-Pagus uses to judge whether there is a science of something, and (b) what meaning of the concept of universal he brings into play with this question.<sup>12</sup>

(a) The replies that Ps.-Pagus gives in §§65–67 to the arguments that there is no science of universals ( §§56–58)—as well as the proofs he expounds in §§60–62 to demonstrate that there is a science of universals, to which he explicitly subscribes (§63)—provide elements of an answer to our inquiry regarding the epistemic parameters that he uses. On the basis of these elements, it is possible to rebuild the “criteriology” of science implemented by our *magister artium*. It appears that Ps.-Pagus implicitly makes use of four criteria in order to assess whether there can be scientific knowledge of a given thing. A thing can be the object of a science<sup>13</sup> if (i) it is known via its cause; (ii) it is divisible in parts of which the properties (*proprie passiones*) can be proven by means of the principles which formally belong to it; (iii) it is proportionate to the human intellect; (iv) the

*V. Répertoire des noms commençant par J (suite: à partir de Johannes D.)*, Studia Artistarum 11 (Turnhout, 2003), 134–38. On the historical importance of this arts master (assuming that Ps.-Pagus is *Iohannes Pagus*), see Lafleur and Carrier, “Une figure métissée du platonisme médiéval,” 105–60.

<sup>12</sup> This question is also to be found in Robert Kilwardby’s *Isagoge* commentary—“an possit esse sciencia de uniuersalibus”—and also in that of Robertus Anglicus—“an uniuersale possit esse subiectum in scientia.” Concerning the former, see Patrick O. Lewry, “Robert Kilwardby’s Writings on the *Logica Vetus*” (D.Phil. diss., Oxford, 1978), 359–60; for the latter, see David Piché, *Le problème des universaux à la Faculté des arts de Paris entre 1230 et 1260* (Paris, 2005), 274–79, §§25–34.

<sup>13</sup> It should be noted that Ps.-Pagus never uses the expression “obiectum scientie” in the portion of his commentary that is the object of the present study. We use the phrase “object of science” only for its convenience and not to mean anything more than that which is scientifically known, or that of which there is science.

intellect grasps it through abstraction or apprehends it in an abstract way. Let us examine each of these four parameters.

(i) The argument that brings the concept of cause into play (§56) rests upon a direct quotation from the *Posterior Analytics* (1.2 [71b9–12]), which asserts that we consider knowing a thing when we know the cause of the thing's existence (*causa propter quam res est*) and know that this is the cause of precisely that thing and that the thing could not be other than it is. In short, science is a knowledge that implies the grasp of necessary causes, of both formal and final order, which take place in reality. The argument comes to the conclusion that there is no science of universals by maintaining that they cannot be the object of a knowledge of this type: indeed, if universals had a cause, it would be either particular—an option dismissed on the grounds of the principle asserting the higher nobility of the cause over its effect—or universal, in which case, seeing as we want to know the cause of the universal, we are drawn into an infinite regress.

Ps.-Pagus's answer to this argument in §65 consists in invoking another type of causality: we are no longer dealing with the cause understood in the sense of one or the other essential principle of the concrete compound, namely act (form) or potency (matter), but rather with the cause understood in the sense of what allows an entity to exist in reality; we might even say, not as an efficient cause, but as a supposite, i.e., as substrate, ontological support. Ps.-Pagus maintains that the cause of the universal is to be found in the singular, insofar as it allows the universal to exist and continue in being. The singular is, so to speak, the ontological bearer of the universal. Implicitly present here is the idea that a universal not realized in any singular would be deprived of existence and, *a fortiori*, of continuity in existence.<sup>14</sup> Such a conception is perfectly in accordance with the immanent realism that Ps.-Pagus endorses in plain language from the beginning to the end of his commentary, viz. that the universal exists in

<sup>14</sup> Could there be universals which exist, yet without being realized by a single individual? In a later passage of his commentary, §217, *P*, fol. 9ra–rb; *V*, fol. 68ra, ed. Lafleur, Piché, and Carrier, “*Questiones circa litteram de uniuersalibus* (II),” 28, Ps.-Pagus contemplates the case of beings that are born from the earth or borne out of putrefaction (one can believe he has here in mind cases of spontaneous generation). He asserts that the universal realized by such beings when they have yet to appear and, consequently, when none exists in act, is maintained, according to essence, in the causes of these upcoming individuals. Even in this case, then, an extra-mental ontological support is required in order for the universal to exist.

the singular things which realize it.<sup>15</sup> Hence the authority Ps.-Pagus quotes to support his answer: it consists in an adage taken from the *De anima* (2.4 [415a26–415b7]), which asserts that the universal (the specific being) is maintained and reproduced by the individual living beings on account of a faculty of begetting bestowed upon them.<sup>16</sup>

A similar argument referring to causality can be found in Robert Kilwardby's *Notule super librum Porphyrii*. The objection is based upon the same concept of science, namely, knowledge of a thing through its cause, in order to deny universals the possibility of being scientifically apprehended insofar as they do not have a cause but are causes themselves. Indeed, according to the objection—which, on this point, converges with the thought of Kilwardby<sup>17</sup>—the universal is the form in the sense of the essence or quiddity of the individual.<sup>18</sup>

Kilwardby answers that nothing forbids a cause from being itself caused. Such is the case of the universal, which has a cause whereby we can know some of its properties; this cause is—maybe (*fortassis*), adds

<sup>15</sup> Despite this coherence, one may wonder whether Ps.-Pagus's reply really does answer the objection it addresses: Does the singular, as the subject wherein the universal is found, explain the universal? Does the type of causality that the individual exerts over the universal correspond to the one required in the present context? In what way does knowing that the universal exists in its singular provide a scientific knowledge of the universal? A presentation of the key elements of Ps.-Pagus's realist theory can be found in Piché, *Le problème des universaux*, 218–24 and 257–59.

<sup>16</sup> The adage as phrased in the text is “collata est uirtus generatiua istis indiuiduis, ut saluent et multiplicent diuinum esse et perpetuum speciei: omnia enim hoc appetunt et illius gratia agunt.” The species is qualified of divine being because, being incorruptible in itself, it remains perpetually across the generational chain of individuals which are born and perish.

<sup>17</sup> Cf. Robert Kilwardby, *Notule super librum Porphyrii*, Cambridge, Peterhouse 206, fol. 34va; Madrid, Biblioteca Universitaria 73, fol. 2va–vb.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid., Cambridge, Peterhouse 206, fol. 33rb; Madrid, Biblioteca Universitaria 73, fol. 1rb: “Dubitatur hic in primis an possit esse scientia de uniuersalibus. Apparet enim quod non sic. Quorum non est acceptio possibilis per causam, illorum non est scientia. Est enim scire causam cognoscere. Set uniuersalium non est acceptio possibilis per causam. Sunt enim cause: est enim uniuersale essentia et forma et quidditas indiuidui. Ergo uniuersalium non erit scientia.”

The idea according to which the universal is the cause of the singular thing inasmuch as it is its form—understood in the sense of essence or quiddity—is the result of a textual montage essentially built from the following passages of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* 7.3 (1028b33–1029a3), 6 (1031a17–18), 7 (1032b1), and 13 (1038b6–8).

Kilwardby, who thus remains tentative on this issue—a certain nature which lies on the side of the universal. Kilwardby does not provide us any additional explanations, yet we can conjecture this much: it is possible to abstract from the various types of universals (genus, species, etc.) a common quiddity, viz. the very notion of universality, on account of which we will be able to explain the properties that characterize each universal *per se*, namely, from the realist viewpoint of Kilwardby, the aptitude to be in many things and to be said of many things. Be this part of his answer as it may, Kilwardby immediately proposes a complementary solution: the universal has a cause also as regards the substance, in the sense that genus comes from intelligible matter, difference from form, the species from the composition of such matter and form, the property (*proprium*) from the species, as well as the accident, although the accident does not properly come from one species only, but from the species in general.<sup>19</sup> Consequently, there is a science of universals, for it is possible to know them through their cause.<sup>20</sup>

(ii) The argument that calls upon the criterion of divisibility (§57), fortified by the remarks of Aristotle in *Posterior Analytics* 1.28 (87a38–9),<sup>21</sup> denies the existence of a science of the universal for the reason that the universal is not composed of parts in which to divide it. The simplicity and, hence, indivisibility of the universal are deduced from its ontological

<sup>19</sup> The origin of this analogical model, which establishes an interplay of similarities between the constituents of substance on the one hand and the Porphyrian predicables (or types of universals) on the other, stems from a passage of Porphyry's *Isagoge*, in the chapter on difference: cf. *Porphyre: Isagoge*, texte grec et latin, traduction par Alain de Libera et Alain-Philippe Segonds, introduction et notes par Alain de Libera, *Sic et Non* (Paris, 1998), 13, §10.

<sup>20</sup> Robert Kilwardby, *Notule super librum Porphyrii*, Cambridge, Peterhouse 206, fol. 33rb; Madrid, Biblioteca Universitaria 73, fol. 1rb: “Ad quod notandum quod uniuersale, etsi sit causa, tamen causam habet per quam potest cognosci aliqua proprietas de illo, et hec fortassis est aliqua natura reperta ex parte ipsius uniuersalis. Habet etiam causam ex parte ipsius substantie: genus enim nascitur a materia intelligibili, differentia autem a forma, species quoque ab hiis, proprium uero a specie et communiter accidens. Et sic est horum acceptio [cognitio Madrid] possibilis per causam.”

<sup>21</sup> Aristotle's remarks are given in the text as “una est scientia que est unius subjecti partes et passiones considerans,” which we can translate “a science is one, which concerns a single subject of which it considers the parts and properties.”

status: it is identified with form,<sup>22</sup> which is a simple entity, invariable and indivisible.<sup>23</sup>

True to his scholastic habits, Ps.-Pagus in §66 replies to this argument by carrying out distinctions. A thing can be indivisible in the sense that it can be divided in parts neither by quantity nor by faculties (*uirtutes*): such is the case for God. In another sense, a thing is indivisible because it cannot be divided in itself, although it constitutes the principle of what is divisible: such is the case for the point and the unity. Obviously it is not under either of these modalities that Ps.-Pagus maintains the indivisibility of the universal. He does so by means of two implicit quotations, one from the *Book of Six Principles*, the other from the *Posterior Analytics* (2.19 [100a3–9]). The universal is an indivisible inasmuch as it is a notional unity which is received in an indivisible faculty (*potentia*), the intellect, (*Posterior Analytics*). The reception of the universal in the intellect is the result of the addition of discrete quantities, the sensible singulars (*Book of Six Principles*).<sup>24</sup> In other words, even if Ps.-Pagus does not use this vocabulary, he has in mind induction as a mental operation, through which the intellect acquires the universal, following the process described by Aristotle in the passage of his *Posterior Analytics* mentioned above: “From sensation memory is produced . . . , from memory many times repeated experience is produced. Indeed, memories many in number make up a single experience. From experience, or from any universal resting in the soul, one beside the many though it is one and the same in them all, stems the principle of art and science. . . .”<sup>25</sup> Ps.-Pagus adds that this type

<sup>22</sup> In order to justify this identification of the universal with form, Ps.-Pagus calls upon the *New Metaphysics*, i.e., the Arabo-Latin translation of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* which we owe in all likelihood to Michael Scotus, produced between 1220 and 1224 and, as it has been shown, known “as early as 1225 in the Faculty of Arts of Paris”; cf. René-Antoine Gauthier, “Notes sur les débuts (1225–1240) du premier ‘averroïsme’,” *Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques* 66 (1982): 333–35 and 367.

<sup>23</sup> Ps.-Pagus refers in name to the *Book of Six Principles*, to which, in part, he owes this expression. Cf. *Liber sex principiorum* 1.1, ed. Minio-Paluello and Dod (AL 1.6–7), 35.3–4: “Forma uero est compositioni contingens, simplici et inuariabili essentia consistens.”

<sup>24</sup> *Liber sex principiorum* 1.9, ed. Minio-Paluello and Dod (AL 1.6–7), 37.2–7.

<sup>25</sup> Aristotle, *Analytica posteriora* 2.19 (100a3–9); transl. Iacobi, in *Analytica posteriora, translationes Iacobi, Anonymi siue “Ioannis,” Gerardi et recensio Guillelmi*

of indivisible, which is the universal, possesses the essential and formal parts and principles whereby to demonstrate its properties. This constitutes the second criterion allowing us to assess whether there can be scientific knowledge of something. How should we understand, in this context, “parts,” “properties,” and “principles”? Ps.-*Pagus* offers no explanation on this subject, but we believe the idea is as follows. Let us take, for example, species as the universal. This second intention has subjective parts, namely, the first intentions (“man,” “horse,” “ox,” etc.) which can serve as subjects to it in propositions where it appears as a predicate (“‘man’ is a species,” “‘horse’ is a species,” “‘ox’ is a species,” etc.). The typical properties of the species, according to its Porphyrian characterization, viz. to be predicated of many things which differ numerically and to be predicated by aiming at the essence or quiddity of the things of which it is predicated (“species est quod de pluribus et differentibus numero in eo quod quid sit predicatur”),<sup>26</sup> are demonstrated for each of its subjective parts, in other words for each first intention of specific order, by means of formal principles which constitute in an essential way any mental intention, such as the unity, the abstractivity, the intellectuality, etc. The same explanatory outline could apply *mutatis mutandis* to the other types of universals that Porphyry differentiates (genus, difference, property, and accident).

(iii) The criterion stating that a thing must be proportionate to the human intellect in order to constitute an object of science comes in two different arguments, §60 and §62. According to the first, every faculty (*potentia*) is ordered to its object, a premise that Ps.-*Pagus* justifies by Aristotle’s maxim (*De anima*, 2.4 [415a16–22]) which stipulates that faculties (*potentiae*) are accomplished and distinguished by their acts, which in turn are accomplished and distinguished by their objects. But the object of the intellect is the universal, a second premise that Ps.-*Pagus* is content to accept

*de Moerbeka*, ed. Lorenzo Minio-Paluello and Bernard G. Dod, AL 4.1–4 (Bruges and Paris, 1968), 105.18–106.4: “Ex sensu quidem igitur fit memoria, sicut diximus, ex memoria autem multotiens facta experimentum. Multe enim memorie numero experimentum est unum. Ex experimento autem aut ex omni quiescente uniuersali in anima, uno preter multa, quodcumque in omnibus unum sit illis idem est, artis principium et scientie. . . .”

<sup>26</sup> Porphyry, *Isagoge* 4.11–12; *translatio Boethii*, ed. Minio-Paluello (AL 1.6), 9.6–7.

by citing Aristotle's authority in *Physics* 1.5 (189a5–8).<sup>27</sup> The conclusion is obvious: the intellect is ordered to the universal, since the universal is the object which perfects and distinguishes it as faculty of the human soul; and since Ps.-Pagus asserts the equivalence between science on the one hand and this relation of dependence between the intellect and its object on the other, he can conclude that there is a science of the universal.<sup>28</sup>

The second argument spells out a thesis commonly subscribed to in Ps.-Pagus's time, according to which the capacity of a given faculty to relate to what is abstract depends on the degree of simplicity and spirituality that characterizes this faculty. It goes as follows: the more a substance is simple and spiritual, the more it is free from materiality and proportionate to what is abstracted from here and now; but the intellect, which presents a higher degree of simplicity and spirituality than the sensorial faculty (*sensus*), is further free from materiality and further proportionate to what is abstracted from here and now than the sensorial faculty; but this abstract reality is precisely the universal, in the knowledge of which the intellect finds its perfection, which is none other than science: there is thus a science of the universal.

(iv) These previous remarks lead us directly to the last parameter, that of abstraction, which is deduced from two arguments, §§61 and 67. We have already understood that a thing can only become an object of science if it fits the modality of the abstract. The first argument (§61) develops this idea. Ps.-Pagus applies to the universal a principle he borrows from *Metaphysics* 2.1 (993b24–26): in a given genus, the cause of a property of the things of this genus is what eminently possesses this property. But, accord-

<sup>27</sup> Ps.-Pagus quotes this authority as “uniuersale est intellectus, singulare uero sensus,” which we can translate as “the universal pertains to the intellect, whereas the singular pertains to the senses.”

<sup>28</sup> In Robertus Anglicus's *Isagoge* commentary, we find an argumentative structure deployed in the same general mindset as the previous argument (cf. Piché, *Le problème des universaux*, 276, §31): “Item de eo solum est scientia quod ab intellectu est apprehensibile; set uniuersale est huiusmodi, quoniam dicitur in secundo *De anima* (2.5 (417b24–25)) quod ‘nos intelligimus cum uolumus’; ergo uniuersale, quod est obiectum intellectus, est in nobis et presens nobis: quare et cetera (i.e. de uniuersali potest esse scientia)” (“Likewise, there is science only of what can be apprehended by the intellect; but the universal is of this type, since it is said in the second (book of) *De anima* that ‘we think whenever we wish’; thus the universal, which is the object of the intellect, is in us and present with us: that is why, etc. (i.e., there can be a science of the universal”).

ing to Ps.-Pagus, for the genus of science, it is being universal that gives to all things the actuality and modality characteristic to the object of scientific knowledge, since all that is known scientifically is known by means of abstraction of the universal from particulars:<sup>29</sup> the universal is thus eminently the object of science. In other words, no matter which science is considered, it will always concern something universal, never merely singular things.<sup>30</sup> Universality is thus the epistemic modality peculiar to science and, at least in the case of material things, there is only universal in act through intellectual abstraction. Consequently, there is science only if the intellect abstracts the universal from individual things. Hence we can say that the universal is the principle of intelligibility of singular things, which is why it can itself constitute, *qua* universal, the object of a science

<sup>29</sup> To support this assertion, Ps.-Pagus explicitly refers to the second book of the *Posterior Analytics*. Yet we do not find this idea (“omne quod scitur scitur per uniuersalis abstractionem a partibus”) in chap. 19 of the second book of this work. The terminology used by Ps.-Pagus is more closely akin to the following passage of chap. 18 of the first book (81a40–b5), which, we should stress, contains the only occurrence of the expression “abstractio” (or one of its derivatives) found in the entirety of the *Analytica posteriora*: “Est autem demonstratio quidem ex uniuersalibus, inductio autem ex his que sunt secundum partem; impossibile autem uniuersalia speculari non per inductionem, quoniam et que ex abstractione dicuntur est per inductiones nota facere, quod insunt in unoquoque genere quedam, et si non separabilia sunt, secundum quod huiusmodi unumquodque est” (*transl. Iacobi*, ed. Minio-Paluello and Dod [AL 4.1], 40.7–12), which we can translate “Demonstration is carried out from the universals, whereas induction is carried out from the things which exist according to part (i.e., the particulars); moreover, it is impossible that the universals be known theoretically if not by induction, since even what is said to come from an abstraction becomes known by inductions, i.e., the fact that some things may be found in each genus in such a way that each is as it is, even if (the genera) cannot exist separately.”

<sup>30</sup> In §87, Ps.-Pagus asserts plainly that singulars are not objects of science and gives a reason for this: “it must be said there is no science of singulars, as (there is one) of universals: singulars, indeed, are uncertain, because they are corruptible, and they are infinite, because they can be borne and corrupted infinitely, since they are composed of contraries or assembled from contraries. And that is why (singulars) cannot constitute a science, whereas universals are finite and certain and incorruptible, and that is why they can fall into a science.” At the time Ps.-Pagus writes, the impossibility of a science of the singular is generally thought to be an epistemological axiom, which is made only further unanswerable by referring to Aristotle’s authority. Cf. *Posterior Analytics* 1.31 (87b28–39); *De anima* 2.5 (417b22–23); and *Metaphysics* 7.15 (1039b27–40a5).

concerning it specifically (we shall see later which one and under which mode).<sup>31</sup>

In §67 (which answers an objection formulated in §58) we can see how Ps.-Pagus conceives the abstraction required in the present context, i.e., in the framework of an interrogation concerning the possibility of a science of universals. Ps.-Pagus here expands on four modalities whereby a thing can be understood by the intellect.

First, the intellect can understand a thing by abstracting its species from sensible conditions. All that is understood following this modality requires the intermediary of a phantasm, i.e., a sensible representation of the thing present in the imagination (or phantasy), which is one of the internal senses. Furthermore, in this passage, we believe that one must understand the term “species” (*species*) not in its logical sense (viz. one of the five predicables or five types of universals designated by Porphyry), but rather in its gnoseological sense, i.e., as referring to the intelligible form which is the likeness of a real essence and which, on this account, represents this essence in and for the intellect. We come up here against the condition of possibility of natural science (physics, in the broad and medieval meaning of this term): if such a science is possible, it is because the intellect can abstract essential information concerning nature’s material things from phantasms which represent them.

Second, the intellect can understand the species<sup>32</sup> of the thing which is in itself, which amounts to understanding the principle of knowledge of the thing; in other words, the intellect can understand that whereby the thing is known intellectually. Even though Ps.-Pagus does not give any

<sup>31</sup> The criterion of abstraction also comes into play in the argumentation that Robertus Anglicus develops to sustain his answer, according to which there is a science of the universal *per se*. The following passage is eloquent in this respect (Piché, *Le problème des universaux*, 276–78, §33): “licet uniuersale, sub tali esse, non cadat in sensu, ipsum tamen cadit in sensu sub esse alio, ut in hoc particulari. Hec enim forma hominis quam in Sorte uides, cum depuratur a conditionibus materialibus, scilicet hic et nunc, et abstrahitur per intellectum, fit uniuersalis” (“although the universal, under this ⟨universal⟩ being, is not received in the sense, it is nevertheless received in the sense under another being, namely, in this particular. Indeed, this human form that you see in Socrates, when it is purified from its material conditions, namely, the here and now, and when it is abstracted by the intellect, becomes universal”).

<sup>32</sup> In our opinion, this term must here again be understood in its gnoseological meaning.

further explanation, we think he is aiming at the capacity which the intellect has of apprehending psychic or mental entities that are in itself, namely, the representational likenesses that are the species. The issue thus now concerns the condition of possibility of cognitive psychology: if this science is possible, it is because the intellect is able to grasp in itself the mental representations by way of which it knows the things of the world.

Third, a thing can be intellectually grasped by means of its effects and remnants: it is in this fashion that we can apprehend God (*Primum*), since he is reflected in his creatures, wherein divine goodness is contained in potency. Ps.-Papus notes the finiteness of the human mind: our intellect, obscured by phantasms, cannot apprehend the true light of God in all its purity but only grasps it in what diffuses it, namely, its effects. These considerations relate to the condition of possibility of theological science (the issue here, obviously, concerns philosophical or natural theology and not biblical or revealed theology): knowledge of the Divine is possible insofar as our intellect is able to follow the effects back to their first Cause.

Fourth, and this is the modality which mainly interests us, the intellect understands a thing by uniting with it, by abstracting its essence from phantasms and by stripping the essence of them (*depuratio*): that is how the intellect grasps the universal. This final modality of abstraction may appear quite similar to the first one, yet we should highlight its specific traits which, to be precise, amount to four: first, the thing understood intellectually is united to the soul,<sup>33</sup> which contrasts, so it seems to us, with being represented by a mental likeness; second, the intellect does not abstract a species (in the gnoseological sense), but the very essence of the thing, in this case the essence of the universal; third, this essence is abstracted from phantasms (and not only from sensible conditions), i.e., the intellect, so we think, obtains for itself the essence from sensible representations which it then sets aside—it frees the essence or roots it out from

<sup>33</sup> At the beginning of his prologue (§7), Ps.-Papus defines science precisely as the union of the object of knowledge (*scibile*) and the knower (*sciens*). He specifies that since nature has not made the human soul in such a way that the things themselves are actually united to it, this soul needs a means whereby it can unite to things; this means or intermediate is science: “Sed quia res cognoscibiles non sunt actu unite anime ipsi per naturam, ideo indiget alico medio per quod ille res eidem uniantur. Hoc autem est scientia, que est unio scibilis cum scientie” (Lafleur and Carrier, “Une figure métissée du platonisme médiéval,” 149).

sensible images which it dismisses afterwards<sup>34</sup> (whereas in the case of the first modality of abstraction, a thing is understood through or by the intermediary of its phantasm); and fourth, the intellect thus proceeds to purge the essence of the understood thing—it purifies it of all trace of sensible materiality.

This modality of abstraction of which Ps.-Pagus informs us seems to amount to a sort of capacity held by the intellect, which would allow it to free itself entirely from the sensible images that can obscure it, in order to grasp in their pure state the very essences of things and to make them immediately present in itself without having to resort to the mediation of mental representations. This type of abstraction opens wide the epistemic horizon under which metaphysics (in the sense of ontology) and logic can be deployed: these sciences are only possible (each under a specific mode, as we shall see later) providing that the intellect is capable of a higher power of abstraction than the one at work in the natural sciences (the realm of physics), a power of second order, so to speak, whereby the intellect can apprehend the universal *qua* universal, grasping what the universal is in its very essence.<sup>35</sup>

(b) “Universal” is a polysemic term and we should determine the meaning in which Ps.-Pagus understands it in the present context. In his response to the first of the four questions he raises in the prologue, he warns us himself of the existence of different types of universal (§64). We can speak of the universal in the sense of an entity which results from the aggregation or reunion of many things, the universal being, for example, which results from the adjunction of all particular beings. But this is not the kind of universal we are dealing with here. The universal in the sense relevant to the present question is “uniuersale per ambitum et continen-

<sup>34</sup> We should retain in the expression “abstraction a fantasmatibus” the double meaning of the Latin preposition *a*, which implies both the origin or departure point and the separation or setting aside.

<sup>35</sup> It should be noted that the linking of each of these four modes of intellection to a branch of philosophical knowledge is our interpretation: Ps.-Pagus does not make such a connection, although in another passage of his prologue Ps.-Pagus connects the different modes of abstraction with the different philosophical sciences (§13, ed. Lafleur and Carrier, “Une figure métissée du platonisme médiéval,” 152–53; and see the doctrinal “overview” of this paragraph, *ibid.*, 134–36); we will return to this theme later on.

tiam.”<sup>36</sup> This expression—or an equivalent phrase—is found in many thinkers of the thirteenth century in the context of discussions concerning the logic or the ontology of universal entities.<sup>37</sup> Yet, as far as we know, Ps.-Pagus is the only one who uses it to designate the meaning of the universal that is in play in the specifically Porphyrian question about the mode of being of universals and in the other, closely related one about the possibility of a science which would have them for object. Now, what does it mean to be universal “per ambitum et continentiam”? Unfortunately, Ps.-Pagus does not answer this question. By taking into consideration the Boethian matrix from which this phrase was elaborated and the theoretical context wherein it is inserted, we can nevertheless venture the following interpretation. It seems to us that the term *continentia*<sup>38</sup> signifies what a generic or specific entity contains under it, in other words the set of things

<sup>36</sup> In another passage of his commentary concerning Porphyry’s three questions (*P*, fol. 8rb; *V*, fol. 67rb; ed. §176), Ps.-Pagus adds a third type of universal to the two already mentioned: the universal by causal influence, for example, when we say that the causality of the sun is universal, in the sense that this star spreads its warmth and light on all planets and on all living beings. See Lafleur, Piché, and Carrier, “*Questiones circa litteram de uniuersalibus* (I),” 159–60, (II), 13–14.

<sup>37</sup> We have found it in Philip the Chancellor’s *Summa de bono* (1225–28), Robert Kilwardby’s *Notule super librum Porphyrii* (1237–45), Boethius of Dacia’s *Quaestiones super librum Topicorum* (1265–70), and other texts. Here is, by way of comparison, the significant occurrence of this expression in Philip the Chancellor’s *Summa de bono* (De bono 1, ed. N. Wicki [Bern, 1985], 8.60–63): “Bonum et ens conuerti non impedit quin notificetur per ens, quia licet conuertantur quantum ad continentiam et ambitum suppositorum, bonum tamen habundat ratione super ens” (“That the good and being be convertible does not prevent *⟨the good⟩* from taking its definition from being, for although they are convertible in regard to the scope and extension of their supposita, the good nevertheless surpasses being in meaning . . .”); cf. David Piché, “Le concept de vérité dans la *Summa de bono* (Q. I–III) de Philippe le Chancelier,” *Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques* 92 (2008): 3–32 [19, §23]).

<sup>38</sup> According to the Gaffiot, this term means, amongst other things, “capacity,” as in the amount a recipient, for example, can contain, and also “content.” The term *continentia* is only found on two occasions in Boethius’s Latin translation of Porphyry’s *Isagoge*: “Commune est autem generi et differentiae continentia specierum”; and “Amplius quidem genera abundant earum quae sub ipsis sunt specierum continentia, species uero generibus abundant propriis differentiis” (see Porphyry, *Isagoge*, chap. 7, §1, 16 and chap. 10, §5, 19 of the Libera and Segonds edition-translation). It should be noted, moreover, that the verb *contineo*, -ere is used on several occasions in this Latin translation of Boethius.

that this entity includes or encompasses, whereas the term *ambitus*<sup>39</sup> signifies the extent or limits of the things of which this same entity is predicated.

The instigator of this conceptuality is Boethius. In his second commentary on the *Isagoge*, we find four occurrences of the term *ambitus*, two of which appear paired with the verb *continere*,<sup>40</sup> as a result, this suggests a terminological kinship which might have inspired the elaboration of the key phrase in university thinkers of the thirteenth century, who, needless to say, knew this work of Boethius. With regard to this issue, the following passage<sup>41</sup> appears to us of the utmost importance: “Praeterea est illis hoc etiam commune, quod genus ac species totum sunt eorum quae intra suum ambitum continent et coherent; omnium enim specierum totum est genus et omnium individuorum totum species.”<sup>42</sup>

In this passage (which is not the only one), Boethius confronts Latin thought with the vast problem of the universal, *qua* whole distinct from the integral whole, and which divides into subjective parts, namely, the real or logical subjects, included in the universal’s extension, and of which it is predicated. We do not intend to discuss this problem in itself here. Let it suffice for us to mention that Boethius closely associates the idea of a circumscribed extension of the universal, which is signified by the term *ambitus*, with the idea of what the universal includes or contains, which is

<sup>39</sup> According to the Gaffiot, the term *ambitus* means, amongst other things, “circular movement; circuit; circumference; enclosure.” It should be noted that the term *ambitus* is nowhere to be found in Boethius’s Latin translation of Porphyry’s *Isagoge*, as well as in the medieval Latin translations of the Aristotelian logical corpus.

<sup>40</sup> In the two other occurrences of the term, it is coupled with the verb *includere*, of which the meaning is very close—or identical—to that of *continere*. The term “continentia,” for its part, is used on three occasions, and separated from the term *ambitus* on each.

<sup>41</sup> This is the commentary on the *Isagoge*, chap. 9, §3, 18 of the Libera and Segonds edition-translation.

<sup>42</sup> Boethius, *In “Isagogen” Porphyrii Commentorum Editio secunda* 5.6, in *Anicii Manlii Seuerini Boethii In “Isagogen” Porphyrii Commenta*, copiis a Georg Schepss comparatis suisque usus recensuit Samuel Brandt, *Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticon Latinorum* 48 (Vienna and Leipzig, 1906), 303.17–21 (“In addition, genus and species also have in common that they are the whole of these ⟨things⟩ which they encompass and contain within their extension; for the genus is the whole of all its species and the species is the whole of all its individuals”).

signified by the verb *continere*, a term lexically akin to the substantive *continentia*. Following the hypothesis that this text had an influence on Ps.-Pagus, who deals with the universal in the same theoretical framework, namely, the set of problems raised by Porphyry in the *Isagoge*, which he applies himself to commenting, following Boethius, we conclude that the type of entity that interests our master when he asks himself if there is a science of universals is the one that possesses universality by virtue of its content and its extension.<sup>43</sup>

As noted above, Ps.-Pagus's answer to this question, the first of the four initially raised, is affirmative: the universal according to extension and content can be known scientifically. Our master points out that such a universal is to be classified either under the category of substance or under the category of accident. There is a science *stricto sensu* only in the case of an accident which has its own proper cause in its subject, with which it is convertible; consequently, such an accident is attributed to its common subject just as it is to its individual subjects. Ps.-Pagus provides the example “having three angles” which is the property of the common triangle and yet is proper to any particular triangle. Ps.-Pagus follows in the wake of Aristotle's *Posterior Analytics*, which he mentions by name, with this idea that there is a science when we demonstrate, by way of syllogisms, that a certain property belongs to a particular for the very reason that it belongs properly to the universal under which this particular is subsumed. In short, such a universal is the object of a science that Ps.-Pagus in the strict sense defines, following Aristotelian guidelines, as the effect of a

<sup>43</sup> In a passage worth quoting of his *De animalibus* (lib. 14, tract. 45, cap. 2, ed. Stadler, 1308 [available on <http://albertusmagnus.uwaterloo.ca>]), Albertus Magnus neatly distinguishes the type of universal we have just characterized following Ps.-Pagus, which we can call the “universal of predication,” from another type of universal which we can call “universal of causation”: “quaelibet intelligentia mouens orbem est plena formis, sed superiores habent magis formas uniuersales et inferiores magis determinatas et minus uniuersales. Uniuersales autem dico secundum quod uniuersale est causa formaliter praehabens et simpliciter habens ea quea post ipsum sunt, non secundum ambitum praedicationis” (“any Intelligence which moves an orb is full of forms, but the superior *Intelligences* have more universal forms and the inferior have more determined and less universal forms. Yet I speak here of universal *forms* in the sense that the universal is a cause which possesses and pre-contains formally and absolutely the things which are posterior to it, not of *what is universal* according to the extension of the predication”).

demonstration which, our master adds, is a syllogism that produces knowledge.<sup>44</sup>

If we consider the universals found in the category of substance, as well as those of the order of the accident that does not have its proper cause in its subject and is thus not convertible with it, for example, a colour, then, asserts Ps.-Pagus, there is only science in a larger sense or speaking generally (in contrast with science in the strict sense, i.e., as we have seen, what is produced by demonstration). And even further, an accident of this kind is only object of science insofar as it is taken under the mode of substance. To illustrate his remarks, Ps.-Pagus uses the following example: if there were a science of colour, this object would not be considered as the accident of a body, but as something abstracted from such and such particular colour; in other words, the colour would be considered as if it were a self-subsisting universal essence, independent of all singular corporal substrate.

2. To what science does it belong to study the type of universal we have just characterized? A good many reasons militate in favour of metaphysics. It is indeed an ontology and, as such, it is up to it to consider all modalities of being, including the universal (§72). Metaphysics is also an axiology and, from this point of view, it falls within its competence to regulate all other sciences, which includes the study of the particular modality under which something is constituted as the subject of any science: the universal perfectly meets this requirement, for there can be a science only of something which assumes the form of the universal (§73). Finally, since sciences are differentiated one from the other according to the degree of abstraction of their respective object, it is up to the science that distinguishes itself from the others by being situated at the highest level of abstraction, i.e., metaphysics, to study what is abstract in the highest degree, namely, the universals (§74). But it is no less legitimate to think that logic, rather, holds the prerogative of studying universals. Indeed, this science

<sup>44</sup> “Demonstratio est sillogismus faciens scire,” an extremely popular adage in philosophers of the Latin Middle Ages, which is taken from the *Posterior Analytics* 1.2 (71b17–18). It should be noted that the previous considerations call upon, in a condensed form, the two first criteria of science that we identified earlier. Moreover, the triangle example is found in the Aristotle of the *Posterior Analytics* (1.4 [73b25–74a3]), with the difference that, with regard to Ps.-Pagus’s statement, it deals with the relation between the triangle in general and the isosceles triangle, concerning the property of having angles equal in sum to two right angles.

studies the intentions of things, and not the things themselves; but the universal is what holds the status of intention to the highest degree (§76).<sup>45</sup> Moreover, since logic concerns all sciences, it is interested in what characterizes their specific subjects; but the proper character of these subjects, precisely, is to be universal: that is why it belongs to logic to study the universals (§77).

After this dialectical preamble, Ps.-Pagus offers us in §83 his magisterial answer to the question initially asked, which is accompanied by solutions to four correlative questions,<sup>46</sup> whereby he has the opportunity to refine his thought. The central piece of Ps.-Pagus's doctrine consists in acknowledging the plurality of legitimate epistemic perspectives under which the universal can be studied. The key concept of this doctrine, of which we have already had a glimpse in the dialectical preamble, is that of intention (*intentio*). Nowhere does Ps.-Pagus provide an explicit definition,<sup>47</sup> yet by comparing different texts wherein he calls upon this concept, we can bring out its principal notional traits. (i) The intention is the

<sup>45</sup> The authority Ps.-Pagus invokes by name in this argument is Avicenna. Our master does not refer to any particular work of the Persian philosopher, yet we will later see that Ps.-Pagus takes up his conception of the subject of logic exposed in the *Liber de philosophia prima* (the Latin translation of the *Metaphysics* of the *Kitāb al-Shifā*).

<sup>46</sup> The four correlative questions are (1) In what way do metaphysics and logic differ, since we say of both of them that they concern all things? (§79); (2) In what way does logic differ from any other science, since we say that all sciences, just as logic—and especially Porphyry's *Isagoge*—concern the universal? (§80); (3) In what way do logic and metaphysics differ, since both proceed by abstraction? (§81); (4) Why is there no science of the singular as there is science of the universals? (§82)—the answer to this question has been discussed in n. 30 above. It is worth noting that Ps.-Pagus's answers to the correlative questions are out of sequence ( §§84–87 answering §§79, 81, 80, and 82 respectively).

<sup>47</sup> This is in contrast to the later undertaking, in the early fourteenth century, of the first systematic theories of intentionality, led notably by Hervaeus Natalis. For the complete edition and English translation of his *De secundis intentionibus*, see John P. Doyle, *A Treatise of Master Hervaeus Natalis (d. 1323), the Doctor Perspicacissimus, on Second Intentions*, 2 vols. (Milwaukee, 2008). A partial critical edition of Hervaeus's treatise (the two first distinctions) has been prepared by Judith Dijs: it is available online at <https://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/handle/1887/18607>. For a study of the debates concerning intentionality in the Latin Middle Ages from Thomas Aquinas to Giraldus Odonis, see Lambert-Marie De Rijk, "Study on the Medieval Intentionality Debate up to ca. 1350," in Giraldus Odonis O.F.M., *Opera philosophica*, vol. 2, *De intentionibus* (Leiden and Boston, 2005), 17–376.

grasping of the thing, not the thing itself, although an authentic intention is founded in reality (in contrast with a fictitious representation of reality); (ii) it results from an abstraction carried out by the intellect and, consequently, resides in it; (iii) it holds the status of a logical being or being of reason (“esse logicum”; “esse rationis”), i.e., an entity which receives its existence from the activity and/or the receptivity of the intellectual faculty; (iv) when it is made explicit by means of a properly logical definition, it expresses what the thing is, the specific quiddity of the thing that corresponds to it in reality; (v) it is what makes a relation of predication possible on the part of the intellect.

According to Ps.-Pagus, each discipline grasps the universal in its own perspective.<sup>48</sup> As a result, our master acknowledges outright all the arguments advanced previously, those in favour of metaphysics as well as those in favour of logic.<sup>49</sup> Thus metaphysics, which apprehends reality as it is in itself (“secundum ueritatem”), grasps the universals as real modalities of being, i.e., as essences which can be separated—by an abstraction, we should add, carried out by the human intellect—from the things of which they are the essences, although they are never separated in reality. It should be noted that in this passage of his commentary Ps.-Pagus under-

<sup>48</sup> As he is investigating the relation between science and universal, Ps.-Pagus sets aside from his field of investigation all that does not belong to the necessary causal order of nature, namely, what is the act of chance or fortune, what ensues from human will, what is contingent, and what is individual *qua* individual. Cf. §88 in view of these remarks.

<sup>49</sup> Ps.-Pagus’s answer to the present question includes a third discipline, natural philosophy, of which he asserts that in one of its parts it studies universals inasmuch as they have existence in act in their singulars and inasmuch as these underlie the continuation of essences in being—in conformity with the passage quoted earlier from the *De anima* (2.4 [415a26–b7])—or insofar as the universals constitute the object of a natural faculty of the human soul (namely, the intellect)—a function which Ps.-Pagus legitimates by invoking the third book of the aforementioned Aristotelian work, although the most relevant passage is to be found in 2.5 (417b22–8), from which the following adage was forged (Iohannes de Fonte, *Auctoritates Aristotelis*, ed. Jacqueline Hamesse, *Les Auctoritates Aristotelis. Un florilège médiéval. Étude historique et édition critique*, Philosophes médiévaux 17 [Louvain-Paris, 1974], 179, n° 61): “Anima intelligit quando uult, sed non sentit quando uult, quia objectum intellectus est in anima, ut uniuersale, objectum sensus est extra animam, ut particulare” (“The soul thinks when it wants, but does not sense when it wants, for the object of the intellect is in the soul, as universal, (whereas) the object of the sense is exterior to the soul, as particular”).

stands metaphysics as an ontology; the term itself may be absent, yet the idea of a science of being is clearly there. We shall see later that there is, according to our master, another way to characterize metaphysics.

Logic, for its part, grasps the universals inasmuch as they are intentions which, according to their modalities of predication and ordination, are founded in the things. That is all Ps.-Pagus says, but we understand his assertion as follows: when a universal intention is predicated of some thing (“Socrates is a man”; “‘man’ is a species”; etc.), or when we say that genus and species, on the one hand, and species and the individuals of which it is predicated, on the other, are ordered as something superior with regard to what is inferior to it (in other words, the extension of the genus is greater than that of the species, which has a greater extension than the individual—which, strictly speaking, does not have an extension, for it is not predicated of anything apart from itself), these relations of predication and hierarchical inclusion are not fabrications of the human intellect but rest upon the way reality itself is constituted and ordered. (Socrates possesses in reality the specific essence of man; such an essence is capable in reality of being in many things which differ only in number; the various types of essence differ in reality in many species because of their constitutive differences and converge in reality to the same genus, in accordance with their common generic component; etc.) Logic thus provides every other science with the method whereby to progress in knowledge (§84), for this progression, at least initially, involves knowing which quiddity has to be attributed to individuals and in what way genera and species are ordered. Ps.-Pagus can thus endorse in his own name (“dicimus”) the Avicennian determination of the subject of logic<sup>50</sup> (§83): this science concerns second intentions (genus, species, etc.) inasmuch as they are applied to first intentions (“animal,” “man,” etc.). In other words, logic studies the intentions of first order, i.e., the intentions designating extra-mental realities, by typifying them through intentions of second order, i.e., intentions designating the types of universality which befall intentions of first order. In short, logic has, amongst other tasks, to determine what are the modalities according to which first intentions are predicated of things. For example,

<sup>50</sup> Although Ps.-Pagus does not mention Avicenna here, he calls upon him by name elsewhere—as we have already indicated—in an argument concerning the connection between logic and intention (§76).

“‘man’ is a species” means that the first intention, “man,” is predicated of many things differing in number by aiming at their essence or quiddity.

The text from which scholastic thinkers could draw this characterization of the subject of logic is the second chapter of the first book of the *Liber de philosophia prima siue scientia diuina*, where one can indeed read what follows (ed. S. Van Riet, Avicenna Latinus 2.1 [Louvain and Leiden, 1977], 10.73–77): “Subiectum uero logicae, sicut scisti, sunt intentiones intellectae secundo, quae apponuntur intentionibus intellectis primo, secundum hoc quod per eas peruenitur de cognito ad incognitum, non inquantum ipsae sunt intellectae et habent esse intelligibile, quod esse nullo modo pendet ex materia, uel pendet ex materia, sed non corporeo” (“Concerning the subject of logic, as you have learned, it is the intentions secondly thought, which are appended to the intentions first thought, in such a way that, through them, we reach the unknown from the known, not *⟨however⟩* insofar as they are thought or have the intelligible being, which does not depend in any way upon matter, or depends upon a matter which is not corporal”). Thus, following Avicenna, the object of logic is not the mode of being or the ontological status of intentions in the intellect (which falls within the scope of metaphysics), nor the fact that these intentions are thought (which concerns psychology), but rather the various modalities according to which intellectual intentions relate to things and thus render a knowledge of them possible. Ps.-Pagus inscribes his thought in the wake of this Avicennian conception of the subject of logic.

Needless to say, the definitional phrase the Western philosophers drew from the Latin Avicenna, “logica est de secundis intentionibus applicatis primis” (following Ps.-Pagus’s own turn of phrase), had quite a considerable fortune. What is worth mentioning, however, is that Ps.-Pagus is the only philosopher of his generation (1230–60) to use it in the framework of an introduction to a commentary on Porphyry’s *Isagoge*, i.e., in the context of an introduction to logic, or to all of philosophy. Indeed, as far as we know, while the idea according to which logic deals with second intentions (or even just simply intentions) is present in Latin thinkers of the mid-thirteenth century, the Avicennian phrase, which would become canonical at the turn of the next century, is nowhere to be found in any of the *Isagoge* commentaries we have studied, contemporary with Ps.-Pagus, namely, those of Albertus Magnus, Nicholas of Paris, Robertus Anglicus, and Robert Kilwardby (nor in the *De ortu scientiarum* of this arts master

turned theologian), nor in the corpus of “didascalical”<sup>51</sup> texts (containing “introductions to philosophy” and “guides to the student”) which the Parisian faculty of arts produced in this period, with the noteworthy exception of the anonymous *De communibus artium liberalium*, where the phrase can be read in an argument against the position of the author, who maintains that syllogism is the subject of logic.<sup>52</sup>

Returning to Ps.-Pagus, we see that at this stage of his discursive progression he has established logic to be the science that treats the abstract entities understood as universals. It now remains to be seen in what way logic can be distinguished from metaphysics as far as abstraction is concerned, and in what way the logical doctrine transmitted by the *Isagoge* is different from all other science, as far as having the universal for its object. As to the first issue, Ps.-Pagus answers (§85) that the metaphysician studies abstraction in the sense of a separation,<sup>53</sup> i.e., he deems that some realities are separated from matter, which, in fact, they are (metaphysics is here understood as theology, science of divine realities), whereas the logician abstracts in the sense that he considers material realities independently of their matter (for example, when he considers the specific intention of “man,” the logician ignores the matter which constitutes human individuals).<sup>54</sup> As to the second issue, Ps.-Pagus answers (§86) that when

<sup>51</sup> On this term and those texts, see Claude Lafleur, “Les textes ‘didascaliques’ (‘introductions à la philosophie’ et ‘guides de l’étudiant’) de la Faculté des arts de Paris au XIII<sup>e</sup> siècle: *notabilia et status quaestionis*,” in *L’enseignement des disciplines à la Faculté des arts (Paris et Oxford, XIII<sup>e</sup>–XV<sup>e</sup> siècles)*, ed. Olga Weijers and Louis Holtz, *Studia Artistarum. Études sur la Faculté des arts dans les Universités médiévales* 4 (Turnhout, 1997), 345–72.

<sup>52</sup> See Claude Lafleur, with the collaboration of Joanne Carrier, “Un instrument de révision destiné aux candidats à la licence de la Faculté des arts de Paris, le *De communibus artium liberalium* (vers 1250?),” *Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale* 5 (1994): 129–203 (155, §5): “Preterea, illud debet dici subiectum logice quod principaliter considerat logica; hoc autem est secunda intentio adiuncta prime, ut dicit Avissenna; ergo, etc.” (“Moreover, it must be said that the subject of logic is what logic chiefly considers; and this is the second intention adjoined to the first (intention), as Avicenna says; thus, etc.”).

<sup>53</sup> Concerning this understanding of abstraction in the sense of separation, see Claude Lafleur and Joanne Carrier, “Abstraction, séparation et tripartition de la philosophie théorétique: quelques éléments de l’arrière-fond farabien et artien de Thomas d’Aquin, *Super Boetium De Trinitate*, question 5, article 3,” *Recherches de théologie et de philosophie médiévales* 67 (2000): 249–69.

<sup>54</sup> In a prior passage of his prologue (§13, ed. Lafleur and Carrier, “Une figure

we say all sciences concern universals, we must understand by this that the specific realities that sciences treat are grasped under the modality of the universal. Ps.-Pagus illustrates his assertion by taking the example of the demonstrative science (i.e., the science of demonstration covered by the *Posterior Analytics*): this science concerns demonstration in general, abstracted from this or that demonstration; in other words, this science is interested in what demonstration is and not the singular operations of demonstration. Likewise, we could add as an additional example, the science of the living (what we call today biology) deals with the living in general (the nature of the living, its properties, etc.) by setting aside the particularities which affect the living individual beings as singulars. Moreover, according to Ps.-Pagus, when we say that Porphyry's *Isagoge* (which constitutes the first step in the Faculty of Arts logical curriculum) concerns the universals, this means that its subject is the universal taken under the modality of intention, and not under the modality of a thing. For example, the logician does not study the human "thing" (what man is, his properties, etc.) but "man" as a universal intention of specific order, i.e., as an intention that has the property of being predicated of many things by aiming at their essence or quiddity.

métissée du platonisme medieval," 152–53), Ps.-Pagus had already carried out this distinction between metaphysical separation and logical abstraction (we deliberately leave aside what Ps.-Pagus asserts concerning mathematics, for that goes beyond our aim): "Sed notandum quod, quamvis abstractio conueniat methaphisico et logico, tamen differenter. Vno enim modo appellatur abstractio existentia alicuius extra materiam quod nunquam fuit in materia nec est nec erit, et talis abstractio proprio uocabulo 'separatio' nuncupatur. Alio quidem modo appellatur abstractio alicuius communis preter singularia in quibus est.... Primo ergo modo abstractio methaphisico appropriatur; ... secundo autem modo logico et omni scientie in quantum scientia: omnis enim scientia est de uniuersali quod est unum preter multa" (*ibid.*, 156: "But it should be noted that, although the abstraction suits both the metaphysician and the logician, it is nevertheless in a different fashion. Indeed, in a first way we call abstraction the existence of something exterior to matter, *⟨of something, thus,⟩* which never was, nor is, nor will be in matter; and such an abstraction by the appropriate term takes on the name of 'separation.' In a second way, of course, we call it abstraction of something common independently of the singulars wherein it lies.... In the first way, the abstraction is peculiar to the metaphysician; ... in the second, for its part, to the logician and to all science *qua* science: indeed, all science is about the universal insofar as it is one independently of many").

The thesis according to which we must establish a distinction between the complementary considerations of the logician and metaphysician towards the universal is commonplace in the *Isagoge Commentaries* contemporary with Ps.-Pagus. From Albertus Magnus to Robert Kilwardby, including Nicholas of Paris, Robertus Anglicus, and the anonymous compiler of the *Communia logice*,<sup>55</sup> all acknowledge that the universal, as a modality, condition, or division of being, or even as a thing in itself, a real nature or essence (taken independently from the individuals, material or not, that realize it), is the concern of metaphysics (understood as an ontology). Now, according to these philosophers, in what perspective does the logician study the universal?

According to Albertus Magnus, the universal belongs to logical considerations insofar as it is the cause or reason of predictability: indeed, according to him, the universal is predictable of many things for the reason that it holds the aptitude of being in many things; and since predication—an operation of reason which makes progress in knowledge possible—concerns the logician, it is in this perspective that he deals with the universal.

Nicholas of Paris appeals to the same motive: as condition of the predicate being, the universal belongs to the field of logic. But that is not all: according to Nicholas, the logician deals with universals insofar as they are realities designated by signs, more precisely insofar as they are named (unlike the metaphysician who apprehends them only as realities, by disregarding any name which may be of use to designate them); this can be explained by the fact that the logician studies the acts of language (*actus sermonis*)—predication and nomination. Similar remarks are to be found in the *Communia logice*: the universal is considered in logic inasmuch as it

<sup>55</sup> Albertus Magnus, *Super Porphyrium de V universalibus*, ed. Manuel Santos Noya, *editio Coloniensis*, vol. 1.1 (Münster, 2004), 17.39–49; Nicholas of Paris, *Scriptum super libro Porphyrii*, Munich, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek Clm. 14460, fols. 3rb and 5va–vb; Robertus Anglicus, *Scriptum super libro Porphyrii*, ed. Piché, *Le problème des universaux*, 278–82, §§35–42; Robert Kilwardby, *Notule super librum Porphyrii*, Cambridge, Peterhouse 206, fol. 33rb; Madrid, Biblioteca Universitaria 73, fol. 1rb; Anonymous, *Communia Logice*, ed Claude Lafleur and David Piché, with the collaboration of Joanne Carrier, “Porphyre et les universaux dans les *Communia logicae* du ms. Paris, BnF, lat. 16617,” *Laval théologique et philosophique* 60 (2004): 507, §51.

relates to the act of stating as subject or predicate (*actus subiciendi uel predicandi*).

The consideration of the dimension of language—which in Ps.-Pagus, we should mention, is absent from the section of his commentary relevant to the present analysis—is also to be found in Robert Anglicus, who asserts that the logician considers the universal inasmuch as it “falls” under language (*sermo*), more precisely, inasmuch as it is predicated; and in Robert Kilwardby, who maintains that the logician studies universals inasmuch as they have the natural property of being united with language (*sermo*)—unlike the metaphysician, who considers them as separated (*abstrahuntur*) from language.

Besides this distinction between the respective approaches of the logician and metaphysician (*primus philosophus*), Robert Kilwardby proposes three others. First, the metaphysician examines the causes of universals, that is, he tries to know where genus, difference, etc. come from, whereas the logician takes this examination for granted and provides the definitions and properties of the universals. Conversely, and this is the second demarcation line, it is the logician, and not the metaphysician, who gives the manner by which each universal (genus, difference, species, etc.) is articulated with the others (*modus construendi*). Thirdly, while the metaphysician considers the universals as concomitants of being (*consequentialia ad ens*), the logician apprehends them as notions (*rationes*) or common intentions, whereby it is fitting to consider universal beings.

Robertus Anglicus is confronted with an objection similar to the one Ps.-Pagus receives (§74) and which, as we have expounded earlier, consists in pointing out that since it is up to the metaphysician to study abstract realities and since the universals are such realities, their consideration falls within his scope. Robertus’s answer is interesting insofar as it takes up the originally Aristotelian tripartite scheme of the theoretical sciences (*Metaphysics* E [VI], 1),<sup>56</sup> but substitutes in it logic for physics and also

<sup>56</sup> Concerning the destinies of this textual matrix in the Parisian faculty of arts and in Thomas Aquinas and some of his commentators, see Lafleur and Carrier, “Abstraction, séparation et tripartition de la philosophie théorétique,” “Dieu, la théologie et la métaphysique au milieu du XIII<sup>e</sup> siècle selon des textes épistémologiques artiens et thomasiens,” *Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques* 89 (2005): 261–94, “Abstraction et séparation: de Thomas d’Aquin aux néo-scolastiques, avec retour à Aristote et aux artiens,” *Laval théologique et philosophique* 66 (2010): 105–26, and

introduces the vocabulary of intentionality. This arts master maintains that there are many types of abstraction. Some realities are abstracted both according to being (i.e., we should add, separated from sensible matter from the point of view of their real existence) and according to the way in which we consider them: the universal which is abstracted according to this modality<sup>57</sup> belongs to the field of metaphysics. Other realities are abstracted according to the way in which we consider them, although they are not abstracted according to being. Such a modality of abstraction is divided into two cases. In the first case, what is abstracted is a first intention reality and belongs to a determined category (*genus determinatum*),<sup>58</sup> quantity for example: this type of abstraction concerns the mathematician who, following the example given by Robertus, abstracts the line from this or that line in order to consider it independently from its singular, spatio-temporally circumscribed existence, even if, actually, the line has such a particularized existence. In the second case, what is abstracted is a second-intention reality and does not belong to any category more than another: it is in this way that the universal studied by Porphyry's *Isagoge*—and, as a result, by the logician—is abstracted, namely, the predictable, which is divided in five types (genus, species, difference, etc.) that in turn permeate all categories (substance, quantity, quality, etc.), and are found in each of them.

3. We shall be briefer concerning the third and fourth questions that Ps.-Pagus raises in the section of his prologue which is the object of the present study. It will suffice to shed some light on the essential elements of his magisterial answer.

Ps.-Pagus maintains that the universals, the five Porphyrian predicables, constitute the subject of a science (§98), against the arguments claiming

“Double abstraction et séparation dans les *Communia logice* (mitan du XIII<sup>e</sup> siècle): complément aux parallèles artiens de la doctrine thomasienne,” *Laval théologique et philosophique* 66 (2010): 127–75.

<sup>57</sup> Robertus probably has in mind here the universal that exists as idea in the human intellect. The study of the ontological status of this idea belongs to the metaphysician: on this outlook, see Piché, *Le problème des universaux*, 156–58, 304, §99, and 310, §107.

<sup>58</sup> It is obvious that in view of the context, Robertus understands the term “genus” in the sense of the generalissimo genus, namely, one of the ten categories differentiated in the peripatetic tradition on the basis of chap. 4 of Aristotle's *Categories*.

that their plurality is incompatible with the unity of subject on which unity of science rests (§§91–94). According to our master, the universal or predicate—what is in and is said of many—is the smallest common denominator uniting genus, species, difference, property, and accident. This common element ensures the unity of the subject on account of which the unity of the science concerning these five universals is also guaranteed.<sup>59</sup>

But in what way is the universal common to the five universals? The question must be raised since, as Ps.-Pagus reminds us (§99), there are many ways to be common.<sup>60</sup> It is by combining the notions of name (*nomen*), property (*proprietas*), and reality (*res*) that Ps.-Pagus obtains and presents successively four modes of community (§§100–103):

- (1) There is what is common according to these three parameters, the univocal.
- (2) There is what is common according to name and reality but not according to property, the analogical, which in turn is subdivided in three types:
  - (2.1) the analogical which can be said of many, but of none through the mediation of another, for example, substance, which can be said both of form and of matter;

<sup>59</sup> Ps.-Pagus does not assert that there is only one science that concerns universals, which would contradict the position he defended in the previous question; he rather asserts that in the field of logic or rational philosophy, the five predicables can be gathered within a unified science, precisely the one which Porphyry transmits in his *Isagoge*; in other words, the division of universals in five types does not produce as a consequence five distinct sciences, one for each type of universal.

<sup>60</sup> Ps.-Pagus then refers to a commentary on the fourth book of the *Metaphysics* (in fact, the manuscript of Padua, although hard to read here, does seem to give the term “quartum,” but the manuscript of the Vatican rather offers the term “quatuor”). Is our Master referring to a commentary that he would have composed himself? Is it rather Averroes’ *Commentary*? As a matter of fact, the developments soon to follow (§100–103) could very well have been inspired by an important passage of Averroes’ *Long Commentary* on book IV (Gamma) of Aristotle’s *Metaphysics* (cf. Aristotelis “*Metaphysicorum libri*” XIII. *Cum Auerrois Cordubensis in eosdem “Commentariis”* . . . [Venice: “apud Iunctas,” 1562], VIII, fols. 64v–66r) in which the philosopher from Cordoba confronts the problem of the unity of science, in this case the science of being, to which he proposes a solution calling upon the distinction between univocals, equivocals, and intermediates. Despite this thematic kinship, we do not find the precise expressions that Ps.-Pagus uses in his own discussion of the problem, namely, as we are about to see, the *nomen / proprietas / res* triad.

(2.2) the analogical which can be said of many, of one in a prior way, of the other in a posterior way and through the mediation of the prior; this type of analogical divides into two kinds, following the relation of the prior to the posterior:

(2.2.1) the one belongs to the essence of the other as constitutive part: thus is it with substance, which can be said of the body and the animal; or

(2.2.2) the one does not belong to the essence of the other as a part, but rather as foundation and root (*fundamentum radicale*): such is the case for being, which can be said of the substance and the accident.

(3) There is what is common according to name and property but not according to reality. Ps.-Pagus points out that what is common in this way has many appellations, but he does not specify which ones. He provides us, however, with an example: the discrete and continuous quantities, two distinct realities which nevertheless fall under the same name of quantity and possess the same property, that of measuring (*mensurare*).

(4) Finally, there is what is common according to name but not according to property nor to reality, the purely equivocal.

The answer that Ps.-Pagus puts forth to the question initially asked (§104) consists in asserting that in addition to the unity of a science of which the subject is something common according to univocity (mode 1 above), what is common according to analogy by anteriority and posteriority (2.2) holds a sufficient unity to guarantee the unity of the science of which it is the subject.<sup>61</sup> This is the case for the universal or predicate,

<sup>61</sup> By contrast, the modalities of being common in 2.1, 3, and 4 do not enable the foundation of the unity of a science. This doctrine will be repeated in a later passage of Ps.-Pagus's *Isagoge Commentary* (Padua, fol. 14va; Vatican, fol. 73ra). It is worth reproducing this passage here: "Commune enim multis modis sumitur. *<1>* Est enim quoddam commune secundum nomen et esse et proprietatem: et tale est uniuocum et tale non impedit unitatem subiecti, nec unitatem generis predicabilis, nec unitatem scientie. *<2>* Alio modo est commune secundum rem et nomen, non tamen secundum proprietatem, ut ens de substantia et accidente: et tale impedit unitatem generis predicabilis, non tamen unitatem scientie, nec subiecti. . . . *<3>* Tertio modo est commune secundum nomen et proprietatem, non tamen secundum esse nature, ut quantitas: et tale impedit unitatem subiecti, non tamen generis predicabilis. *<4>* Quarto modo est commune secundum nomen, non tamen secundum rem, nec secundum proprietatem:

the subject of the science taught in Porphyry's *Isagoge*. Indeed, although the five predicables differ with regard to their respective property, namely, the mode of predication which befalls each,<sup>62</sup> they nonetheless have in common the name and reality of the universal or predicate, in such a way that the universal can be said analogically of genus, species, difference, property, and accident. It would remain to be seen what type of analogy more precisely concerns the universal or predicate, but this question is not discussed in the present section of Ps.-Pagus's prologue to his *Isagoge* commentary.

Ps.-Pagus adds two reasons which support the thesis of the unity of the Porphyrian science of universals (§105): in conformity with what Porphyry himself asserts in the *prooemium* of his *Isagoge*, the science taught in this work is constructed according to a unique mode of procedure—namely, in the guise of an introduction which refrains from dealing with too profound a question, tackling only the simple and easy questions—and it possesses a unique goal, which is the science of predication (set out in Aristotle's *Categories*), to which it has the task of introducing.<sup>63</sup>

To conclude, it should be noted that although contemporary arts masters all explicitly raise the question of the unity of the science of predicables,<sup>64</sup>

et tale est pure equiuocum totum impediens, scilicet genus subiectum et genus predicabile.”

<sup>62</sup> In another passage of his *Isagoge Commentary* (Padua, fols. 7vb–8ra; Vatican, fol. 67ra), Ps.-Pagus expounds this diversity of modes of predication. The universal can be predicated by aiming at the quiddity (*in quid*). In this case, either it signifies and expresses the quiddity and it is maintained (*saluatur*) in many things, and it is then the genus; or it signifies and expresses the quiddity and it is sometimes enough for it to be maintained in a single thing, and it is then the species; finally, if it signifies the quiddity and expresses the qualification (*quale*), it is then the difference. Furthermore, the universal can be predicated by aiming at the qualification (*in quale*). In this case, if it has a proper cause in the principles of its subject, it is the property; if it has a common cause in the principles of its subject, it is the accident. For a presentation of the various theoretical models governing the deduction of the five types of universals in the arts masters contemporary with Ps.-Pagus, see Piché, *Le problème des universaux*, 149–55.

<sup>63</sup> See Porphyry, *Isagoge*, §1, 1 of the Libera and Segonds edition-translation.

<sup>64</sup> See Nicholas of Paris, *Scriptum super libro Porphyrii*, Munich, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek Clm. 14460, fol. 4va: “utrum hec scientia sit una”; Vatican, Vat. lat. 3011, fol. 2ra: “dubitatur de unitate (corr. uniuersalitate) istius scientie”; Robertus Anglicus, *Scriptum super libro Porphyrii*, ed. Piché, *Le problème des universaux*, 310–15, §§110–19: “posset de unitate huius scientie queri”; Robert Kilwardby, *Notule*

only Nicholas of Paris, like Ps.-Pagus, uses the concept of analogy to solve this question.<sup>65</sup>

4. The fourth and last question in Ps.-Pagus's prologue of his *Isagoge* commentary does not appear fully developed, a phenomenon that occurs elsewhere in this commentary.<sup>66</sup> Indeed, to the question which asks if the science of universals found in Porphyry's work subalternates all other sciences, Ps.-Pagus only provides two dialectical arguments (§§115 and 117), offers no explicit solution to the one which opposes his position and, especially, presents by way of a magisterial answer an inventory of the many ways—eight in total—according to which there is subalternation (§§118–26) without explicitly telling us which one applies to the case of the science of predicables with regard to the other disciplines: in fact, this enumeration of modes of subalternation concludes by a laconic phrase which informs us that “through this the answer to the question is patent” (§127). We would have wished for further development of the subject, particularly considering that our master is the only of his generation of *Isagoge* commentators to raise such a question, wherein he deploys a whole range of

*super librum Porphyrii*, Cambridge, Peterhouse 206, fol. 33va; Madrid, Biblioteca Universitaria 73, fol. 1va: “dubitatur . . . de unitate huius scientie.”

<sup>65</sup> Nicholas of Paris, Munich, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek Clm. 14460, fol. 5rb: “Et dico quod uniuersale non est equale et uniuocum, set analogum: et talis unitas sufficit ad unitatem subiecti”; Vatican City, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana Vat. lat. 3011, fol. 2rb: “Ad hoc autem quod dubitatur, quod uniuersale non <est> eiusdem rationis secundum quod dicitur de istis quinque, dico quod uerum est: non tamen est equiuocum immo analogum. Et dico quod unitas analogie in subiecto sufficit (*corr.* subicit) ad unitatem scientie, sicut ens, cum sit analogum ad substantiam et accidentis, tamen <est> subiectum in metaphysica.” The anonymous author of the *Communia logice* invokes the concept of analogy in a similar theoretical context. Here is the relevant excerpt: “Quod autem ipsum uniuersale non possit esse subiectum, ostenditur tali ratione: Nam subiectum in scientia debet esse uniuocum, sed uniuersale non est commune uniuocum ad quinque uniuersalia; ergo uniuersale non poterit esse subiectum commune. . . . Vnde non subicietur in Libro Porphirii. . . . Ad obiectum in contrarium dicendum est quod non oportet ad hoc quod aliquid sit subiectum in scientia quod sit ponere uniuocum, sed sufficit quod sit analogum dictum per prius et posterius de suis inferioribus. Vnde hoc uniuersale non sit uniuocum ad sua uniuersalia, est tamen quoddam analogum dictum per prius de genere, et specie, et differentia; per posterius, de proprio et accidente” (Anonymous, *Communia Logice*, ed. Lafleur, Piché, and Carrier, in “Porphyre et les universaux dans les *Communia logice*,” 506 and 507, §§46, 47 and 53).

<sup>66</sup> Concerning this phenomenon, see Piché, *Le problème des universaux*, 83–84.

types of subalternation, a concept essential to medieval epistemology and one of which we also know the fortune in Thomist writing.

That being said, we can, without much effort, come to determine to which type Ps.-Pagus subscribes, even though, in the end, some questions remain. Indeed, six of the eight cases of subalternation are ascribed by name to particular sciences, thus the subalternation of harmonic to arithmetic (§119), of surgery to geometry (§120), of all science to metaphysics (§121), of naval science to astrology (§122), of the art of uttering a speech to the art of composing a speech (§123), and of the science of fabrication of bridles (or bits) to military science (§124).

Thus two modes of subalternation remain as candidates to the relation of the science of universals with the other sciences: the seventh and eighth (§§125–26). The seventh mode of subalternation occurs when a science regulates other sciences with regard to the mode of proceeding and provides them with the instrument of which they must make use. Ps.-Pagus points out that it is this relation that binds language sciences (*sermocinales*) to other sciences. Yet, following the division of sciences to which our master had proceeded at the beginning of his prologue,<sup>67</sup> logic belongs, like grammar and rhetoric, to the rational or language sciences, and Porphyry's *Isagoge* is one of its parts. Not that this work is constitutive *per se* of logic (it is not “de integritate artis”) in the same way as Aristotle's *Analytics*, for example, but it is constitutive in the sense that it sheds some light on or explains capital notions—namely, the universals—without which logic would not find its full accomplishment (it is “de bonitate artis”). Thus, to answer the question initially asked, it seems that Ps.-Pagus believes that all sciences are subalternated to the science of universals, provided that we take the concept of subalternation in its seventh meaning. Therefore, one may think that Ps.-Pagus accepts the conclusion of the dialectical argument (§115), the one in favour of the science of universals' subalternating nature, in which one finds the key expression “mode of proceeding” (*modus procedendi*).

What is the mode of proceeding with regard to which language sciences, logic namely, regulate other sciences and what is the instrument they provide? Ps.-Pagus does not answer this question here (§125), but the remarks of his prologue concerning language sciences<sup>68</sup> lead us to believe that he

<sup>67</sup> *P*, fols. 3vb–5ra; *V*, fols. 63vb–64vb.

<sup>68</sup> *Ibid.*

endorses the idea according to which these sciences transmit to the other sciences the adequate way of using language (*sermo*) in order to reach congruity, truth, persuasive effectiveness, which are respectively the ends of grammar, of logic, and of rhetoric. More precisely, logic (to which, of course, belongs the science of universals) regulates other sciences in all that is related to the way of proceeding in the discovery of principles and in the production of assent through demonstration and other similar language signs.

But what is to be said of the eighth and final mode of subalternation (§126)? Without mentioning any particular science, Ps.-Pagus asserts that this mode of subalternation occurs when a science grasps the common delimitations and general modes under which another science must, in some way, be understood. In the absence of an explanation on the part of our master, we will abstain for the time being from formulating any conjecture concerning what he means by “communes terminationes” and “modi generales”; we thus leave to a further inquiry the task of determining the exact signification of this last mode of subalternation.

#### PRINCIPLES OF THE EDITION

The edition of these preliminary questions of epistemological nature, the *Questiones ante litteram de uniuersalibus*, follows the principles and norms that have been used for the edition of the *Questiones circa litteram de uniuersalibus*.<sup>69</sup> These principles are briefly reviewed here, starting with a statistical evaluation of the two manuscript witnesses.<sup>70</sup>

Comparing the witnesses of the portion of the *Isagoge* commentary that contains the *Questiones ante litteram de uniuersalibus* (P, fols. 5ra–6vb; V, fols. 64vb–66rb; ed. §§53–129), we find that the value of the V witness is often superior to that of P. Out of 314 points of variation, we have deemed it necessary or preferable on 230 occasions to follow the reading of V, against only 84 in favour of P. Out of these 314 variants, there are

<sup>69</sup> See Lafleur, Piché, and Carrier, “*Questiones circa litteram de uniuersalibus* (II),” 2–4.

<sup>70</sup> The same type of evaluation—reaching the same conclusion about the respective value of these manuscript witnesses—has been made for the second series of questions of this *Scriptum super librum Porfirii*; see Lafleur, Piché, and Carrier, “*Questiones circa litteram de uniuersalibus* (II),” 1–2.

only 10 omissions (*om.*) in *V*, whereas 54 are omissions in *P*, including four long omissions by homoeoteleuton (*hom. om.*).<sup>71</sup> Thus *P* obviously cannot be the model of *V*, yet there are also several indications that *V* cannot be the model of *P*, including two short omissions by homeoteleuton earlier in *V* (in the introduction, on fols. 63ra and 63va).<sup>72</sup> Under these conditions, notwithstanding the superiority of *V*, the support of both these independent manuscripts has clearly been useful for establishing the text. In 26 cases, however, we have deemed it preferable to opt for a reading other than those of the two witnesses, noting it in the apparatus through *scripsimus*.<sup>73</sup>

For the sake of clarity, the critical apparatus—in which all the variants are indicated—is positive. The abbreviations included in our critical notations are standard, except in the case of scribal (auto)corrections, where *pP* means “first state of the *P* text,” and *sP* means “second state of the *P* text.”

While specifying internal references, the *apparatus fontium* provides, as much as possible, the location of the references or of the explicit quotations as well as that of the many implicit quotations and also some signifi-

<sup>71</sup> §60 (46) sed . . . intellectus *V* : *hom. om. P*; §94 (253–54) et quod . . . proximo *V* : *hom. om. P*; §§100–101 (279–82) et secundum . . . proprietatem *V* : *hom. om. P*; §§119–20 (355–58) et equalis . . . eiusdem generis *V* : *hom. om. P*.

<sup>72</sup> §1 quod anima *P* : *hom. om. V* (see Lafleur and Carrier, “Une figure métissée du platonisme médiéval,” 143); §16 se et non secundum *P* : *hom. om. V*.

<sup>73</sup> §53 (6) sit illa utrum *scripsimus* : utrum illa sit *P* : fit illa utrum *V*; §58 (39) ibi *scripsimus* : in primo *PV*; §60 (46) obiectum *scripsimus* : intellectus obiectum *P* : obiectum intellectus *V*; §64 (71) in *scripsimus* : et *P* : uni *V*; §67 (115–16) condicionibus *scripsimus* : condicionibus *PV*; §68 (131) notabilis *scripsimus* : annotabilius *P* : an notabilis *V*; §73 (149) uult *scripsimus* (*cf. infra*, §84) : uniuersale *PV*; §73 (149–50) quod methaphysica *scripsimus* : *om. P* : quod materia *V*; (150) sit *scripsimus* : cuius *PV*; (*ibid.*) quasi *scripsimus* : quod *P* : pro *V*; (*ibid.*) dans *scripsimus* : causas *PV*; §83 (191) ueritatem *scripsimus* (*cf. infra*, §84) : uirtutem *PV*; §84 (197) apprehensionem *scripsimus* : apprehentionem *P* : apprehensionem *V*; (198) simul *scripsimus ex fonte* : solum *PV*; §85 (202) tertiam *scripsimus* : aliam *PV*; §86 (206) secundam *scripsimus* : tertiam *PV*; §92 (241) in partibile *scripsimus* : in particolare *P* : in partibile *V*; §93 (250) unam *scripsimus* : aliquam *P* : quamquam *V*; §100 (280) quodlibet *scripsimus* : quolibet *V* (*om. P*); §110 (325–26) tamen secundum rem *scripsimus* : secundum proprietatem rem tamen *pP* : secundum rem tamen *sP* : tamen secundum ratione *V*; §119 (351) simpliciter *scripsimus* : substantie *P* : similiter *V*; (355) aristmetica *scripsimus* : aric<sup>nica</sup> *V* (*om. P*); §120 (358) accident *scripsimus* : accidentaliter *V* (*om. P*); (*ibid.*) eiusdem *scripsimus* : eius *V* (*om. P*); §123 (373) sermonem *scripsimus* : remotionem *PV*; (*ibid.*) sermone uti *scripsimus* : uti remotione *P* : remotione uti *V*.

cant parallel passages in the commentaries on the *Isagoge* by Parisian arts masters up to the mid-thirteenth century or in that of a contemporary theologian like Albertus Magnus; also taken into consideration are Philip the Chancellor's influential *Summa de bono*, the "didascalical" faculty of arts texts, and the adages in the *Auctoritates Aristotelis*.

Our critical edition gives priority to the medieval spelling of the manuscripts without "normalizing" it. The edited text therefore includes forms such as *arismetica*, *armonica*, *cyrurgicus*, *diffinitio*, *hii*, *ydentitas*, *Methaphysica*, *methaphisicus*, *nichil*, (liber) *Phisicorum*, *sillogismus*, etc. In order to facilitate the understanding of the text, however, we have opted for a strong punctuation that frames the sentences and brings out their logical articulations. Likewise, as the use of capital letters is not systematic in the manuscripts, we have added them ourselves (1) at the beginning of a new sentence; (2) to all proper nouns, as well as those which have taken on that function by antonomasia (e.g., *Philosophus* to designate Aristotle); (3) to all terms employed in order to designate God or divine realities (*Primum*, *Lux prima*); and (4) to the first element of titles of works.

In the text of the edition, italics are used to highlight the title of books and to emphasize words reproduced literally or almost literally in quotations. We have limited the use of quotation marks to the terms taken up by the author in his glosses. Technical expressions and the words which need to be brought out have been placed between inverted commas ‘’. Square brackets [ ] enclose passages that we have marked for deletion, whereas all supplied text is inserted between angle brackets <>, including all instrumental information added by the present editors, such as the numbered division of the text in paragraphs, the identification of the objection/solution system, and the subtitles corresponding to the major articulations of this series of questions on the universals which we have labeled *Questiones ante litteram de uniuersalibus*.

#### EDITION

*P* = Padua, Biblioteca Universitaria 1589, fols. 5ra–6vb.

*V* = Vatican City, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana Vat. lat. 5988, fols. 64vb–66rb.

〈QUESTIONES ANTE LITTERAM DE UNIVERSALIBUS  
SCRIPTI SUPER LIBRUM PORFIRII  
(FORTASSE ASCRIPTE MAGISTRO IOHANNI PAGO)〉

5      〈§53〉 Unde, antequam ulterius diuidatur, oriuntur quatuor disputanda.  
Primo enim queritur utrum de uniuersalibus scientia possit esse.<sup>1</sup> Secundo  
queritur, dato quod sic, que sit illa, utrum rationalis aut methaphysica. Ter-  
tio, utrum una uel plures. Quarto, utrum omnes alie scientie subalternentur  
isti scientie.

5ra P  
64vb V

10     〈§54〉 〈1〉 Circa primum sic proceditur.

〈POSITIO DIALECTICA〉

〈§55〉 Et uidetur quod de istis uniuersalibus non possit esse scientia.  
〈§56〉 〈A〉 Prima ratio hec est.<sup>2</sup> Cuiuscumque non est acceptio possibilis  
per causam infallibilem, eiusdem non est scientia; uniuersalia sunt huius-

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5      de uniuersalibus scientia V : scientia de uniuersalibus P      possit P : posset V  
6      queritur dato quod sic V : dato quod sic queritur P      que V : om. P      sit illa ut-  
rum *scripsimus* : utrum illa sit P : fit illa utrum V      8 isti PsV : iste pV      12 non  
possit esse scientia V : scientia non possit esse P      14 infallibilem V : infallibiliter P

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<sup>1</sup> The same question also figures in first place in other *Isagoge* commentaries of arts masters, e.g., Robert Kilwardby, *Notule super librum Porphyrii*, Cambridge, Peterhouse 206, fol. 33rb; Madrid, Biblioteca Universitaria 73, fol. 1rb: “Dubitatur hic in primis an possit esse sciencia de uniuersalibus”; Robertus Anglicus, *Scriptum super libro Porphyrii*, in David Piché, *Le problème des universaux à la Faculté des arts de Paris entre 1230 et 1260*, Sic et Non (Paris, 2005), 274–75, §25: “quero primo . . . an uniuersale possit esse subiectum in scientia.”

<sup>2</sup> For a similar objection formulated in another *Isagoge* commentary (Robert Kilwardby, *Notule super librum Porphyrii*, Cambridge, Peterhouse 206, fol. 33rb; Madrid, Biblioteca Universitaria 73, fol. 1rb), see the analysis in the doctrinal study above, p. 7 and n. 18. Kilwardby holds this doctrine, which according to him proceeds from Aristotelian metaphysics, as shown by the answer he gives to a subsequent objection: Cambridge, Peterhouse 206, fol. 34va; Madrid, Biblioteca Universitaria 73,

15 modi: ergo de uniuersalibus non est scientia. Maior patet, quia scribitur in primo *Posteriorum*<sup>3</sup> quod tunc *unumquodque opinamur scire, cum causam arbitramur cognoscere propter quam res est et quoniam illius causa est et quoniam non contingit aliter se habere*. Minor patet, quia si uniuersale causam habeat, aut illa causa est particularis, aut uniuersalis. Non est particularis, quia in quolibet genere causa nobilior est causato; sed particulae ignobilis est uniuersali, sicut in multis locis scribitur; non est etiam uniuersalis, quia tunc de illa causa queritur, | cum sit uniuersalis, utrum ha-

5rb P

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14–15 huiusmodi *P* : huius *V*      15–16 scribitur in primo *V* : sicut in libro *P*  
 16 *unumquodque V* : *om. P*      *opinamur V* : *oppinamur P*      17 *cognoscere V* :  
*cognoscere P*      *quam V* : *quid P*      *causa est V* : *inv. P*      18 *quoniam V* : *quam P*  
*non sPV* : *om. pP*      19 *est*<sup>1</sup> *V* : *erit P*      *aut*<sup>2</sup> *V* : *uel P*      19–20 *non est par-*  
*ticularis V* : *particularis non P*      21 *sicut V* : *nam sP* : *non pP*      *est*<sup>2</sup> *V* : *om. P*

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fol. 2va: “Intellige etiam quod uniuersale consideratum secundum sui naturam et sui essentia est substantia et quidditas indiuidui, ut ostenditur in septimo *Philosophie Prime* [cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysica* 7.3 (1028b33–1029a3), 6 (1031a17–18), 7 (1032b1), and 13 (1038b6–8)]. . . .”

<sup>3</sup> Aristotle, *Analytica Posteriora* 1.2 (71b9–12) and 2.11 (94a20); transl. Iacobi Venetici, in *Analytica posteriora, Translationes Iacobi, Anonymi siue “Ioannis,” Gerardi et recensio Guillelmi de Moerbeka*, ed. Lorenzo Minio-Paluello and Bernard G. Dod, AL 4.1–4 (Bruges and Paris, 1968), 7.4–7 and 85.1: “Scire autem opinamur unumquodque simpliciter, . . . cum causamque arbitramur cognoscere propter quam res est, quoniam illius causa est, et non est contingere hoc aliter se habere” and “Quoniam autem scire opinamur cum sciamus causam . . .”; cf. Iohannes de Fonte, *Auctoriates Aristotelis*, ed. Jacqueline Hamesse, *Les Auctoriates Aristotelis. Un florilège médiéval. Étude historique et édition critique*, Philosophes médiévaux 17 (Louvain and Paris, 1974), 311, n<sup>os</sup> 7 and 8: “Scire opinamur unumquodque quod est simpliciter . . .” and “Scire est causam rei cognoscere et quoniam illius est causa, et non contingit aliter se habere.” See also Aristotle, *Metaphysica* 2.2 (994b29–30); transl. Anonyma siue “Media,” in *Metaphysica, Lib. I-X, XII-XIV, Translatio Anonyma siue “Media,”* ed. Gudrun Vuillemin-Diem, AL 25.2 (Leiden, 1976), 39.14–15; transl. Iacobi siue “Vetusissima,” in *Metaphysica, Lib. I-IV.4, Translatio Iacobi siue “Vetusissima” cum Scholiis et Translatio Composita siue “Vetus,”* ed. Gudrun Vuillemin-Diem, AL 25.1–1<sup>a</sup> (Brussels and Paris, 1970), 39.22–23; transl. Composita siue “Vetus,” ed. Vuillemin-Diem (AL 25.1<sup>a</sup>), 122.14; transl. Michaelis Scoti siue “Noua,” in *Aristotelis Metaphysicorum libri XIII. Cum Auerrois Cordubensis in eosdem Commentariis et Epitome. Theophrasti Metaphysicorum liber* (Venice: “apud Iunctas,” 1562), VIII, fol. 34rE.

beat *causam*, si uero habeat, tunc contingit *in infinitum ire*, quod est inconueniens.<sup>4</sup>

25     ⟨§57⟩ ⟨B⟩ Ad idem est secunda ratio. Omne illud quod debet facere scientiam debet esse compositum ex partibus et principiis quibus mediantibus de ipso probantur proprie passiones; sed uniuersale est simplex et non compositum: ergo de uniuersalibus non erit scientia. Maior patet, quia scribitur in primo *Posteriorum*<sup>5</sup> quod *una est scientia que est unius* subiecti *partes et passiones* considerans; et sic innuit quod subiectum habeat partes et passiones. Minor patet, quia uniuersale et forma idem sunt, sicut dicit Philosophus in *Methaphysica noua*; *forma autem est simplex et inuariabilis* et indiuisibilis, ut habetur in *Sex principiis*.<sup>6</sup>

30     ⟨§58⟩ ⟨C⟩ Ad idem est tertia ratio. In quolibet genere debet esse proportio *agentis ad patiens*; sed scibile est agens respectu scientis; ergo debet esse proportio inter scibile et scientem; sed uniuersale est inproportiona-

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25 omne *P : esse V*     26 debet *V : oportet P*     27 probantur *P : probentur V*  
 passiones *sPV*: sufficiens passiones *pP*     29 que est *V : om. P*     31 quia *V :*  
*quod P*     sunt *P : om. V*     35 scibile *P : sibile V*

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<sup>4</sup> Aristotle, *Metaphysica* 2.2 (994a1–11); transl. *Anonyma siue “Media,”* ed. Vuillemin-Diem (AL 25.2), 37.11–20: “Sed quia est principium quoddam et non infinite cause existentium . . . ; similiter autem nec id cuius causa in infinitum ire est possibile, ire quidem sanitatis causam, illam uero felicitatis et felicitatem alius, et ita semper aliud aliud causam esse; et in quid erat esse similiter”; transl. *Iacobi siue “Vetusissima,”* ed. Vuillemin-Diem (AL 25.1), 37.12–23; transl. *Composita siue “Vetus,”* ed. Vuillemin-Diem (AL 25.1<sup>a</sup>), 120.8–17; transl. *Michaelis Scoti siue “Noua,”* (Venice: “apud Iunctas,” 1562), VIII, fol. 30vG–H. Cf. Iohannes de Fonte, *Auctoritates Aristotelis*, ed. Hamesse, 118, n<sup>o</sup> 43: “In nullo causarum convenit ire in infinitum . . . ”

<sup>5</sup> Aristotle, *Analytica Posteriora* 1.28 (87a38–39); transl. *Iacobi*, ed. Minio-Paluello and Dod (AL 4.1), 60.21–61.1: “Una autem scientia est que est unius generis, quecumque ex primis componuntur et partes aut passiones horum sunt per se.”

<sup>6</sup> Anonymous, *Liber sex principiorum* 1.1, in *Categoriarum Supplementa: Porphyrii Isagoge, Translatio Boethii, et Anonymi Fragmentum vulgo vocatum “Liber Sex Principiorum,”* ed. Lorenzo Minio-Paluello and Bernard G. Dod, AL 1.6–7 (Bruges and Paris, 1966), 35.3–4: “Forma uero est compositioni contingens, simplici et inuariabili essentia consistens”; cf. Iohannes de Fonte, *Auctoritates Aristotelis*, ed. Hamesse, 306, n<sup>o</sup> 1 (same text).

bile intellectui nostro: ergo de uniuersali non erit scientia. Maior patet in libro *Phisicorum*,<sup>7</sup> minor uero in undecimo *Prime philosophie*<sup>8</sup> et in tertio *De anima*.<sup>9</sup> Patet etiam consequentia tota, quia scribitur ibi<sup>10</sup> quod totum nostrum *intelligere* est mediante *fantasmate*;<sup>11</sup> uniuersale autem, cum non habeat speciem alligatam sensibili materie, nunquam adgenerat fantasma: et sic uniuersale non poterit intelligi nec sciri.

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36–37 inproportionabile <i>P</i> : proportionabile <i>V</i>	37 nostro <i>P</i> : meo <i>V</i>	38
uero <i>V</i> : <i>om. P</i>	philosophie et in tertio <i>V</i> : intentio <i>P</i>	39 ibi <i>scriptus</i> : in
primo <i>PV</i>	41 nunquam <i>V</i> : <i>om. P</i>	adgenerat <i>V</i> : agenerat <i>P</i>

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<sup>7</sup> Cf. Aristotle, *Physica* 3.1 (201a22–23); *transl. “Vetus” Iacobi Venetici*, ed. Fernand Bossier and Jozef Brams, AL 7.1, 2 (Leiden and New York, 1990), 100.1–3: “... multa iam agent et patientur ab inuicem; omne enim erit simul actuum et passuum.”

<sup>8</sup> In fact Book *A* (12), since neither Michael Scot’s Arabo-Latin translation nor the anonymous Graeco-Latin translation contain Book *K* (11): cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysica* 12.1 (1071a3–5); *transl. Michaelis Scotti siue “Noua”* (Venice: “apud Iunctas,” 1562), VIII, fol. 311rG: “Et etiam alio modo principia proportionaliter sunt eadem, ut potentia et actus”; *transl. Anonyma siue “Media,”* ed. Vuillemin-Diem (AL 25.2), 209.14–15: “Amplius alio modo, quod proportionale est, principia eadem, ut actus et potentia.”

<sup>9</sup> Cf. Aristotle, *De anima* 3.4 (429a13–18); *transl. “Vetus” Iacobi Venetici*, ed. Gauthier, 445: “Et quomodo forte fit ipsum intelligere, si igitur est intelligere sicut sentire aut pati aliquid sit ab intelligibili ... sicut sensituum ad sensibilia, sic intellectuum ad intelligibilia”; Iohannes de Fonte, *Auctoritates Aristotelis*, ed. Hamesse, 185, n<sup>o</sup>s 136 and 137: “... Intelligere est pati” and “Sicut se habet sensus ad sensibilia, sic se habet intellectus ad intelligibilia.”

<sup>10</sup> The reading “in primo” in the manuscripts could also be interpreted as a corruption of a numerical reference to the fourth or the fifth chapter of *De anima*’s third book in the prevailing textual division at that time (which made the third book begin at the current fourth chapter of this final book), the passages we cite as *De anima* 3.7 and 8 in n. 11 below. The text would then have to be emended in the following way: “in quarto (capitulo tertii libri *De anima*).”

<sup>11</sup> Aristotle, *De anima* 3.7 and 8 (431a16–17, 431b2 and 432a8–14); *transl. “Vetus” Iacobi Venetici*, ed. Gauthier, 477, 478, and 484: “... nequaquam sine fantasmate intelligit anima”; “Species quidem igitur in fantasmatis intellectuum intelligit ...” and “... cum speculetur, necesse est simul fantasmata speculari.... Primi autem intellectus ... non sunt sine fantasmatis.” Cf. Iohannes de Fonte, *Auctoritates Aristotelis*, ed. Hamesse, 188, n<sup>o</sup> 167: “Necesse est ut quemcumque intelligentem phantasmata speculari.”

## ⟨OPPOSITUM⟩

⟨§59⟩ Ad oppositum sunt tres rationes. |

65ra V

45     ⟨§60⟩ ⟨a⟩ Prima talis. In quolibet genere est ordinatio et dependentia potentie ad obiectum; sed uniuersale est obiectum intellectus; erit ergo hec dependentia intellectus ab uniuersali; sed hec dependentia non est aliud quam scientia: ergo erit de uniuersali in intellectu scientia.<sup>12</sup> Maior patet, quia scribitur in secundo *De anima*<sup>13</sup> quod complementur et distinguntur potentie per actus et illi per obiecta. Minor patet in primo *Phisicorum*,<sup>14</sup> ubi dicit littera quod uniuersale est intellectus, singulare uero sensus.

50     ⟨§61⟩ ⟨b⟩ Ad idem est secunda ratio. In quolibet genere, illud quod dat actum proprium rebus eiusdem generis maxime ipsum communicat; sed uniuersale dat actum et modum sciendi omnibus aliis: ergo uniuersale est maxime scibile. Maior patet, quia scribitur in primo<sup>15</sup> capitulo *Methaphi-*

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46 obiectum *scripsimus* : intellectus obiectum *P* : obiectum intellectus *V*     sed  
... intellectus *V* : *hom. om. P*     hec *V* : *huius P*     47 hec *V* : *huiusmodi P*  
aliud *V* : aliud uniuersale *P*     48 erit *V* : *est P*     in *V* : *om. P*     intellectu *P* : in-  
tellectui *V*     51 ubi *V* : *ut P*     *est P* : *dictum est V*     55 scribitur *V* : *dicitur P*

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<sup>12</sup> For a similar argument in Robertus Anglicus's *Isagoge* commentary, see the doctrinal study above, p. 11 n. 28.

<sup>13</sup> Aristotle, *De anima* 2.4 (415a16–22); transl. “*Vetus*” Iacobi Venetici, ed. Gauthier, 204. Cf. Iohannes de Fonte, *Auctoritates Aristotelis*, ed. Hamesse, 179, n° 56: “*Potentiae cognoscuntur per actus, actus vero per obiecta.*”

<sup>14</sup> Aristotle, *Physica* 1.5 (189a5–8); transl. “*Vetus*” Iacobi Venetici, ed. Bossier and Brams (AL 7.1), 26.2–5; transl. *Vaticana*, ed. Mansion (AL 7.2), 14.1–3; transl. *Michaelis Scoti*, in *Aristotelis De Physico auditu libri octo. Cum Averrois Cordubensis uariis in eosdem commentariis* (Venice: “apud Iunctas,” 1562), IV, fol. 30vG. Cf. Iohannes de Fonte, *Auctoritates Aristotelis*, ed. Hamesse, 142, n° 27: “*Universale secundum intellectum notius est quam particulare secundum sensum. . . .*”

<sup>15</sup> Aristotle, *Metaphysica* 2.1 (993b23–27); transl. *Anonyma siue “Media,”* ed. Vuillemin-Diem (AL 25.2), 37.3–7: “*Nescimus autem uerum sine causa; unumquodque uero et id aliorum maxime secundum quod in aliis inest uniuocatio (ut ignis calidissimus; et enim aliis est causa hic caloris); est ergo uerissimum quod posterioribus est causa inesse ueris;*” transl. *Iacobi siue “Vetusissima,”* ed. Vuillemin-Diem (AL 25.1), 37.4–8; transl. *Composita siue “Vetus,”* ed. Vuillemin-Diem (AL 25.1<sup>a</sup>), 120.1–4; transl. *Michaelis Scoti siue “Noua”* (Venice: “apud Iunctas,” 1562), VIII, fol. 29vL: “*Et nos non scimus ueritatem absque hoc quod sciamus suam causam. . . . uerbi gratia ignis in fine caliditatis. Ex quo oportet ut maxime uerum sit illud, quod est*

*sice noue quod ignis est causa caloris in aliis*, ideo est *in fine caliditatis*; dat enim actum et modum calidi aliis. Minor patet, quia scribitur in fine secundi *Posteriorum*<sup>16</sup> quod omne quod scitur scitur per *uniuersalis* abstractionem a *paribus*.<sup>17</sup>

- 60     ⟨§62⟩ ⟨c⟩ Ad idem est tertium argumentum. Quanto substantia simplicior est et spiritualior, tanto absoluatur ab eo quod alligatur materie et proportionatur ei quod est semper et ubique; sed intellectus est simplicior et spiritualior quam sensus; ergo magis absoluatur et magis proportionatur ei quod est abstractum, hoc autem est uniuersale; sicut sensus perficitur in cognitione singularis, sic intellectus in cognitione uniuersalis, hoc autem est scientia: ideo de uniuersalibus scientiam habere oportet.
- 65

⟨RESPONSIO AD PRIMAM QUESTIONEM⟩

⟨§63⟩ ⟨1\*⟩ Ad hanc questionem intelligendum est quod, sicut probant ultime rationes, de uniuersali est scientia.

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55–56 Methaphisice noue V : inv. P     56 quod P : quia V     ideo P : non V  
 58 uniuersalis V : uniuersali P     60 quanto V : quod quanto P     60–61 simplicior  
 est V : inv. P     61 spiritualior P : specialior V     62 ei quod V : ea que P  
 63 spiritualior P : specialior V     absoluatur P : absoluetur V     64 abstractum V :  
 abstractus P     65 sic P : sicut V     66 scientia V : om. P     scientiam habere V :  
 esse scientiam hanc P

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causa ueritatis rerum, que sunt post.” Cf. Iohannes de Fonte, *Auctoritates Aristotelis*, ed. Hamesse, 118, n° 41: “Quicquid est causa aliorum ut tale, illud est maxime tale, ut ignis qui est maxime tale ut ignis, est causa caloris aliis, ideo ipse maxime est talis....”

<sup>16</sup> Actually, Aristotle, *Analytica Posteriora* 1.18 (81a40–b5); *transl. Iacobi*, ed. Minio-Paluello and Dod (AL 4.1), 40.7–12: “Est autem demonstratio quidem ex uniuersalibus, inductio autem ex his que sunt secundum partem; impossibile autem uniuersalia speculari non per inductionem, quoniam et que ex abstractione dicuntur est per inductiones nota facere, quod insunt in unoquoque genere quedam, et si non separabilia sunt, secundum quod huiusmodi unumquodque est.” Cf. Iohannes de Fonte, *Auctoritates Aristotelis*, ed. Hamesse, 317, n° 71.

<sup>17</sup> For an analogous use, in arts master Robertus Anglicus’s *Isagoge* commentary, of the criterion of abstraction to establish the possibility of a science of the universal, see the doctrinal study above, p. 13 n. 31.

70      <§64> Sed notandum quod uniuersale est multis modis. Quoddam enim  
 est uniuersale per aggregationem multorum in unum, prout dico quod *pri-  
 ma rerum creatarum est esse*<sup>18</sup> et latius omni alio, eo quod est aggregatum  
 ex omnibus que sunt: et tali uniuersali respondet scientia tota integra ex  
 principiis, et est ens. Alio modo est uniuersale per ambitum et continen-  
 tiam,<sup>19</sup> et hoc in genere substantie aut in genere accidentis. Primo modo  
 respondet sibi scientia, largo modo scientiam appellando. Si uero in genere  
 accidentis, aliquando habet causam propriam et conuertibilem cum sub-  
 jecto secundum esse et supposita, ut habere tres angulos in triangulo pro-  
 prium est trianguli communis <et> tamen cuilibet triangulo particulari: et  
 80     tale uniuersale habet scientiam que est effectus demonstrationis, secundum  
 quod scribitur in primo *Posteriorum*,<sup>20</sup> quod *demonstratio* | est *sillogis-*

5va P

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70 notandum V : nota P      71 in *scripsimus* : et P : uni V      dico quod P : di-  
 cens quoniam V      72 cretarum V : cretarum P      omni alio P : omnium  
 aliorum V      73 et V : in P      integra P : integrata V      74 est<sup>1</sup> P : om. V      74–  
 75 continentiam V : continentiam P      76 largo V : large P      77 aliquando  
 habet causam V : habet omne P      propriam V : proprium P      conuertibilem V :  
 conuertibile P      78 in V : cum P      79 et<sup>1</sup> *supplevimus* : om. PV      triangulo V :  
 om. P      80 tale V : talis P

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<sup>18</sup> Anonymous, *Liber de causis* 4.37, in Adriaan Pattin, “Le *Liber de causis*. Édition établie à l'aide de 90 manuscrits, avec introduction et notes,” *Tijdschrift voor filosofie* 28 (1966): 142: “Prima rerum cretarum est esse . . .”; cf. *La demeure de l'être. Autour d'un anonyme*. Étude et traduction du *Liber de causis*, ed. Pierre Magnard, Olivier Boulnois, Bruno Pinchard, and Jean-Luc Solère, Philologie et Mercure (Paris, 1990), 44–45.

<sup>19</sup> For the meaning of the phrase “per ambitum et continentiam” according to our master and information on the sources of this terminology (Porphyry, Boethius), see, the doctrinal study above, pp. 16–17 and n. 37 for its use in Philippe the Chancellor (also attested in Robert Kilwardby and Boethius of Dacia). See also David Piché, “La signification de l'expression clef *uniuersale per continentiam et ambitum* dans le Commentaire sur l'*Isagoge* de Porphyre attribué à Jean le Page,” *Bulletin de philosophie médiévale* 55 (2013): 19–44.

<sup>20</sup> Aristotle, *Analytica Posteriora* 1.2 (71b17–18); transl. Iacobi, ed. Minio-Paluello and Dod (AL 4.1), 7.13–15: “Demonstrationem autem dico sillogismum . . . facientem scire.” Cf. Iohannes de Fonte, *Auctoritates Aristotelis*, ed. Hamesse, 312, n° 11: “Demonstratio est syllogismus faciens scire quod in habendo demonstrationem scimus.”

85      *mus faciens scire*; aliquando autem est uniuersale in genere accidentis, non habens causam propriam aut conuertibilem cum subiecto, et tali non debetur scientia demonstratiua, sed solum scientia communiter dicta, nec tamen facit scientiam prout sumitur ut accidens, sed potius per modum substantie: si enim de colore esset scientia, non *(esset)* prout color sumitur ut accidens corporis, sed potius prout abstrahit ab hoc et ab hoc colore. Sic ergo manifestum quod uniuersalia possunt sciri.

⟨CONTRA POSITIONEM DIALECTICAM⟩

90      ⟨§65⟩ ⟨A\*⟩ Ad argumenta in oppositum, respondendum est scilicet quod uniuersale causam habet.<sup>21</sup> Habere autem causam est multipliciter. Uno quidem modo aliquid habet causam ex parte sui esse et conseruationis et sine qua nec potest esse nec continuari, et sic dicitur uniuersale habere causam in suo singulari, secundum quod scribitur in secundo *De anima*,<sup>22</sup> 95      quod collata est uirtus generatiua istis indiuiduis, ut saluent et multiplicant *diuinum* esse et perpetuum *speciei*: omnia enim hoc appetunt et illius gra-

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82 est *P* : *om.* *V*      83 habens *V* : *habentis P*      86 enim *V* : *causa P*      de colore esset *V* : esset de colore *P*      esset<sup>2</sup> *supplevimus* : *om.* *PV*      color *V* : *om.* *P*  
 90 scilicet *V* : secundum *P*      91 causam *P* : *causa V*      est multipliciter *V* : *inv. P*  
 92 ex *P* : *a V*      et<sup>2</sup> *V* : *ut P*      93 nec<sup>1</sup> *V* : *non P*      continuari *P* : *contineri V*  
 dicitur uniuersale *V* : uniuersale datur(?) *P*      94 secundum *V* : *om. P*      95 indiuiduis *V* : *indiuisis P*      multiplicant *V* : *multiplicantur P*      96 appetunt *P* :  
 apetunt *V*

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<sup>21</sup> For the answer provided by Robert Kilwardby in his *Notule super librum Porphyrii* (Cambridge, Peterhouse 206, fol. 33rb; Madrid, Biblioteca Universitaria 73, fol. 1rb) to an objection similar to the one to which the author of our commentary answers here (§56), see the doctrinal study above, p. 8 and n. 20.

<sup>22</sup> Aristotle, *De anima* 2.4 (415a26–b7); transl. “*Vetus*” *Iacobi Venetici*, ed. Gauthier, 204: “Naturalium enim omnibus uiuentibus inest, quecunque perfecta et non imperfecta. Quam generationem per se uariam habere est facere alterum sicut et ipsum est; animal autem animal, planta autem plantam, quatinus ipso diuino semper participant, secundum quod possunt: omnia enim illud appetunt et illius causa agunt quecunque agunt secundum naturam. . . . Quoniam igitur communicare non possunt ipso semper et diuina continuatione, propter id quod nichil contingit corruptibilium idem et unum numero permanere. . . . numero quidem non unum, specie autem unum.” Cf. Iohannes de Fonte, *Auctoritates Aristotelis*, ed. Hamesse, 179, n<sup>o</sup>s 57–58.

100 tia agunt. Alio quidem modo aliquid habet causam uia compositionis, ut dicitur unumquodque compositum consistere ex eo quod est actu et ex eo quod est potentia, ut patet in homine et in quolibet consimili. Utrum autem talis compositio uniuersali debeatur, queretur in sequentibus.<sup>23</sup> Sic ergo uniuersale causam habet per quam existit in esse et continuatur, nec contingit ibi in infinitum abire: est enim status et ordinatio in rebus, ut patebit in sequentibus.<sup>24</sup>

105 〈§66〉〈B\*〉 Ad aliud dicendum est quod ‘indiuisible’ dicitur multipliciter. Uno quidem modo quod non potest diuidi in partes nec secundum quantitatem nec secundum uirtutem, sicut Primum. Secundo modo est indiuisible quod per se non potest diuidi, principium tamen est diuisibilis, sicut punctus et unitas. Tertio est indiuisible quod resultat ex multorum diuisibilium unione per acceptionem sui in potentia indiuisibili, sicut *uniuersale* quod resultat *ex singularium discretione*,<sup>25</sup> quod *in intellectu quiescens est principium artis et scientie*:<sup>26</sup> tale ergo indiuisible | 〈habet〉

65rb V  
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97 uia V: uiam P      99 in<sup>2</sup> V: om. P      100 talis compositio V: inv. P  
 101 habet V: om. P      et V: om. P      101–2 contingit V: conuenit P      102 et  
 ordinatio in rebus V: in rebus et ordinatio P      103 sequentibus V: consequentibus P  
 104 aliud P: alio V      106 quantitatem nec secundum uirtutem V: uirtutem nec  
 secundum quantitatem P      secundo P: secundum V: est V: dicitur P      107 per  
 se V: om. P      diuisibilis V: diuisibile P      109 diuisibilium V: indiuisibilium P  
 sui V: om. P      110 in V: om. P      111 est P: om. V      tale ergo indiuisibile V: talis ergo indiuisibilis P      habet supplevimus: om. PV

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<sup>23</sup> §163 (P, fol. 8ra; V, fol. 67ra–rb) and 190–97 (P, fol. 8va–vb; V, fol. 67va–vb) according to the paragraphs numbers of our edition, “*Questiones circa litteram de uniuersalibus* (II),” 6.23–9.36 and 18.157–22.206.

<sup>24</sup> §220 (P, fol. 9rb; V, fol. 68rb) in “*Questiones circa litteram de uniuersalibus* (II),” 30.336–45.

<sup>25</sup> Cf. Anonymous, *Liber sex principiorum* 1.9, ed. Minio-Paluello and Dod (AL 1.6–7), 37.2–7: “Natura igitur occulte in his operatur; nam, sicut ex plurium coniunctione constitutio quedam priorum excedens quantitatem efficitur, sic ex singularium discretione unum quiddam intelligitur eorum excedens predicationem. Quapropter communitas omnis naturalis est quoniam a singularitate procedit, que creationi coequatur.”

<sup>26</sup> Cf. Aristotle, *Analytica posteriora* 2.19 (100a3–9); *transl. Iacobi*, ed. Minio-Paluello and Dod (AL 4.1), 105.18–106.4: “Ex sensu quidem igitur fit memoria, sicut diximus, ex memoria autem multotiens facta experimentum. Multe enim memorie nu-

partes et principia essentialia et formalia per que probantur proprie passiones.

115      *⟨§67⟩ ⟨C\*⟩ Ad tertium dicendum est quod aliquid intelligitur multipli-  
citer. Uno quidem modo per abstractionem speciei a sensibilibus condicio-  
nibus, et sic nichil habet intelligi nisi mediante fantasmate. Alio quidem  
modo aliquid habet intelligi quia principium est alterum cognoscendi, et  
sic species rei intellectui unita habet intelligi: ipsa enim est principium rem  
cognoscendi. Tertio quidem modo aliquid habet intelligi per suos effectus  
120     et uestigia, et sic Primum intelligitur quocumque modo a nobis, nam re-  
lucet in suis creaturis in quibus comprehenditur bonitas potentia: unde  
scribitur in libro *Fontis*<sup>27</sup> uite quod *sicut lumen solis* non manifestatur  
oculo nisi prout a *terra* repercutitur, sic nec Lux prima ineffabilis manifes-  
tatur intellectui nisi prout per effectus suos diffunditur, nam sicut uesper-*

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112 principia <i>V</i> : principia indiuisibilia <i>P</i>	115–16 condicionibus <i>scriptis- mus</i> : condicionibus <i>PV</i>	118 intellectui unita <i>V</i> : <i>inv. P</i>
		ipsa <i>P</i> : ipse <i>V</i>
118–19 rem cognoscendi <i>V</i> : <i>inv. P</i>	120–21 relucet <i>P</i> : reducit <i>V</i>	121 crea- turis <i>V</i> : <i>om. P</i>
122 uite <i>P</i> : <i>uire V</i>	quod <i>V</i> : <i>om. P</i>	123 oculo <i>V</i> : <i>om. P</i>
prima <i>V</i> : primi <i>P</i>	124 nam sicut <i>V</i> : <i>unde P</i>	

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mero experimentum est unum. Ex experimento autem aut ex omni quiescente universali in anima, uno preter multa, quodcumque in omnibus unum sit illis idem est, artis principium et scientie, si quidem est circa generationem, artis est, si uero circa esse, scientie.” Cf. Iohannes de Fonte, *Auctoritates Aristotelis*, ed. Hamesse, 321, n° 120: “Ex sensu nobis fit memoria, ex multis memoriis experimentum”; 321, n° 121: “Uniuersale quiescens in anima est principium artis et scientiae”; 321, n° 124: “Uniuersale est unum in multis et unum praeter multa.”

<sup>27</sup> Avicebron, *Fons vitae* 3.16 and 3.35, in *Avencebrolis (Ibn Gebiro) Fons vitae ex arabico in latinum translatius ab Iohanne Hispano et Dominico Gundissalino*, ed. Clemens Baeumker, Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters 1.2 (Münster, 1892), 112.25–113.5 and 159.19–160.4: “Exemplum autem fluxus uel deductionis formae a substantia simplici spirituali et actionis suae in materia corporali est sicut lumen solis, quod est infusum aëri penetrans illum et nondum tamen appetat *propter subtilitatem*, donec inueniat corpus solidum, ut terram . . .; et tunc magis emicuit eius irradiatio” (Baeumker’s italics) and “causa autem est in hoc, quod lumen in se est spirituale et subtile; et ideo non uidetur eius essentia, id est forma eius, nisi cum coniungitur corpori superficiem habenti, . . . sicut lumen defluxum in aërem cuius forma non deprehenditur sensu, donec ipsum lumen diffundatur super corpus solidum, sicut super terram, et sic appetat lumen eius et offert se sensui.”

125 tilio non potest luminis excellentiam capere, sic nec intellectus noster<sup>28</sup> ob-  
umbratus fantasmatisbus non potest lumen uerum Primi apprehendere in  
sua puritate. Alio quidem modo aliquid intelligitur per unionem sui cum  
anima et per depurationem et abstractionem a fantasmatisbus, et sic uni-  
uersale habet intelligi: per intellectum enim abstrahitur et depuratur essen-  
tia sua a fantasmatisbus.  
130

⟨§68⟩ Oritur ergo notabilis propositio ex predictis: uniuersalum necesse est habere scientiam, in quibus singularia relucescunt; uniuersale enim cui-libet suorum singularium est speculum et ymago.

⟨§69⟩ Et hec de prima | questione dicta sufficient.

5vb *P*

135 〈SECUNDA QUESTIO〉

⟨§70⟩ ⟨2⟩ Circa secundum queritur.

〈POSITIO DIALECTICA〉

⟨§71⟩ Et uidetur quod scientia de uniuersalibus sit methaphysica et non logica.<sup>29</sup>

125 excellentiam *P* : excelentiam *V*      125–26 obumbratus *P* : obumbretus *V*  
 126 apprehendere *P* : aprehendere *V*      127 puritate *V* : proprietate *P*      128 de-  
 purationem et abstractionem a fantasmatisbus *V* : abstractionem a fantasmatisbus et de-  
 purationem *P*      131 notabilis *scriptsimus* : annotabilius *P* : an notabilis *V*      132–  
 33 cuiilibet *P* : cuiuslibet *V*

<sup>28</sup> Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysica* 2.1 (993b9–11); *transl. Michaelis Scoti siue “Noua,” in Aristoteles Latinus. Codices descriptis G. Lacombe in societatem operis adsumptis A. Birkenmajer, M. Dulong, Aet. Franceschini, Corpus Philosophorum Medii Aevi* (Rome, 1939), 152, specimen 41: “Dispositio enim intellectus in anima apud illud quod est in natura ualde manifestum similis est dispositioni oculorum uestertilionis apud lucem solis”; *ibid.* (Venice: “apud Iunctas,” 1562), VIII, fol. 28vI. Like the *Auctoritates Aristotelis*, the other Latin versions of the Metaphysics do not have “uestertilionis,” a characteristic term of the Arabo-Latin translation, but rather “nictuarum” or “nicticoracum.” Cf. *Iohannes de Fonte, Auctoritates Aristotelis*, ed. Hammes, 118, n° 35: “Sicut se habet oculus nocticoracis ad lumen solis uel diei, sic se habet noster intellectus ad manifestissima naturae, ad deum, et ad substantias separatas, et ad naturas rerum subtilium.”

<sup>29</sup> For the position of the contemporary *Isagoge* commentaries relating to the

- 140      ⟨§72⟩ ⟨A⟩ Cuiuscumque enim est considerare ipsum totum natum diuidi  
in partes et accipere partes illius totius; sed methaphisica *considerat* totum  
*ens*: ergo methaphisica considerat partes entis que sunt uniuersalia. Maior  
patet in primo<sup>30</sup> *Posteriorum* ubi dicitur quod pars et *totum* sunt eiusdem  
*coordinationis*; minor scribitur in *Methaphysica noua*.<sup>31</sup>
- 145      ⟨§73⟩ ⟨B⟩ Ad idem est secunda ratio. Illa scientia, cuius proprium est  
omnes alias scientias regulare, debet esse de illis per que constituuntur

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141 et accipere *pPV* : est considerare *sP* (*sup. lin. al. man.*)      methaphisica *V* :  
methaphisicus *P*      142 methaphisica *V* : mathaphisica *P*      143 *Posteriorum*  
*P* : preteriorum *V*      dicitur *P* : dicit *V*      144 coordinationis *P* : cordinationis *V*  
scribitur *V* : sequitur *P*      146 scientias *V* : *om. P*

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metaphysical or logical universal (Albertus Magnus, *Super Porphyrium de V univer-*  
*salibus*, ed. Manuel Santos Noya, editio Coloniensis, vol. 1.1 [Münster, 2004], 17.39–  
49; Nicholas of Paris, *Scriptum super libro Porphyrii*, Munich, Bayerische Staats-  
bibliothek Clm. 14460, fols. 3rb and 5va–vb; Robertus Anglicus, *Scriptum super libro*  
*Porphyrii*, ed. Piché, 278–82, §§35–42; Robert Kilwardby, *Notule super librum Por-*  
*phyrii*, Cambridge, Peterhouse 206, fol. 33rb; Madrid, Biblioteca Universitaria 73,  
fol. 1rb; and, amongst didascalical texts, Anonymous, *Communia Logice*, in Claude  
Lafleur and David Piché, with the collaboration of Joanne Carrier, “Porphyre et les  
universaux dans les *Communia logicae* du ms. Paris, BnF, lat. 16617,” *Laval théo-*  
*logique et philosophique* 60.3 [2004]: 507, §51), see the analysis of question 2 above  
in the doctrinal study.

<sup>30</sup> Aristotle, *Analytica Posteriora* 1.15 (79b5–11); *transl. Iacobi*, ed. Minio-  
Paluello and Dod (AL 4.1), 34.1–7: “Quod autem contingit B non esse in quo toto est  
A, aut iterum A in quo est B, manifestum ex coordinationibus est, quecumque non  
commutantur ad inuicem. . . . commutarentur enim coordinationes.” Cf. Iohannes de  
Fonte, *Auctoritates Aristotelis*, ed. Hamesse, 317, n° 68.

<sup>31</sup> See, for example, Aristotle, *Metaphysica* 4.1 and 2 (1003a21–24 and 1004a13–  
18); *transl. Michaelis Scoti siue “Noua”* (Venice: “apud Iunctas,” 1562), VIII, fols.  
63vM–64rA and 71rF: “Unius quidem scientiae scientiarum est consyderatio de ente  
et de rebus quae sunt entis per se. Et ista scientia non est una earum quae dicuntur  
particulares, quoniam non est alicuius scientiae particularis consyderatio de ente uni-  
uersali . . .” and “Manifestum est igitur quod una scientia habet consyderationem de  
ente simpliciter et quod ista scientia habet consyderare non de substantiis tantum, sed  
de his quae sunt substantiarum etiam, scilicet praedictis, et ante et post, et genere et  
forma, et uniuersali et particulari, et aliis similibus.” Cf. Iohannes de Fonte, *Auctori-  
tates Aristotelis*, ed. Hamesse, 122, n° 87: “Prima philosophia, id est metaphysica,  
considerat ens et passiones et principia entis secundum quod ens.”

150 subiecta in qualibet scientia; sed methaphisica est huiusmodi: ergo methaphisica erit de uniuersalibus per que constituitur subiectum artis cuiuslibet. Maior patet in primo capitulo *Veteris Methaphisice*:<sup>32</sup> ideo enim uult quod methaphisica sit *domina omnium aliarum*,<sup>33</sup> quasi regulas dans et modum procedendi in aliis. Assumptio patet: nichil enim scientiam perficit nisi induat modum uniuersalis.

155      *⟨§74⟩ (c)* Ad idem est tertia ratio. Omnis scientia que differt ab aliis per abstractionem et simplicitatem debet esse de maxime abstractis; methaphisica autem est huiusmodi: ergo erit de uniuersalibus, que sunt maxime abstracta. Maior per se patet. Minor scribitur in secundo *Phisicorum*.<sup>34</sup>

⟨OPPOSITUM⟩

*⟨§75⟩ Ad oppositum sunt due rationes.*

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148      constituuntur *V* : constituuntur *P*      artis cuiuslibet *V* : *inv. P*      149      capitulo *V* : tertius *P*      enim *V* : causa manifesta *P*      uult *scripsimus* (*cf., infra, §84*) : uniuersale *PV*      149–50 quod methaphisica *scripsimus* : *om. P* : quod materia *V* 150      sit *scripsimus* : cuius *PV*      quasi *scripsimus* : quod *P* : pro *V*      dans *scripsimus* : causas *PV*      155      autem *P* : *om. V*

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<sup>32</sup> Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysica* 1.1 (983a6); *transl. Composita siue “Vetus,”* ed. Vuillemin-Diem (AL 25.1a), 93.20–21: “Hec enim diuinissima et honorabilissima est; . . . quam maxime deus habet, scientiarum dea est . . .” cf. Iohannes de Fonte, *Auctoritates Aristotelis*, ed. Hamesse, 117, n° 27: “Nulla scientia est nobilior et melior metaphysica, quia ipsa est maxime divina cum sit deo. . . .”

<sup>33</sup> Rather than the *Metaphysics*, this phrase “domina omnium aliarum ⟨scientiarum⟩” recalls the *Posterior Analytics* in the version of “John”; cf. Aristotle, *Analytica Posteriora* 2.9 (76a17–18); *transl. Anonyma siue “Ioannis,”* ed. Minio-Paluello and Dod (AL 4.2), 124.8–9: “. . . erunt enim illa omnium principia et scientia que est illorum *domina omnium*.”

<sup>34</sup> Where the comparison about the abstraction is made between the physicist and the mathematician, and not, as here in our author, between logic and metaphysics: cf. Aristotle, *Physica* 2.2 (193b22–194a1); *transl. “Vetus” Iacobi Venetici*, ed. Bossier et Brams (AL 7.1), 49.13–51.22: “Quoniam autem determinatum est quot modis natura dicatur, post hoc speculandum est quid differt mathematicus a phisico . . . mathematicus . . . abstrahit; abstracta enim intellectu a motu sunt, et nichil differt neque fit mendacium abstrahentium. Latet autem hoc facientes et circa ideas dicentes; phisica enim abstrahunt cum minus sint abstracta mathematicis.” Cf. Iohannes de Fonte, *Auctoritates Aristotelis*, ed. Hamesse, 145, n° 57: “Abstrahentium non est mendacium.”

160     ⟨§76⟩ ⟨a⟩ Omnis scientia que differt ab alia scientia eo quod ista accipit intentionem illa uero rem debet esse de illo quod maxime accipit modum intentionis; sed *logica* est huiusmodi, sicut dicit Auicenna:<sup>35</sup> ergo erit de uniuersalibus, que maxime habent modum intentionis.

165     ⟨§77⟩ ⟨b⟩ Ad idem est secunda ratio. Omnis scientia cuius acceptio cadit supra omnes scientias speciales debet esse de illo quod cadit supra subiectum quodlibet speciale; *logica* est huiusmodi: ergo erit de uniuersalibus, que cadunt supra subiectum quodlibet speciale. Minor patet, quia *logica* est de omnibus, sicut Philosophus dicit in *Methaphysica*.

⟨QUESTIONES COMMUNES CORRELATIVE⟩

170     ⟨§78⟩ Huius gratia queruntur quatuor communes questiones.

170     ⟨§79⟩ ⟨2<sup>1</sup>⟩ Prima questio est, cum methaphysica dicatur esse de omnibus et *logica*, quomodo differenter?

175     ⟨§80⟩ ⟨2<sup>2</sup>⟩ Secunda questio est, cum omnis scientia dicatur de uniuersali et *logica* et maxime liber iste, quomodo differenter?

175     ⟨§81⟩ ⟨2<sup>3</sup>⟩ Tertia questio est, cum *logica* abstrahit et methaphysica, quomodo differenter?

175     ⟨§82⟩ ⟨2<sup>4</sup>⟩ Quarta questio est: quare de singularibus non habemus scientiam sicut de uniuersalibus?

⟨RESPONSIO AD SECUNDAM QUESTIONEM⟩

180     ⟨§83⟩ ⟨2\*⟩ Ad primum dicendum quod uniuersalia multis modis sumuntur. Possunt enim accipi prout dicunt essentias quasdam separabiles,

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159 que *PsV*: que que *pV*      162 habent *V*: *om. P*      165 erit *V*: *logica* est *P*

167 Philosophus dicit *V*: *inv. P*      169 huius *P*: huiusmodi *V*      170 methaphysica *P*: methaphysica *V*      171 *logica PsV*: *lg logica pV*      174 abstrahit

*V*: abstrahitur *P*      et methaphysica *V*: methaphysica iste *P*      176–77 habemus scientiam sicut *V*: habetur scientia nisi *P*

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<sup>35</sup> Implicit reference to the second intentions, subject of logic, according to the well-known Avicennian definition (cf. Avicenna, *Liber de philosophia prima siue scientia diuina* 1.2, ed. Simone Van Riet, Avicenna Latinus 2.1 [Louvain and Leiden, 1977], 10.73–77, quoted on p. 23 above), taken up again below, without mentioning the author, in the “Responsio ad secundam questionem” (§83).

185

65va V

numquam tamen separatas: et sic dicuntur partes entis et methaphisico pertinent. Alio modo uniuersalia possunt accipi prout nominant intentionem fundatam in rebus secundum modum predicandi uel ordinandi: et sic logico pertinent. Sic enim dicimus quod *logica* est de *secundis intentionibus applicatis primis*.<sup>36</sup> Tertio quidem modo accipiuntur | *uniuersalia* prout sunt in *singularibus* in quibus habent esse actualiter et continuationem essentie, uel prout sunt obiectum *potentie naturalis anime*: et sic pertinent

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181 methaphisico <i>P</i> : methephisico <i>V</i>	183 secundum modum <i>V</i> : secundo
185 modo <i>P</i> modo <i>P</i> : <i>om. V</i>	186 singularibus <i>V</i> : simplicibus <i>P</i>
accidentale <i>V</i>	actualiter <i>P</i> :
187 naturalis <i>P</i> : notabilis <i>V</i>	

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<sup>36</sup> Avicenna, *Liber de philosophia prima siue scientia diuina* 1.2, ed. Van Riet (Avicenna Latinus 2.1), 10.73–77: “Subiectum uero logicae, sicut scisti, sunt intentiones intellectae secundo, quae apponuntur intentionibus intellectis primo, secundum hoc quod per eas peruenitur de cognito ad incognitum, non inquantum ipsae sunt intellectae et habent esse intelligibile, quod esse nullo modo pendet ex materia, uel pendet ex materia, sed non corporeo.” See the “oppositum” above (§76), where the name of Avicenna is mentioned in link with the thesis which implicitly refers to the present definition of logic, introduced here anonymously or rather credited as “dicimus.” Even though this Avicennian characterization of the subject of logic is already put under the spotlight in the twelfth century by Gundissalinus (*De diuisione philosophiae*, “De logica,” ed. Ludwig Baur [Münster, 1903], 70.17–20; and ed. Alexander Fidora and Dorothée Werner, Herders Bibliothek der Philosophie des Mittelalters 9 [Freiburg, Basel, and Vienna, 2007], 150) and would become essential at the turning-point of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, none of the other *Isagoge* commentaries contemporary with the one partially edited here (i.e., none of the commentaries of the period 1230–60 by Robert Kilwardby, Nicholas of Paris, Robertus Anglicus, and Albertus Magnus) alludes to it. The same goes for the arts masters’ didascalical texts (including the *De ortu scientiarum* of Robert Kilwardby) with, to our knowledge, the sole exception of the *De communibus artium liberalium*: cf. Claude Lafleur, with the collaboration of Joanne Carrier, “Un instrument de révision destiné aux candidats à la licence de la Faculté des arts de Paris, le *De communibus artium liberalium* (vers 1250?)”, *Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medieval* 5.3 (1994): 155, §5: “Preterea, illud debet dici subiectum logice quod principaliter considerat logica; hoc autem est secunda intentio adjuncta prime, ut dicit Auisenna; ergo, etc.” (it should be noted that this is an objection which the author-compiler of the *De communibus* reduces to his position by equating the syllogism—for him the subject of logic—with the intention mainly studied by this discipline).

ad naturalem philosophum quantum ad unam sui partem, sicut patet in tertio *De anima*.<sup>37</sup> Concedo ergo quod uniuersalia, prout sunt partes entis  
 190 uel principia regulandi scientias, non solummodo secundum intentionem,  
 sed secundum ueritatem, methaphisico pertinent, sicut probant prime rationes  
 ad hanc partem inducere. Prout autem sunt intentiones, logico pertinent,  
 ut dictum est.<sup>38</sup> Et sic rationes utroque modo procedunt.

〈RESPONSIONES AD QUESTIONES COMMUNES CORRELATIVAS〉

195     〈§84〉 〈2<sup>1\*</sup>〉 Ad primam questionem est dicendum quod, sicut | littera  
 dicit in *Methaphysica noua*, methaphisicus accipit omnia secundum uerita-  
 tem, logicus autem secundum intentionem uel apprehensionem. Unde uult  
 ibi<sup>39</sup> littera in textu quod non *simul querenda est scientia cum modo scien-*

6ra P

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188 ad naturalem philosophum *V* : naturali philosopho *P*     unam sui *V* : suam *P*  
 191 ueritatem *scripsimus* (*cf. infra*, §84) : uirtutem *PV*     methaphisico *P* : metha-  
 phisico *V*     195 est *V* : *om. P*     196 dicit *V* : *om. P*     197 apprehensionem  
*scripsimus* : apprehensionem *P* : apprehensionem *V*     198 ibi littera *V* : *inv. P*  
*simul scripsimus ex fonte* : solum *PV*

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<sup>37</sup> Aristotle, *De anima* 2.5 (417b22–28); 3.4 (429a13–18, 27–29); *transl. “Vetus” Iacobi Venetici*, ed. Gauthier, 281; 445: “Causa autem est quoniam singularium secundum actum sensus est, sciencia autem uniuersalium. Hec autem in ipsa quodam modo sunt anima . . .” and “Et quomodo forte fit ipsum intelligere, si igitur est intelligere sicut sentire aut pati aliquid sit ab intelligibili, aut aliquod huiusmodi alterum sit. Inpassibile ergo oportet esse, susceptiva autem speciei et potencia huiusmodi est, set non hoc. . . . Et bene iam dicentes sunt animam esse locum specierum, nisi quod non tota, set intellectiua, neque actu set potencia est species.” Cf. Iohannes de Fonte, *Auctoritates Aristotelis*, ed. Hamesse, 182, n° 96: “Scientia est uniuersalium.”

<sup>38</sup> See above in the present paragraph.

<sup>39</sup> Aristotle, *Metaphysica* 2.3, 995a13–14; *transl. Iacobi siue “Vetustissima,”* ed. Vuillemin-Diem (AL 25.1), 40.13–14: “inconueniens sit simul querere scientiam et modum scientie”; *transl. Composita siue “Vetus,”* ed. Vuillemin-Diem (AL 25.1<sup>a</sup>), 123.5: “simul scientiam et modum scientie querere inconueniens est”; *transl. Anonyma siue “Media,”* ed. Vuillemin-Diem (AL 25.2), 39.30–40.1: “absurdum est simul querere scientiam et modum scientie”; *transl. Michaelis Scoti siue “Noua,”* in *Averroes (Ibn Rushd), In Aristotelis librum II (a) Metaphysicorum commentarius*, ed. Gion Darms (Freiburg, 1966), *textus* 15, 76.10: “Malum enim est quaerere simul aliquam scientiam et modum” (*cf. ed. Venice: “apud Iunctas,”* 1562, VIII, fol. 35rB);

tie. Modus scientie ibi appellatur ‘logica’. Cui consonat Alfarabius dicens  
200 quod logica est figura aliarum scientiarum et instrumentum artium, sicut  
*manus est organum organorum*.<sup>40</sup>

⟨§85⟩ ⟨2<sup>3\*</sup>⟩ Ad tertiam questionem dicendum quod methaphisicus abs-  
trahit *separando* et accipiendo rem que *numquam* est *in materia*;<sup>41</sup> logicus

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199 ibi appellatur <i>V</i> : <i>inv. P</i>	consonat <i>V</i> : <i>sonat P</i>	202 tertiam <i>scrip-</i> <i>simus</i> : <i>aliam PV</i>
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Iohannes de Fonte, *Auctoritates Aristotelis*, ed. Hamesse, 119, n° 60: “Absurdum est simul habere (*sic*) scientiam et modum sciendi.”

<sup>40</sup> This characterization of logic appears not to be in the *Alfarabius Latinus*. In his own *Isagoge* commentary, Robert Kilwardby, without specifying an *auctoritas*, defines logic in a way that approximates that of our author: Robert Kilwardby, *Notule super librum Porphyrii*, Cambridge, Peterhouse 206, fol. 33ra; Madrid, Biblioteca Universitaria 73, fol. 1ra: “Inter omnes quoque artes primo querenda est illa ars [i.e., logic] que dicitur ars artium et scientia scientiarum, sicut manus dicitur organum organorum, et intellectus species specierum.” As it was highlighted by R. A. Gauthier (in *Sancti Thomae de Aquino . . . , Sentencia libri De anima*, 4, *app. fontium*, 29–30), the beginning of the formula (“art of the arts and science of the sciences”) was first a way of defining (prime) philosophy itself inspired by Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 1.2 and used by many authors from Ammonius and Philoponus to Hugh of St. Victor and Gundissalinus, including Macrobius, Cassiodorus, Isidore of Seville, John Damascene, and others (e.g., Isidore of Seville, *Etymologiarum siue originum libri XX* 2.24.9, ed. Wallace M. Lindsay [Oxford, 1911; rpt., 1957]; and *Etymologies, Book 2: Rhetoric*, ed. Peter K. Marshall, *Auteurs latins du Moyen Âge* [Paris, 1983], 107.2–3: “Philosophia est ars artium et disciplina disciplinarum”). The second part of the formula (“organ of the organs”), appears in our text and comes from Aristotle, *De anima* 3.8 (432a1–3); *transl. “Vetus” Iacobi Venetici*, ed. Gauthier, 484: “Quare anima sicut manus est: manus enim est organum organorum, et intellectus est species specierum et sensus est species sensibilium.” Cf. Iohannes de Fonte, *Auctoritates Aristotelis*, ed. Hamesse, 188, n°s 164 and 165: “Manus est organum organorum” and “Intellectus est species specierum, id est formarum.” The instrumentality of logic towards the other arts, for its part, overlaps with the debate (logic: instrument or part of philosophy?) that Boethius relates, for example, in the *Second edition* of his *Commentary on Porphyry’s Isagoge* 1.3, in *Anicii Manlii Seuerini Boethii In “Isagogem” Porphyrii Commenta*, copiis a Georgio Schepss comparatis suisque usus re-censuit Samuel Brandt, *Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum* 47 (Vienna and Leipzig, 1906), 140–43.

<sup>41</sup> Here the reality is absolutely separated from matter about which metaphysics is concerned according to Alfarabi: cf. Alfarabi, *De intellectu et intellecto*, ed. Étienne

205 uero abstrahit considerando quod est in materia, preter materiam tamen,  
sicut est expositum in precedentibus.<sup>42</sup>

⟨§86⟩ ⟨2<sup>2\*</sup>⟩ Ad secundam questionem dicendum est quod, cum dicitur:  
omnis *scientia* est de *uniuersalibus*,<sup>43</sup> hoc est intelligendum de aliqua re

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206 secundam *scripsimus* : tertiam PV      est V : *om. P*

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Gilson, “Les sources gréco-arabes de l’augustinisme avicenniant,” *Archives d’histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Âge* 4 (1929–30): 120.182–83; 121.211–16 (where the key term *separatio* appears) and 230–35: “Cum autem fuerint hic aliqua que sunt forme non in materiis, nec fuerunt unquam forme in materiis . . . et hinc incipiunt forme descendere usque ad formam corporalem ylealem et hinc incipiunt eleuari quoisque separantur a materiis paulatim cum modis separacionis superantis se. Si autem fuerunt forme que nullo modo sunt in materiis, nec fuerunt, nec erunt nunquam in materiis excedentes se in perfeccione et separacione . . . a quo iterum cum erexeris te, peruenies ad primum ordinem eorum que sunt separata. Ex quorum ordinibus primus est ordo intelligencie agentis. Unde intelligencia agens, quam nominauit Aristoteles in tercio tractatu libri de anima, est forma separata, que nec fuit in materia, nec erit unquam.” The interpretation of this Farabian idea, and of its taking over by the arts masters, is provided by Alain de Libera, *La querelle des universaux de Platon à la fin du Moyen Âge*, Des travaux (Paris, 1996), 110–16 (“Séparation et abstraction: l’influence d’Al-Fârâbî sur la première scolastique”; “Intuition intellectuelle et connaissance métaphysique: Roger Bacon”; and “La métaphysique comme connaissance des choses divines”).

<sup>42</sup> See Ps.-Pagus, Prologue “Sicut dicit philosophus” of the *Scriptum super librum Porfirii* (P, fol. 3rb; V, fol. 63rb): “Sed notandum quod, quamvis abstractio conueniat methaphisico et logico, tamen differenter. Uno enim modo appellatur abstractio existentia alicuius extra materiam quod ‘nunquam fuit in materia nec est nec erit,’ et talis abstractio proprio uocabulo ‘separatio’ nuncupatur.” For the edition of this passage, see Claude Lafleur, with the collaboration of Joanne Carrier, “Abstraction, séparation et tripartition de la philosophie théorétique: quelques éléments de l’arrière-fond farabien et artien de Thomas d’Aquin, *Super Boetium ‘De Trinitate,’ question 5, article 3*,” *Recherches de théologie et philosophie médiévaux* 67.2 (2000): 268, and “Une figure métissée du platonisme médiéval: Jean le Page et le Prologue de son Commentaire (vers 1231–40) sur l’*Isagoge de Porphyre*,” in *Une philosophie dans l’histoire. Hommages à Raymond Klibansky*, ed. Bjarne Melkevik and Jean-Marc Narbonne, Zêtésis: Textes et essais 3 (Paris and Québec, 2000), 152–53, §13.

<sup>43</sup> Aristotle, *Analytica Posteriora* 1.31 (87b37–39); transl. Iacobi, ed. Minio-Paluello and Dod (AL 4.1), 62.11–12: “sentire quidem enim necesse est singulariter, scientia autem est in cognoscendo uniuersale” (cf. Iohannes de Fonte, *Auctoritates*

speciali accepta per modum uniuersalis, et sic demonstratiua scientia est de demonstratione, hoc est abstrahit ab hac et ab illa; quando dicitur istum librum esse de uniuersalibus, hoc est dictum de illo quod est uniuersale, non tamen sumptum per modum rei, sed per modum intentionis, ut apparebit iam.<sup>44</sup>

210      215      *⟨§87⟩ ⟨2<sup>4\*</sup>⟩* Ad quartam, dicendum quod de *singularibus non est scientia*, sicut de *uniuersalibus*:<sup>45</sup> sunt enim singularia incerta quia corruptibilia, et sunt infinita, quia in infinitum generabilia et corruptibilia, quia ex con-

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208 et *P* : ut *V*      sic *P* : si *V*      209 de *P* : *om. V*      211–12 apparebit *V* :  
apparet *P*      214 singularia *V* : uniuersalia *P*      215 in *V* : *om. P*

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*Aristotelis*, ed. Hamesse, 319, n° 93: “Sensus est singularium, scientia uero uniuersalium”); *De anima* 2.5 (417b22–23), *transl. “Vetus” Iacobi Venetici*, ed. Gauthier, 281: “Causa autem est quoniam singularium secundum actum sensus est, sciencia autem uniuersalium” (cf. Iohannes de Fonte, *Auctoritates Aristotelis*, ed. Hamesse, 182, n° 96: “Scientia est uniuersalium”); *Metaphysica* 3.6 (1003a13–15), *transl. Iacobi siue “Vetustissima,”* ed. Vuillemin-Diem (AL 25.1), 61.2–4: “si uero non uniuersalia sed sicut singularia, non erunt scibiles (uniuersales enim scientie sunt omnium)”); and 13 (12).10 (1087a10–11), *transl. Anonyma siue “Media,”* ed. Vuillemin-Diem (AL 25.2), 254.22–23: “Scientiam uero esse uniuersalem omnem. . . .”

<sup>44</sup> In *Lectio 3*, on genus: *P*, fol. 12ra; *V*, fol. 70va–vb: “Ad hoc dicendum . . . quod accipit metaphisicus essentiam generis, logicus vero intentionem illius in re, non tamen accipit rem per modum rei, sed per modum intentionis.” Reading with the *P* witness, “as it appears already” (“ut apparebit iam”), it should be rather referred, above, to §76 and §83, where logic is associated “maximally to the mode of intention,” or even, in an Avicennian manner, “to second intentions applied to the first.”

<sup>45</sup> Aristotle, *Analytica Posteriora* 1.18 (81b6–7); *transl. Iacobi*, ed. Minio-Paluello and Dod (AL 4.1), 40.13–14: “Singularium enim sensus est; non enim contingit accipere ipsorum scientiam”; *De anima*, 2.5 (417b22–23); *transl. “Vetus” Iacobi Venetici*, ed. Gauthier, 281; *Metaphysica*, 7.15 (1039b27–1040a5); *transl. Anonyma siue “Media,”* ed. Vuillemin-Diem (AL 25.2), 151.5–16: “Unde substantiarum sensibilium singularium nec diffinitio nec demonstratio est. . . . Ergo si demonstratio necessariorum et diffinitio scientialis. . . . Non enim sunt manifesta corrupta scientiam habentibus, cum abeant a sensu, et saluti rationibus in anima earundem non erit nec diffinitio amplius nec demonstratio”; *transl. Michaelis Scoti siue “Noua”* (Venice: “apud Iunctas,” 1562), VIII, fol. 201vL–M: “Et ideo neque definitio, neque demonstratio est substantiarum sensibilium particularium. . . . Et, si demonstratio est ex rebus necessariis, et definitio est uera. . . . Manifestum est igitur, quod non habent definitionem, nec demonstrationem.”

trariis composita uel *(ex)* contrariis alligata. Et ideo non possunt facere scientiam; uniuersalia uero sunt finita et certa et incorruptibilia, et ideo cadunt in scientia.

220     *(§88)* Ex predictis oritur hec notabilis propositio: uniuersalium prout sunt res est methaphysica scientia, prout sunt intentiones logica; dico autem “uniuersalium” perpetuorum, non autem contingentium, causas certas, determinatas, ordinatas, infallibilis habentium. Notandum quod per hoc quod dico: “uniuersalium,” remouentur singularia, quorum omnium, quantum est de se, nulla est scientia;<sup>46</sup> per hoc quod sequitur: “causas habentium ordinatas,” remouentur omnia que occasionantur a casu et a fortuna, que deficiunt a causa et non sunt cause; per hoc quod sequitur: “determinatas,” remouentur uoluntaria, que uoluntate profluunt ad opposita se habentia; per hoc quod dico: “infallibilis,” remouentur omnia contingentia, que possunt impediri in suo opere.

225     *(§89)* Et hec sufficient de secunda questione.

*⟨TERTIA QUESTIO⟩*

*⟨§90⟩ ⟨3⟩ Circa tertium sic queritur.*

*⟨POSITIO DIALECTICA⟩*

*⟨§91⟩ Et uidetur quod de uniuersalibus non possit esse una scientia:*<sup>47</sup>

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216 ex *supplevimus* : *om.* *PV*    217 finita *V* : finita sunt *P*    incorruptibilia *V* :  
immortalia *P*    220 intentiones *PsV* : res est intentiones *pV*    221 autem *V* :  
etiam *P*    certas *V* : creatas *P*    223 remouentur singularia *V* : *inv. P*    225 oc-  
asionantur *V* : accidunt *P*    226 deficiunt *P* : deficiunt *V*    et *V* : *om. P*  
228 per *V* : et per *P*    omnia *P* : *om. V*    234 una scientia *V* : *inv. P*

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<sup>46</sup> Aristotle, *Analytica Posteriora* 1.18 (81b6–7) and 1.31 (87b37–39); *transl. Iacobi*, ed. Minio-Paluello and Dod (AL 4.1), 40.13–14 and 62.11–12; *De anima* 2.5 (417b22–23); *transl. “Vetus” Iacobi Venetici*, ed. Gauthier, 281; *Metaphysica* 7.15 (1039b27–1040a5); *transl. Anonyma siue “Media,”* ed. Vuillemin-Diem (AL 25.2), 151.5–16; *transl. Michaelis Scoti siue “Noua”* (Venice: “apud Iunctas,” 1562), VIII, fol. 201vL–M.

<sup>47</sup> The question of the unity of the science of predicables is also found in other commentators on the *Isagoge* around 1230–60: cf. Nicholas of Paris, *Scriptum super*

235      ⟨§92⟩ ⟨A⟩ Quia scribitur in tertio *De anima*<sup>48</sup> quod *secantur* et diuiduntur *scientie* quemadmodum *et res* scibiles: ergo, cum hec *predicabilia* non habeant unum minimum in quo possint determinari, manifestum est quod non possunt unam *scientiam* facere. Tota consequentia patet, quia ab unitate minimi in subiecto est unitas in scientiis; sed hec *predicabilia* si haberent minimum, aut esset particulare aut uniuersale: particulare esse non potest, hoc enim per se est inpartibile; nec uniuersale, nam sic essent sex uniuersalia et non quinque.

240      ⟨§93⟩ ⟨B⟩ Ad idem est secunda ratio. Sicut scribitur in secundo *Posteriorum*,<sup>49</sup> quatuor requiruntur ad unitatem *scientie*: primum est ut habeat

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235 scribitur *V* : sequitur *P*      236 res *V* : res ex quibus sunt uel *P*      cum *V* :  
est *P*      non *V* : *om. P*      237 possint *P* : possit *V*      238 consequentia  
*PsV* : consequentia q *pV*      239 minimi *V* : numeri *P*      subiecto *V* : secundo *P*  
240 minimum *V* : numerum *P*      241 inpartibile *scriptus* : in particulare *P* : in  
partibile *V*      243–44 in secundo *Posteriorum* *V* : ibi *P*

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*libro Porphyrii*, Munich, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek Clm. 14460, fol. 4va; Vatican, Vat. lat. 3011, fol. 2ra; Robertus Anglicus, *Scriptum super libro Porphyrii*, ed. Piché, 310–15, §§110–19; Robert Kilwardby, *Notule super librum Porphyrii*, Cambridge, Peterhouse 206, fol. 33va; Madrid, Biblioteca Universitaria 73, fol. 1va.

<sup>48</sup> Aristotle, *De anima* 3.8 (431b24–25); transl. “*Vetus*” Iacobi Venetici, ed. Gauthier, 484: “Secantur igitur sciencia et sensus in res”; the wording of our text is more akin, by some features, to the saying found in the *Auctoritates Aristotelis*, ed. Hamesse, 188, n° 162: “Scientiae secantur quemadmodum res de quibus sunt scientiae.” Cf. Aubrey of Reims, *Philosophia*, in René-Antoine Gauthier, “Notes sur Siger de Brabant. II. Siger en 1272–75. Aubrey de Reims et la scission des Normands,” *Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques* 68 (1984): 47.340–41 and *app. fontium*, 340.

<sup>49</sup> The reading “ibi” in *P* would return us to the *De anima*, 3.8 mentioned in §92, but clearly the four requirements for the unity of science are not exposed in this chapter. The reference in *V* to the second book of the *Posterior Analytics*, however, is not easily identifiable, unless one sees there a very free formulation of the four scientific questions according to Aristotle, *Analytica Posteriora*, 2.1–2 (89b23–90a34); transl. Iacobi, ed. Minio-Paluello and Dod (AL 4.1), 69.3–71.14. Cf. Johannes de Fonte, *Auctoritates Aristotelis*, ed. Hamesse, 319, n<sup>os</sup> 97–99: “Quaestiones sunt aequales numero his quae uere scimus”; “Quaestiones sunt quattuor, scilicet quid est et propter quid, si est, quia est. Et istae reducuntur ad quaestionem medii”; and “Causa et medium sunt idem.”

245 unum subiectum de cuius partibus passiones probantur; secundum est ut  
 passiones reducantur et ad unum subiectum considerentur; tertium est ut  
 principia omnia habeant radicationem in subiecto; quartum est ut hec  
 omnia sint appropriata isti scientie: ergo, cum hec predicabilia non habeant  
 eandem proprietatem predicandi nec habeant appropriatum | esse in una  
 250 scientia, ut iam dictum est,<sup>50</sup> manifestum quod nec unam scientiam fa-  
 ciunt.

6rb *P*

255 <§94> <c> Preterea magis communicant que sunt in eodem genere proximo [et quod unum dependet ab altero] | quam que non; sed continua  
 quantitas et discreta sunt sub eodem genere proximo quia sub quantitate,  
 quinque uniuersalia predicabilia non (tria sunt de genere substantie, duo  
 autem de genere accidentis): ergo, cum quantitas continua et discreta non  
 possint unam scientiam facere, multo fortiori nec quinque uniuersalia.

65vb *V*

⟨OPPOSITUM⟩

<§95> Ad oppositum sunt rationes.

260 <§96> <a> Prima talis est: scientiarum specialium quedam sunt de rebus,  
 quedam de signis. Sed sic est in genere scientiarum realium quod una est  
 que accipit illud quod est commune omnibus aliis. Ergo in genere logica-  
 lium siue rationalium, ita erit quod erit una scientia accipiens illud quod  
 commune est omnibus aliis. Hoc autem commune est uniuersale siue pre-  
 dicabile. Erit ergo una scientia de predicabilibus prout colliguntur in unum.

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245 cuius *V*: quibus *P* probantur *V*: demonstrantur *P* secundum *P* : sed  
 secundum *V* ut *V*: quod *P* 246 reducantur et *P* : et eductas *V* con-  
 siderentur *P* : considerent *V* est *V*: *om. P* 247 omnia *V*: communia *P*  
 habeant radicationem *V*: *inv. P* quartum *P* : quitum(?) *V* ut hec *V*: quod *P*  
 248 appropriata *P* : propriata *V* hec *V*: ista *P* 249 nec *V*: non *P* in *V*:  
*om. P* 250 unam *scripsimus* : aliquam *P* : quamquam *V* 253–54 et quod ...  
 proximo *V*: *hom. om. P* 253 et quod unum dependet ab altero *seclusimus* : *V* (*om. P*)  
 255 uniuersalia predicabilia *P* : predicabilia ulla *V* 259 rationes *V*: tres  
 rationes *P* 261 sic *V*: si *P* una *P* : unam *V* 262 est *V*: *om. P*  
 263 rationalium *V*: rationabilium *P* erit<sup>1</sup> *V*: *om. P* 264–65 siue predicabile  
*V*: suum predicabilis *P* 265 erit ergo *P* : erit ergo erit *V* colliguntur *V*: colli-  
 guntur *P*

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<sup>50</sup> See above, §92.

270

⟨§97⟩ ⟨b⟩ Ad idem est secunda ratio. In genere logico duplex est dicibile, scilicet quoddam complexum et quoddam incomplexum. Ergo cum habeamus unam partem de dicibili complexo abstracto a quolibet speciali, ut scientiam *Priorum*, que est de sillogismo exemplari a quolibet abstrahente, oportebit habere aliam partem que sit de dicibili incomplexo communi ad alia. Hoc autem est predicabile siue uniuersale; et sic erit una scientia de predicabili in quo uniuntur uniuersalia.

⟨RESPONSIO AD TERTIAM QUESTIONEM⟩

275

⟨§98⟩ ⟨3\*⟩ Ad hanc questionem intelligendum est quod de istis quinque predicabilibus una potest esse scientia, non in quantum sunt quinque, sed in quantum uniuntur in hoc communi siue uniuersale.

⟨§99⟩ Ad cuius evidentiam est notandum quod commune, sicut scribitur in commento supra quartum *Methaphysice*,<sup>51</sup> est multis modis.

280

⟨§100⟩ Uno modo, secundum proprietatem et secundum nomen et rem, ut quodlibet uniuocum.

285

⟨§101⟩ Alio quidem modo, secundum rem et nomen, non tamen secundum proprietatem, ut analogum. Et hoc est multipliciter: quoddam est analogum quod de pluribus dicitur et de nullo altero mediante, sicut substantia de materia et forma; est enim forma magis substantia quam materia, et quod tale est impedit unitatem scientie. Alio modo est analogum quod dicitur de pluribus de uno per prius, de altero per posterius mediante priori. Et hoc dupliciter: aut enim est unum de essentia alterius sicut pars consti-

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266 logico <i>P</i> : logica <i>V</i>	269 exemplari <i>V</i> : exempla <i>P</i>	270–71 communi
ad alia <i>V</i> : Ad aliam <i>P</i>	272 uniuntur <i>V</i> : uniantur <i>P</i>	274 est <i>P</i> : <i>om.</i> <i>V</i>
275 non <i>P</i> : ideo <i>V</i>	276 communi <i>P</i> : contrarium quod est commune <i>V</i>	
278 quartum(?) <i>P</i> : quatuor <i>V</i>	279–82 et secundum . . . proprietatem <i>V</i> : <i>hom.</i>	
<i>om.</i> <i>P</i>	280 quodlibet <i>scripsimus</i> : quolibet <i>V</i> ( <i>om.</i> <i>P</i> )	282 analogum <i>V</i> :
analogum <i>P</i>	283 analogum <i>sic PV</i>	de <i>PsV</i> : <i>om.</i> <i>pV</i>
demonstratur <i>P</i>	285 analogum <i>sic PV</i>	de nullo <i>V</i> : de-
hoc enim <i>P</i>	286 priori <i>V</i> : priore <i>P</i>	monstratur <i>V</i> :
enim est <i>V</i> : <i>inv.</i> <i>P</i>	287 hoc <i>V</i> :	
	essentia alterius <i>V</i> : substantia alterius siue de	
	essentia <i>P</i>	

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<sup>51</sup> Cf. Averroes, *Commentarium Magnum in libros Metaphysicorum* 4 (Venice: “apud Iunctas,” 1562), VIII, fols. 64v–66r.

tutiuia, et sic substantia dicitur de corpore et de animali; aut unum non est de essentia alterius sicut pars, sed solum sicut fundamentum radicale ipsius, et sic est commune substantie et accidenti; et ista duo anologa non impediunt unitatem scientie.<sup>52</sup>

290            295            295            295            295            295            295  
 〈§102〉 Tertio quidem modo est commune secundum proprietatem et nomen, non tamen secundum rem, ut quantitas respectu continui et discreti. Et appellatur multipliciter. Manet utrobique nomen idem et eadem proprietas que est mensurare, non tamen res eadem. Et quod tale est impedit unitatem scientie.

300            300            300            300            300            300            300  
 〈§103〉 Ultimo modo est commune secundum nomen, non tamen secundum rem et proprietatem, ut pure equiuocum, quod nec potest esse unum genus in predicando, nec in consequendo, nec in essendo.

305            305            305            305            305            305            305  
 〈§104〉 Dico ergo quod non de quolibet communi est una scientia, sed de illo quod habet unum minimum secundum proprietatem, nomen et rem, aut saltem secundum nomen et rem; unde, quamvis hec quinque predicabilia non habeant unum commune secundum eandem proprietatem, eo quod habent diuersos modos predicandi, habent tamen unum commune secundum rem et intentionem, quod appellatur predicabile; et ideo unam scientiam possunt facere. Illud autem minimum quidam appellant ‘genus’: ex genere enim oriuntur *differentie*, eo quod in ipso sunt *potestate*. Et de utroque constituitur species, | ad quam sequitur proprium uel accidens; et sic

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289 fundamentum <i>P</i> : fudamentum <i>V</i>	290 anologa <i>sic PV</i>	294 multi-
quod <i>V</i> : multiplex <i>P</i>	295 non <i>PsV</i> : non res <i>pV</i>	pliciter <i>V</i> :
<i>om. P</i>	<i>talis P</i>	<i>modo V</i> :
<i>impedit sPV</i> : <i>impediti pP</i>	<i>impediti pP</i>	<i>om. P</i> :
<i>secundum V</i> : <i>secundum unum P</i>	298 pure <i>V</i> : <i>potius P</i>	<i>secundum V</i> :
<i>om. P</i>	299 nec <sup>1</sup> <i>P</i> :	<i>secundum V</i> :
<i>non V</i>	300 communi <i>V</i> : <i>om. P</i>	<i>secundum unum P</i>
300            300            300            300            300            300            300	302 <i>predicabilia V</i> : <i>uniuersalia predicabilia P</i>	302 <i>predicabilia V</i> : <i>uniuersalia predicabilia P</i>
<i>habent V</i> : <i>habenat(?) P</i>	<i>eo P</i> : <i>eam V</i>	<i>habent V</i> : <i>habenat(?) P</i>
<i>autem V</i> : <i>om. P</i>	305 <i>predicabile V</i> : <i>predicabilis P</i>	<i>autem V</i> : <i>om. P</i>
306            306            306            306            306            306            306	<i>possunt facere V</i> : <i>posuerunt facere communem P</i>	<i>possunt facere V</i> : <i>posuerunt facere communem P</i>
<i>constituitur V</i> : <i>conscriptibit P</i>	308            308            308            308            308            308            308	<i>constituitur V</i> : <i>conscriptibit P</i>

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<sup>52</sup> Amongst the commentators on the *Isagoge* in 1230–60, only Nicholas of Paris uses the concept of analogy as our master does for answering the question of the unity of the science of the five predicable universals: on this subject, see the analysis of question 3 in the doctrinal study, p. 32 n. 65 above, where a similar use of analogy is reported in the *Communia logice*.

310 omnia possunt referri ad genus. Utrum autem hoc sit uerum melius patebit inferius.<sup>53</sup>

⟨§105⟩ Est autem una hec scientia ab unitate modi procedendi: habet enim unum modum procedendi quem tangit auctor in littera; est autem una ab unitate finis: etsi tamen ad multa ualeant, finaliter tamen ad predicatorum scientiam ordinantur, que uere una est.

315 ⟨§106⟩ Et sic concluditur ex predictis<sup>54</sup> quod ⟨nec⟩ de quantitate in communi nec de sermone in communi potest esse una scientia.

⟨CONTRA POSITIONEM DIALECTICAM⟩

⟨§107⟩ Ad argumentum in oppositum respondemus.

320 ⟨§108⟩ ⟨A\*⟩ Et dicimus quod prima ratio supponit falsum: hec enim pre-  
dicabilia reducuntur ad unum minimum, sicut iam declaratum est.<sup>55</sup>

⟨§109⟩ ⟨B\*⟩ Ad secundum dicendum est quod non quocumque | modo

66ra V

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309 omnia *V* : omnes *P*      hoc sit uerum *V* : sit uerum hoc *P*      312 auc-  
tor *P* : actor *V*      314 uere *V* : res *P*      315 nec *supplevimus* : *om.* *PV* in *sPV* :  
*om. pP*      316 potest *V* : non potest *P*      una scientia *V* : *inv. P*      321 est *V* :  
*om. P*

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<sup>53</sup> In *Lectio 6*, on difference: *P*, fol. 19ra–vb; *V*, fol. 76ra–va. Cf. Porphyry, *Isagoge*, edition of the Greek text in *Porphyrii Isagoge et in Aristotelis Categorias commentarium*, ed. Adolf Busse, *Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca* 4.1 (Berlin, 1887), 11.4–5, anticipating 14.20–21; *transl. Boethii*, ed. Minio-Paluello and Dod (AL 1.6), 17, 21 and 23.2: “potestate quidem omnes habent sub se differentias” and “genus continet differentiam potestate”; cf. *Porphyre: Isagoge*, texte grec et latin, traduction par Alain de Libera et Philippe-Alain Segonds, *Sic et Non* (Paris, 1998), 13, “De differentia,” §9 (“l’animal possède en puissance toutes les différences des ⟨espèces⟩ qui sont sous lui”); and 18, “De differentiis generis et differentiae,” §3 (“le genre embrasse la différence en puissance”); and *Porphyry: Introduction*, trans. with a commentary by John Barnes (Oxford, 2003), 10 (“potentially it [i.e., animal] possesses all the differences of the items under it”) and 13 (“a genus contains the difference potentially”).

<sup>54</sup> See above, §102, which deals explicitly only with quantity (but from where supposedly the impossibility of a unique science of language in general can also be deduced).

<sup>55</sup> See above, §104.

habere scientiam ponimus de uniuersalibus, sed solum secundum modum  
predicandi et ordinandi; et sic sunt appropriata uni scientie.

325      *⟨§110⟩ ⟨C\*⟩ Ad tertium dicendum est quod non fuit simile de quantitate:  
quantitas enim est unum secundum nomen et proprietatem, non tamen se-  
cundum rem, eo quod addebat principia formalia diuersa ab inuicem; non  
tamen predicabile sic faciebat.*

330      *⟨§111⟩ Ex hiis elicetur notabilis propositio: unius subiecti de cuius parti-  
bus probantur proprie passiones per principia radicata in eodem subiecto et  
in eodem genere sub unitate modi procedendi et ydentitate finis, est una  
scientia.*

*⟨§112⟩ Et hec sufficient de tertia questione.*

⟨QUARTA QUESTIO⟩

*⟨§113⟩ ⟨4⟩ Circa quartum sic proceditur.*

335      *⟨POSITIO DIALECTICA⟩*

*⟨§114⟩ Et uidetur quod iste liber omnes alios subalnernet.*

340      *⟨§115⟩ ⟨A⟩ Prima ratio hec est: omnis scientia cuius subiectum se habet  
ex additione ad subiectum alterius scientie ut a qua recipit modum proce-  
dendi ad notificationem partium subalternatur eidem scientie; sed omnes  
alii libri logices sic se habent respectu istius; ergo etc. Maior patet. Minor  
probatur per ea que tanguntur in prohemio huius libri: ualet enim hec  
scientia ad demonstrationes, diuisiones, diffinitiones.*

⟨OPPOSITUM⟩

*⟨§116⟩ In contrarium adducitur hec ratio:*

345      *⟨§117⟩ ⟨a⟩ Quia omnis scientia subalternans dicit ‘propter quid’ de pas-*

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322 habere *V* : habeat *P*      modum *V* : modi *P*      323 sunt *V* : *om. P*  
 324 est *V* : *om. P*      325 nomen *V* : rem *P*      325–26 tamen secundum rem  
*scripsimus* : secundum proprietatem rem tamen *pP* : secundum rem tamen *sP* : tamen  
 secundum ratione *V*      328 elicetur *V* : eligitur *P*      330 eodem genere ... est  
*V* : *om. P*      334 quartum      *V* : quartam *P*      338 additione      *V* : addixione  
*P*      341 prohemio *P* : philosophie *V*      ualet enim *V* : scilicet *P*      342 ad  
*V* : neque ad *P*      344 adducitur *P* : adicitur *V*      hec *sPV* : *om. pP*

sionibus ipsius subalternati; sed hec scientia non sic se habet respectu aliarum scientiarum: ergo non subalternat alias.

〈RESPONSIO AD QUARTAM QUESTIONEM〉

350      〈§118〉 〈4\*〉 Ad evidentiam huius questionis est notandum quod subalternatio est multis modis.

355      〈§119〉 Uno quidem modo est subalternatio simpliciter, quando scilicet subiectum est sub subiecto ex additione se habens, quando utraque habet eandem passionem quarum una est sub altera, ita quod superior dicat ‘propter quid’, inferior uero ‘quia’, ut scilicet utraque maneat eiusdem generis et equalis abstractionis; et hoc modo se habent arismetica et armónica.

360      〈§120〉 Secundo modo dicitur subalternatio quando nec subiectum sub subiecto nec passio sub passione nec accidentum nec sunt eiusdem generis, sed tamen una illarum dicit ‘propter quid’, altera uero ‘quia’; et sic se habent *geometria* et *cyrurgia*: 〈geometres〉 dicit enim ‘*propter quid*’ *uulnera circularia tardius sanantur*, *cyrurgicus* uero ‘*quia*’.<sup>56</sup>

〈§121〉 Tertio est subalternatio quando subiectum est sub subiecto ita quod una est de toto et altera de parte et superior regulat inferiorem quan-

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346 non *V* : nec *P*      346–47 aliarum scientiarum *P* : aliarum *V*      351 simpliciter *scripsimus* : substantie *P* : similiter *V*      quando scilicet *V* : *inv. P*      352 additione *V* : addictione *P*      habet *V* : habent *P*      354 ut *V* : *om. P*      355–58 et equalis . . . eiusdem generis *V* : *hom. om. P*      355 arismetica *scripsimus* : arithmetica *V* (*om. P*)      358 accidentum *scripsimus* : accidentaliter *V* (*om. P*)      eiusdem *scripsimus* : eius *V* (*om. P*)      359 illarum *V* : *om. P*      360 *cyrurgia* *P* : *telurgia* *V* *geometres supplevimus* : *om. PV*      enim *V* : *om. P*      quid *V* : ad *P*      361 circularia *P* : triangularia *V*      *cyrurgicus* *P* : et *rolu<sup>cus</sup>* *V*      362 est<sup>1</sup> *V* : *om. P*      363 toto *P* : tota *V*      et<sup>1</sup> *V* : *om. P*

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<sup>56</sup> Aristotle, *Analytica Posteriora* 1.13 (79a13–16); transl. Iacobi Iacobi, ed. Minio-Paluello and Dod (AL 4.1), 32.15–18: “Multe enim et non sub inuicem scientiarum habent sic, ut medicina ad geometriam; quod quidem enim uulnera circularia tardius sanentur, medici est scire, propter quid autem geometre.” Cf. Iohannes de Fonte, *Auctoritates Aristotelis*, ed. Hamesse, 316–17, n° 65: “In scientiis diuersis saepe una scientia dicitur quod, alia quia, ut medicina dicit quod uulnera circularia tardius sanantur quam oblonga, sed propter quid illud dicit geometria.”

365 tum ad substantiam principiorum subiecti communis ita quod non dicit ‘propter quid’ propriarum passionum, sed solum communium nec est utraque eiusdem generis. Et hoc modo subalternatur methaphysica ad omnes: continet enim omnes et regulat easdem.

370 〈§122〉 Quarto modo est subalternatio quando scientia diuersi generis siue eiusdem recipit aliquid ab alia, sicut naualis ab astrologia recipit stellatarum contemplationem.

375 〈§123〉 Quinto modo est subalternatio quando una docet ex quibus | et qualibus habet componi ars, et ex qua altera habet uti. Et sic se habet illa que docet facere sermonem ad illam que habet sermone uti.

6vb *P*

380 〈§124〉 Sexto modo est quando id quod *una* considerat ordinatur ad *alteram* tanquam ad finem, sicut se habet *factrix*<sup>57</sup> *frenorum* ad illam que est *militaris*.

〈§125〉 Septimo modo, quando una regulat alteram in modo procedendi et ministrat sibi instrumentum quo debet uti. Et sic sermocinales se habent ad alias.

380 〈§126〉 Ultimo modo est subalternatio quando scientia accipit communes terminationes et modos generales sub quibus alia aliquo modo habet comprehendti; et ista sic ad alias se habet non quod proprie illas sibi subalternet, sed potius quia ex quadam ordinatione se habet ad illas.

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364 principiorum *P* : principalior *V*      dicit *V* : dicitur *P*      366 subalternatur methaphysica ad omnes *sic PV* (*sed fortasse intelligendum est* subalternat methaphysica omnes)      367 easdem *P* : eandem *V*      369 recipit aliquid *V* : recipitur *P* sicut *P* : sunt *V*      ab astrologia *V* : astrologia *P*      371 una *V* : unum *P*      372–73 illa que docet *V* : *om. P*      373 sermonem *scripsimus* : remotionem *PV*      sermone uti *scripsimus* : uti remotione *P* : remotione uti *V*      374 est *P* : *om. V* 375 frenorum *P* : tremorum *V*      375–76 ad illam que est *militaris* *V* : *bis P* 377 quando *V* : secundum quod *P*      380 modo *V* : *om. P*      accipit *P* : accepit *V* 382 sic *V* : *om. P*      illas sibi *V* : *inv. P*

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<sup>57</sup> Cf. Aristotle, *Ethica Nichomachea* 1.1 (1094a6–14); *Ethica “Noua,”* in *Ethica Nichomachea, Translatio Antiquissima libr. II-III siue “Ethica Vetus” et Translationis Antiquioris quae supersunt siue “Ethica Noua,” “Hoferiana,” “Borghesiana,”* ed. René-Antoine Gauthier, AL 24.1–3 (Leiden and Brussels, 1972), 65.13: “Multis autem operacionibus entibus et artibus et doctrinis, multi fiunt fines. . . . Quecumque autem sunt talium sub una aliqua uirtute, quemadmodum sub equestri frenorum fac-

⟨§127⟩ Per hoc patet responsio ad questionem.

385     ⟨§128⟩ Ex hiis elicetur notabilis propositio: omnis scientia cuius subjectum ex additione ad subiectum alterius comparatur, passione unius sub alterius passione existente, modo procedendi utrobique uniformiter se habente, ita quod utraque in eodem genere habet principia supponendo eadem, proprie subalternatur.

390      **⟨§129⟩ Et hec de quarta questione | sufficient.**

66rb V

385 elicitur *P* : elicitur *V*      386 additione *V* : addictione *P*      387 alterius  
passione *V* : *inv. P*      existente *V* : ex habente *P*      388 habet *P* : habentibus *V*  
388–89 eadem *V* : eidem *P*

trix et quecumque alie equestrium instrumentorum sunt, hec autem et omnis bellica operacio, sub militari; secundum eundem utique modum, et alie sub altera.”

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