

QUESTIONS CONCERNING FREE CHOICE AND BEATITUDE IN AN EARLY FISHACRE MANUSCRIPT

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AT the end of Book I of Richard Fishacre's Commentary on the *Sentences*, as recorded in Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France lat. 15754 (henceforth identified as *P*), there occur four *quaestiones*, the subjects of which have nothing to do with matters discussed in the first book, which is devoted to the doctrine of the Trinity.¹ Exclusive to *P*, the questions are written over two and a half columns,² in two or possibly three hands that differ from any in the main text. While no further copies of the questions have been discovered, several indications in addition to physical location suggest that they too were authored by Fishacre.

Notwithstanding the current location of the manuscript, the text exhibits a characteristic that has been identified as peculiar to books produced by Oxford scribes and first appears in manuscripts containing Fishacre's Commentary, namely the marking of lines by fives, in Arabic numerals, and between the two columns of text on each page.³ This feature, in fact,

¹ For a complete description of the manuscript, see R. James Long and Maura O'Carroll, *The Life and Works of Richard Fishacre. Prolegomena to the Edition of his Commentary on the "Sentences,"* Bayerische Akademie der Wissenschaften 21 (Munich, 1999), 169–78; the texts presented here as four *quaestiones* and first line of a fifth are listed on p. 170 as two treatises.

² *Ibid.*, 169–70. On fol. 65rb, following the "amen" signalling the end of the text of the first book of the *Sentences* commentary, the first question follows immediately. The script of the added question(s) is noticeably smaller than the preceding text, and after the first three pencilled guide lines, the scribe begins to shorten the distance between lines, such that the ratio by the bottom of the page is 57/66, the latter number representing the lines of the first of the questions ("Quod corpus caeleste . . .").

³ See Richard H. Rouse and Mary A. Rouse, *Preachers, Florilegia and Sermons: Studies on the 'Manipulus florum' of Thomas of Ireland*, Studies and Texts

is found in no fewer than seven of the thirteen manuscripts containing the aforesaid work.⁴ With respect to *P*, however, the line numbering extends only to Book I, fol. 36v; furthermore, with the exception of the first five pages and a few scattered later pages, the numbering by fives have been rendered nearly invisible, because some scribe (or perhaps its current owner) carefully erased them.⁵ We can only speculate that the owner wanted to make place for a new notational system that made use of Arabic numbers together with capital letters for the purpose of identifying arguments and would therefore be more occasional than simply the mechanical marking of every fifth line.⁶ Although there is insufficient evidence in its pastedown notes respecting the date and circumstances of *P*'s sale and purchase,⁷ we do know that the codex early in its history came into the possession of Gerard de Abbeville, a Parisian secular master, who in turn bequeathed it to the Sorbonne upon his death in 1272.⁸

Quite apart from codicological reasons, one can make a case on the grounds of content that *P* should be counted among the earliest of the Fishacre manuscripts, notwithstanding its relatively early sale. Of *P*'s particular value is the unique presence in their proper place in the text of

47 (Toronto, 1979), 20. These line numbers in Oxford books were first noticed by Franz Pelster, "Das Leben und die Schriften des Oxford Dominikanerlehrers Richard Fishacre (†1248)," *Zeitschrift für katholische Theologie* 54 (1930): 517–53.

⁴ *B*, *C*, *N*, *O*, *P*, *R*, and *V* (according to the sigla assigned by the editors of the critical edition published by the Bayerische Akademie der Wissenschaften). In general, these manuscripts exhibit fewer variant readings than the remaining nine (see Long and O'Carroll, *Life and Works of Richard Fishacre*, 49). Other indicators of origin, like the practice of outlining distinctions in the shape of a felled tree (*arbores ramificatae*), above-top-line writing and flourishing practices have been subjects of study by paleographers and suggest a manuscript's origin in an Oxford scriptorium rather than a Parisian (Rouse and Rouse, *Preachers, Florilegia and Sermons*, 50–56).

⁵ Long and O'Carroll, *Life and Works of Richard Fishacre*, 174.

⁶ Rouse and Rouse, *Preachers, Florilegia and Sermons*, 22.

⁷ Long and O'Carroll, *Life and Works of Richard Fishacre*, 178.

⁸ In fact, Gerard's total contribution of codices more than doubled the size of Robert de Sorbonne's library, thereby laying the foundation for it to become "one of the most important and distinguished libraries in (medieval) Europe" (Stephen M. Metzger, *Gerard of Abbeville, Secular Master, on Knowledge, Wisdom and Contemplation*, 2 vols. [Leiden, 2017], 7). Cf. R. H. Rouse, "The Early Library of the Sorbonne," *Scriptorium* 21 (1967): 47–51, 227–51.

two significant and timely questions, to which a subsequent master or scribe assigned the titles *Quaestio de aeternitate vel incoatione mundi*⁹ and *Quaestio de luce*.¹⁰ Two additional questions, *Quaestio de aquis supra firmamentum* and *Quaestio de caelo*, are shared (again, with respect to their proper places in the Commentary) only with Oxford, Balliol College 57 in the instance of the first, and with two additional Oxford manuscripts (New College E.112 and Oriel College 31) in the case of the second. In short, the accumulated evidence argues that *P* ought to be ranked among the earliest copies of Fishacre's *Sentences* Commentary.

Furthermore, there survive additional discussions in manuscripts other than *P* that testify to an active, albeit brief, scholarly career beyond his five or six years commenting on the *Sentences*. Two such works appear at the end of an early (and incomplete) copy, Vatican, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana Ottob. lat. 294: *De ascensione Christi*¹¹ and *Super s. Augustini librum de haeresibus*.¹² Also, a pair of marginal notes in a Cambridge manuscript¹³ teasingly intimates a number of questions beyond those already identified, namely "hic deest quaestio de creatione vel incoatione mundi quae scripta est una cum quaestione de luce in parvo volumine ante quaestionem de haeresibus";¹⁴ and "hic deest quaestio de luce quae scripta est in parvo quaterno cum quaestionibus de

⁹ R. James Long, "The Role of Philosophy in Richard Fishacre's Theology of Creation," *Miscellanea Mediaevalia* 26 (1998): 571–78; see also Long, *Hagar's Vocation. Philosophy's Role in the Theology of Richard Fishacre, O.P.* (Washington, D.C., 2015), 12–20.

¹⁰ R. James Long and Timothy B. Noone, "Fishacre and Rufus on the Metaphysics of Light: Two Unedited Texts," in *Roma, magistra mundi. Itineraria culturae medievalis. Mélanges offerts au Père L. E. Boyle à l'occasion de son 75^e anniversaire*, ed. Jacqueline Hamesse, Textes et études du moyen âge (Louvain-la-Neuve, 1998), 530–48; and Long, *Hagar's Vocation*, 88–109.

¹¹ Long, "Richard Fishacre's *Quaestio* on the Ascension of Christ: An Edition," *Mediaeval Studies* 40 (1978): 30–55; and Long, *Hagar's Vocation*, 208–34.

¹² Long, "Richard Fishacre's *Super S. Augustini librum de haeresibus adnotationes*: An Edition and Commentary," *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge* 60 (1993), 207–79; and Long, *Hagar's Vocation*, 235–54.

¹³ Cambridge, Gonville and Caius College Ms. 329/410 (identified by the siglum C).

¹⁴ Fishacre, *In secundum librum Sententiarum*, dist. 12; ed. Long, Bayerische Akademie der Wissenschaften 24 (Munich, 2008), 1:237.

haeresibus.”¹⁵ This “small volume” or *quaternus* (a booklet or gathering), which has not been identified, was arguably a repository of disputed questions (*quaestiones disputatae*) that originated from the few years that Fishacre spent in the classroom in-between and after his writing of Oxford’s earliest commentary on Lombard’s *Sentences* (i.e., ca. 1241–48).¹⁶

The nature and tone of the questions edited below, however, suggest a later and distinctly different species of the *quaestio* form, a form that reflects a focus that developed in the law schools as well as the case studies of moral theology, formalized as an academic exercise at the University of Paris after 1250 and known as a *quaestio de quolibet* or quodlibetal question.¹⁷ Leonard Boyle, in taking note of the distinction, refers to the “*casus* nature” of the new form.¹⁸ As a curious coincidence, the purchaser of the codex identified as *P*, Gerard de Abbeville, “disputed more quodlibetal questions in the history of the University of Paris than any other Scholastic theologian, religious or secular.”¹⁹

¹⁵ Ibid., dist. 13; 1:256.

¹⁶ In the introduction to my edition of the above-cited volume I refer to this text as the “*Q* Text” (ibid., p. 35*).

¹⁷ See John Wippel, “The Quodlibetal Question as a Distinctive Literary Genre,” in *Les genres littéraires dans les sources théologiques et philosophiques médiévales: définition, critique et exploitation. Actes du Colloque international de Louvain-la-Neuve* (Louvain-la-Neuve, 1982), 67–84, and “Quodlibetal Questions Chiefly in Theology Faculties,” in *Les questions disputées et les questions quodlibétiques dans les Facultés de Théologie, de Droit et de Médecine*, ed. Bernardo Bazàn et al. (Turnhout, 1985), 153–222. Although the sixteenth-century antiquary John Leland makes mention of “Fizaker’s” *Quodlibeta* at King’s College, Cambridge (*Collectanea*, iv, 18), the reference is most probably generic (i.e. assorted questions) and not specific to the form developed at the University of Paris. See reference in Josiah C. Russell, *Dictionary of Writers of Thirteenth Century England* (London, 1936), 115.

¹⁸ Boyle, “The Quodlibets of Thomas Aquinas and Pastoral Care,” in *The Thomist* 38 (1974): 244–46, rpt. in Boyle, *Pastoral Care, Clerical Education and Canon Law 1200–1400*, Variorum Reprints (London, 1981), 11.

¹⁹ Metzger, *Gerard of Abbeville*, 7. A review of the titles of the quodlibets of Gerard edited by Metzger revealed no title resembling the four that appear in this study. A similar search in a much earlier study likewise netted no such title: see P. Glorieux, *Répertoire des maîtres en théologie de Paris au XIII^e siècle* (Paris, 1933), 356–60. It is also the case, somewhat paradoxically, that Gerard was a known ad-

In support of Fishacre's authorship of the questions in *P* (*quodlibetales* or not) there is finally the matter of telltale language. The clearest example that presents itself is Fishacre's use of Robert Grosseteste's invention of the signature terms *aspectus* and *affectus*, meaning "apprehension" and "appetite" or reason and will,²⁰ a distinction which appears in three of the four questions edited below, namely the first, second, and fourth. Although these terms were also widely used by the subsequent Oxford masters Richard Rufus²¹ and Robert Kilwardby,²² in Fishacre's hands they assume a "terminological fluidity" which subsumes *affectus* under *aspectus*, such that love or desire becomes merely a kind of apprehension.²³

Mention should also be made of *P*'s rather extensive table of contents, ranging over eight folia at the beginning of the codex with three columns

versary of the mendicants; see William A. Hinnebusch, *The Early English Friars Preachers* (Rome, 1951), 368.

²⁰ The distinction first appears in the Prologue to Fishacre's *Sentences* Commentary: see Long, "The Science of Theology according to Richard Fishacre: Edition of the Prologue to His *Commentary on the Sentences*," *Mediaeval Studies* 34 (1972): 71–98. See also Long, "Interiority and Self-Knowledge according to Richard Fishacre," in *Intellect and Imagination in Medieval Philosophy*, Actes du XI^e Congrès International de Philosophie Médiévale de la S.I.E.P.M., ed. M. C. Pacheco, and J. F. Meirinhos (Turnhout, 2006), 1269, and *Hagar's Vocation*, 158–59.

²¹ See especially Neil Lewis, "Grosseteste, Fishacre and Richard Rufus on the Distinction of *aspectus* and *affectus*," in *Editioni, traduzioni e tradizioni filosofiche (secoli XII–XVI). Studi per Pietro B. Rossi*, ed. Luca Bianchi, Onorato Grassi, and Cecilia Panti (Rome, 2018), 1:21–34.

²² Kilwardby is especially exhaustive in his understanding of the identity and difference between the terms, devoting an entire question to the discussion: "... quia voluntas vel amor ex parte affectus est, memoria vero et intelligentia ex parte aspectus, quaeritur an sint idem per essentiam aspectus et affectus ... etc.," in Kilwardby, *Quaestiones in librum primum Sententiarum*, q. 61, ed. Johannes Schneider (Munich, 1986), 1:173–76. I am grateful to Professor Lewis for calling my attention to this passage as well as for reading the Latin text below. In the second book of the same work one finds eighty-five instances of the use of *aspectus/affectus* (Kilwardby, *Quaestiones in librum secundum Sententiarum*, ed. Gerhard Leibold (Munich, 1992), *passim*).

²³ Lewis, "Grosseteste, Fishacre and Richard Rufus," 23–26. Since these terms in Fishacre's hands are so fluid, I indicated in my commentary below when the Latin terms themselves were being referenced.

per page, and totaling over 2500 single entries in the form of indirect questions.²⁴ For ease of use the author or scribe has provided underlined topics in roughly alphabetic order. While most of the 262 topics are accompanied by single questions, several contain far more: for example *Deus* (78), *angelus* (58), *creatura rationalis* (27), *decalogus* (25), and *anima* (11). To be noted also is that in one of the statements, under the rubric *theologia* (fol. 6r), there occurs the following: “Quod theologiae una pars est circa mores instruendos quoad *affectum*, alia circa quaestiones difficiles circa fidem discutiendas quoad *aspectum*,”²⁵ and under the rubric *affectus vel aspectus* (1v), there are found five claims, without however supplying any references to the *Sentences* Commentary itself:

De differentia eorum et convenientia eorum qualis sit.

Quod homo doctor vel praedicator neque illuminat aspectum neque accendit affectum, nisi sicut occasio, non autem sicut causa.

Quod contingit simul ad multa affici.

Quod aspectus et affectus idem sunt in essentia sive apprehensiva et motiva sive ratio et voluntas.

Quod aspectus et affectus, memoria et intelligentia et voluntas, idem sunt in essentia.

Of greater interest for our purposes, however, are the subject statements to which are attached a folio number in Arabic numerals together with a capital letter (A–G), which signify the place in the main text to which the reference points and which mode of indexing is attached to the name of Gerard de Abbeville.²⁶ On fol. 3v, under the rubric *beatitudo* (where one might look for references to three of the four questions edited below) the only entry to be assigned a folio number and capital letter (namely, *utrum beatum lateat aliquid* – 74E) bears no hint of the issues raised in three of the questions edited below. In brief, there appears to be no evidence to suggest that the extensive indices at the beginning of the Paris codex were at all related to the text below.

²⁴ Rouse and Rouse, *Preachers, Florilegia and Sermons*, 22. Following the eight numbered folia, there are three blank folia (also numbered) until folio 13r, where the page numbering begins anew (as does the script) with the beginning of the Fishacre introduction (*O altitudo . . .*).

²⁵ See n. 20 above.

²⁶ Rouse and Rouse, *Preachers, Florilegia and Sermons*, 21–22.

In summary, inconclusive as the codicological and textual evidence is, there remains the possibility that the four questions below could have been inserted in the space by a later master, even by Gerard himself,²⁷ notwithstanding the weight of evidence tilting in favor of the Dominican Fishacre's authorship.

The first of the four questions deals with an issue connected with free choice (*liberum arbitrium*), a subject to which Fishacre devotes more pages than any other in Book II of his *Sentences Commentary*.²⁸ Among the *contra* arguments advanced in distinction 24 of the latter work, moreover, the third (of three) focuses on the influence of the heavenly bodies on our bodies and by extension on our souls, "as the radius when water is disturbed."²⁹ The human body, he argues there, is subject to two influences, namely that of the heavenly bodies and its own rational soul. Without a doubt, however, the stronger of these influences is the rational soul, *because it is the nobler*.³⁰

The claim of astrology that heavenly bodies (here the *corpus caeleste*) have dominion over free choice (*liberum arbitrium*), Fishacre takes up and greatly expands in the *P* text. Every form liable to change, runs the first argument, is contingent on the movements of the celestial spheres. But the freedom to choose, continues the argument, is a "natural form liable to change." Therefore, etc. The minor premise, which Fishacre finds objectionable, has it that the will or free choice is a natural form,

²⁷ One recalls Gerard's affinity for the *quaestio de quolibet*, and if my suspicion is correct that these questions resemble this newly evolving form, the conclusion is tempting. On the other hand, see n. 19 above.

²⁸ Fishacre, *In secundum librum Sententiarum*, Part 2: dist. 24, ed. Long (Munich, 2011), 71–115; Long, "Richard Fishacre's Treatise *De libero arbitrio*," in *Moral and Political Philosophies in the Middle Ages*, Proceedings of the Ninth International Congress of Medieval Philosophy, ed. R. Carlos Bazán et al. (Ottawa, 1995), 2:881, and *Hagar's Vocation*, 173.

²⁹ Fishacre, *In secundum librum Sententiarum*, ed. Long, 89.

³⁰ "Corpus humanum duplici subiacet motori, scilicet corporibus caelestibus et ipsi animae rationali. Et procul dubio potentior horum est anima rationalis, quia et nobilior. Si igitur hi duo motores impellant ad opposita ipsum corpus, cum non possit ipsum simul moveri motibus oppositis, necesse habet moveri ipsum corpus secundum agentem fortius impellentem. Et sic patet quod corpora caelestia, licet corpora, afficiant; tamen non habent potestatem in animam nec in corpus contra voluntatem animae, maxime in omnibus actionibus voluntariis" (*ibid.*, 90).

because it belongs to the perfection of human nature, and that is the part played by form. Likewise it is changeable, because it is actually changed from one disposition into its contrary both with respect to knowing (*in aspectu*) as well as to willing (*in affectu*).

Twofold, he responds to this first objection, is the appetite of the reason or will: “a natural appetite” is one by means of which, presented with a pleasurable or a disagreeable object, it will immediately be moved either to seek or to avoid it, and *to that extent* it is contingent on the movements of the celestial bodies. However, this subordination to the heavenly spheres is not, Fishacre insists, in accord with our nature as originally instituted, but as it exists in its current state of post-lapsarian corruption. He identifies lust, for example, as a kind of necessity imposed on our soul. There is nevertheless another species of will or “voluntary appetite” that deliberates concerning its natural appetite and, upon reflection, *voluntarily* consents or refuses to consent. The cause of this kind of appetite, moreover, is not dependent on any heavenly body; rather it is the source of our receiving or renouncing merit. The ability to change, moreover, extends to the rational subject’s ability to change from one disposition to its opposite, respecting both its knowing (*aspectus*) and its willing (*affectus*) manifestations.³¹

A second objection contends that just as the sensible apprehensive power is related to the superior apprehensive power of the intellect, so too is the (sentient) appetite to the correspondingly superior appetite capable of understanding. But the apprehensive powers are so constituted that as the sensitive power is in the act apprehending, the intellectual power necessarily apprehends willy-nilly (*velit nolit*). The major premise is apparent by a transposed proportionality. The minor is *per se* evident, because when the sensible species reaches the innermost power of the common sense accompanied by the perception of the same, one cannot *not* understand ideas (*intellectiva*). Thus it is, for example, that naturally and necessarily the sense appetite is moved from different passions of the body, as when the body is heated, it cannot *not* seek cooling. But it is likewise the case that diverse passions are caused in our bodies from the celestial bodies and their movements, because when hot stars

³¹ Long, “Interiority and Self-Knowledge according to Richard Fishacre,” 1269, and *Hagar’s Vocation*, 159–60, n. 2. Cf. Lewis, “Grosseteste, Fishacre and Richard Rufus,” 23–24.

approach us, our bodies are heated, and the contrary case of frozen stars is likewise true. We can thus conclude: the movement of the sentient appetite is naturally and necessarily caused by the movements of the celestial bodies. But if the sentient appetite is so moved, it is necessary that the intellective appetite is likewise aroused and becomes necessarily a seeker. Therefore, the movement and the appetite of the intellectual power *naturally and necessarily* are caused by the heavenly bodies, and this appetitive power is the same as the will or free choice.

Fishacre's response to this objection is that it is evident that following upon the movement of the sensitive appetite, it is necessary that the rational appetite or will be also moved *to the extent* that that is its nature. "And I call its appetite 'natural' according to a nature that is corrupt, but not insofar as it is will and its appetite arbitrary."

The third argument supposes the truth of Aristotle's argument in the *Metaphysics* that the heavenly bodies are living beings.³² Therefore, just as the human body is related to the celestial body, so too is the mover of the latter to the mover of the former. This dependence, moreover, is proportional, natural, and indeed necessary. In parallel fashion, the mover of the human body is the reason, to which belong the will and free choice.

The response to this objection is that the proportion sketched above is not universally true. Though we observe that a heavenly body through its drawing nearer or retreating may play its role in generating or corrupting the human body, such is not the case with the rational soul, and therefore the argument does not hold. The human body may feel the influence of the stars and through the bodily dispositions thus provoked may tempt the appetite of the sentient or animal soul and thereby the "natural" appetite of the will; notwithstanding this potential effect on the sentient appetite, however, it has no effect on the purely voluntary power of the soul. In short, the will as such remains free in its choosing.

But here, Fishacre raises a fourth and final objection based on the Aristotelian rule, "it is a law of nature that the same cause, provided it remain in the same condition, always produces the same effect." The objection adds that this rule also extends to things that are the same in species.³³ In responding, Fishacre notes that this law is applicable only

³² Arist., *Metaph.* 12.7 (1072b26–27)

³³ Arist., *De gen. et corr.* 2.10 (336a27–28); cf. *Auctoritates Aristotelis*, n. 43

to the realm of natural powers, not to the realm of the voluntary, and whereas every natural power is capable of one and only one effect of a pair of contraries (for example, of heating or cooling), the power of the will, remaining the same, is the sufficient cause of opposites. The will is capable of nothing but willing or not willing, and both are reducible to willing as to their root.

With the same rule in mind, the fourth objection notes that the will or free choice is specifically the same in all humans. Yet because human actions are so diverse and contrary even in the same person depending on the time, an act can be now good, now evil. But that can only be the case, if they are caused by varied and even contrary dispositions of the body. The latter, however, can only be caused by heavenly bodies and their movements.

However, Fishacre responds, this rule must be understood as referring to the active principle which is nature, and not the principle which is the will; or if it refers to both, it must refer primarily and *per se* to the action of the will that is willing. Just as fire consumes a given matter and liquefies another, in each case one and only one action takes place, which is heating. In like manner when the will intends now one pair of opposites, now another, the action is one, namely willing, but terminating in diverse objects. Since, however, fire is of the same “matter,” it cannot produce different results, that is, it cannot on one and the same occasion compress and liquify the same object.

In like manner, argues Fishacre, the will “by itself and absent grace can will nothing apart from evil or at least perhaps indifference.” Aided by grace, however, a will is such that it cannot not will the good. But someone will object: there are any number of contrary actions one can will without grace—for example, now to take a walk, now to rest—how can the same power remain the same and yet act in altogether diverse ways? It can be said that there is still found diversity respecting the will, or at least according to the reason, other than the diverse ends intended, according to which it performs such diverse actions. But since willing or intending an end is to will something, whence is caused in it such a diverse act of the will, namely of diverse ends? Without explicitly citing

(ed. Jacqueline Hamesse, *Les “Auctoritates Aristotelis”: un florilège médiéval; étude historique et édition critique* [Louvain, 1974], 170).

his source, Fishacre reminds his readers of the Stagirite's principle cited above.³⁴

Still there is a difference with respect to the will, because on one occasion it wills an object, on another occasion fails to will the same object. Furthermore, while the willing is active, the power to will or not to will the opposite remains in effect. Such is not the case with respect to fire or any natural active power. Thus it is perhaps necessary to make the point that the aforesaid rule is not to be understood except for natural active powers.

The second question added to the end of *P*'s first book takes up a topic that will be considered, according to the order set by Peter Lombard, at the very end of the fourth and final book,³⁵ yet it also takes a turn more redolent of an issue not taken up by the Lombard. With respect to the blessed angels or humans who have earned the state of glory the question arises concerning the love which they possess toward those things that pertain to themselves—in the first place, whether any of them might desire a degree of happiness higher than that which they possess. That would seem not to be the case, however, because the absence of some desired good would detract from their beatitude.

Secondly, the being that has reached the state of beatitude—angelic or human—wills nothing badly. But the blessed angel or the blessed human would indeed will something badly by seeking something that has not been earned.

Thirdly, nothing can be sought unless there is hope of obtaining it. But the subject in question does not hope to be able to obtain *a*, because it is already confirmed in *b*, and there is no longer time or occasion for the

³⁴ See n. 33 above

³⁵ More precisely this question is suggestive of Fishacre's gloss on distinction 49 of the fourth book of Lombard's *Liber Sententiarum*, viz. "QUOD BEATITUDO PAR ESSET etc. id est beatitudo consistit non in solo gaudio affectus sed in cognitione aspectus; et ideo licet sit aequalitas in gaudio, non autem in cognitione. Non erit par beatitudo. Sed haec responsio non stat, quia necessario quantum cognoscis, tantum amas, vel tantum delectaris et gaudes; et e converso, quia gaudium est de praesentia amati," ed. Louis Shwartz, in "The First Oxford Sentences Commentary on the Last Things: An Edition and Study of Richard Fishacre's *In quartum Sententiarum*, Distinctions 43–50" (Ph.D. diss., University of Toronto, 2015), 312.

earning of further merit. Support for the major premise in this objection is found in Augustine's *De Trinitate*: "... if you ask them about immortality as about happiness, they all answer that they want it. ... No one is wrong to want immortality, if human nature is capable of receiving it as God's gift; if it is not capable of it, then it is not capable of happiness either. For a man to live happily, after all, he must live."³⁶

Likewise, whatever is desired is thought of to the extent that it can be the end product of action. If, however, there is no hope of this end being attained, there is also no possibility of its being the end of an action. Therefore, if the same thing could be sought after and desired, this same end could be conceived together and simultaneously, as though it could and could not be the end of some action—which as a contradiction is an impossibility.

It is additionally the case, according to a particularly dense argument, that to desire *a* is not to desire that *a* exist or that another would possess *a*, but simply that the seeker himself would possess *a*. But this cannot be desired by one already confirmed in *b*, because what is only in the mind's knowledge (*aspectus*) and in no way outside of such knowledge either really or according to its appraisal can move the desire (*affectum*). Good and evil are indeed movers of desire to the extent that, according to Aristotle,³⁷ they are in the realm of the real. But this case, namely for one already confirmed in *b* to have *a*, does not enjoy any reality beyond the mental existence (*extra aspectum mentis*) it has by virtue of its knowledge in the mind—neither according to fact nor according to one's estimation. Therefore, it cannot be desired.

From this it will follow that one is neither saddened owing to the lack of *a* nor can that person be made sad, because *a*'s presence is neither in fact desired nor can be desired. Its absence consequently does not cause sadness nor is it able to, because unless the object's presence be desired, there can be no sadness in its absence.³⁸

³⁶ Augustine, *The Trinity* 13.8.11, trans. Edmund Hill, O.P., in *The Works of Saint Augustine* (Hyde Park, N.Y., 2012), 352.

³⁷ Perhaps a reference to Aristotle, *Eth. Nic.* 1.2 (1094a18–25).

³⁸ A marginal note at this point makes the claim that these arguments (without specification) conclude that unbaptized infants do not seek to see God (*Videtur quod ista argumenta concludunt quod parvuli non baptizati non appetunt videre deum*).

A contrary argument suggests itself: every nature, according to which it is such, loves itself the most and therefore seeks what is good for itself. But to possess *a* would be a good to the one who has *b*, and therefore the subject also craves *a*.

Fishacre responds by reminding his reader that a rational being by its very nature seeks for itself the good, the good whence it was born. Yet no rational nature would hope to be able to obtain *that* good, especially if it be just. Therefore, because the will is above nature, it seeks that good which it thinks to be akin to itself and indeed is owed to itself, otherwise it does not seek it. It does not therefore follow that simply seeking the good entails the quest for any kind or quality of good whatsoever.

The third question, again not considered elsewhere in the *Sentences* Commentary, concerns the case of the same subject, who is (as above) confirmed in *b*. If such a subject should experience the opposite of *b* in a contrary and privative manner, the degree of misery would be calibrated according to the opposite degree of joy, whether or not the possessor of *b* is brought to such an opposite state by some act of detestation or hatred. This, however, seems not to be the case, because the person having reached the state of beatitude has whatever he or she wants; the person in the case just described, however, would not have whatever he or she desires, for he/she would have some “penal affection” (that is, some desire inflicted as a punishment) and a punishment cannot be loved in itself.

Fishacre’s response to this argument is that good or evil taken alone, as well as the true or the merely apparent good, all have the ability to move the will. But good and evil are found in things just as true and false are found in thought, as Aristotle’s *Metaphysics* declares. Thus, those things that move desire are in things truly or only apparently. But that which is opposite to “grade *b*” is in neither mode in reality. Therefore it does not move the feelings.

A second objection makes the claim that the blessed person (*beatus*) wills nothing badly. But the person described above, from whom all love is owed to God, would indeed will something badly. And any will, which has the power to convert itself totally to God, sins if it turns something of itself elsewhere. But the will that is confirmed in glory is able to convert the whole of itself to God. And if it turns itself by a feeling (*affectu*)

of hatred or detestation toward the opposite of *b*, it turns itself elsewhere than to God, as is clear. Therefore, it wills something badly.

Fishacre answers that just as the running of a race differs from the winning thereof, thus also this kind of mortal life differs from the existence enjoyed by the blessed. But as in the time of war there is movement between the two sides, namely good and evil, peace and tumult, only in victory will adherence to peace be achieved. Such is the case in the proposal under discussion, namely that in the present life there is a process from evil to the good. But in the future life there is only complete adhesion to the good. In other words there is no room in the state of beatitude for any will that is not totally focused on God.

The third objection makes the point that just as in bodily things there exists a potentiality that matter has toward form, so in spiritual beings there exists a pliability of the will toward what is desirable. But in spiritual things matter thus seeks out form, which fulfills matter's total possibility, such that it never turns itself into another form. Nor is it capable of doing so. Therefore, the will, having given birth to the appetible which fulfills the whole of its desire, will never turn itself to another in its love. But the opposite of *b* is something other than that good which will be possessed in *b*. And the latter good fulfills the totality of one's desire, because it is the *summum bonum*, and to that opposite state the *beatus* will never convert itself.

Fishacre's response is unambiguous: when something is moved locally, it is moved from one terminus to another; but after being moved, it merely rests wholly in one of the termini, the one namely to which it was moved. The spiritual sense of being moved is that our love (*affectio*) is moved toward good or evil or somewhere between these two ends. In our heavenly home when there is movement, it comes to rest only in the good that is attained. Therefore there is no movement there *from* evil, but only adhesion with the good.

Likewise, the final objection argues that the glorified have already been confirmed and established in their loves. If therefore they have some "penal affection," as for example hatred or detestation, they will have it forever. Therefore, they will be simultaneously miserable and happy, even if you say that it is not necessary that they should always have such an affection. It is sufficient that there remains the possibility that they can have it. Here Fishacre responds, somewhat puzzlingly:

“These reasons seem probable enough, except for the second and the third.”

The final passage appears to be a summation of what is argued in the three preceding arguments and responses. Fishacre begins by suggesting an apparent objection: namely, to the extent that one loves the good, to that same extent is its contrary or “privatively opposed” detested. But the tension is resolved by what has already been stated, because to the extent that it is true that evil is opposed to the good that is loved—either according to reality, or possibly according to the valuation thereof, or what is truer still, “to the extent that the good is loved”—simply speaking this is false. Nonetheless Fishacre adds that it may be loved while possessed to the same extent as the evil opposed to it is hated when that is possessed. “This I say,” concludes Fishacre, “if love will have already stood firm, there is a habit respecting that good and that will not be diminished.”

The last *quaestio* is related to the preceding two with respect to subject matter, but here focuses on the state of blessedness. How are the blessed, he asks first, affected now with respect to their past evil or good deeds? Are they, to begin with, moved by some hatred or detestation toward their past evils and punishments? Fishacre’s response is to refer to the discussion immediately preceding, that is, that “the blessed has everything that he or she wants, and thus desires nothing more.”

In addition, “the blessed is certain that he will *always* have everything that he wants, otherwise he would not have everything that he would want,” namely the security in knowing that his possession is forever. From the first argument above it follows that the blessed person has no evil according to the truth of the matter; from the second no evil even according to appearance or perception. Thus the blessed will never be moved by anger nor by sorrow nor by fear nor by hatred nor by detestation. It also follows from this that the blessed would not be disturbed by seeking for the grace that he or she lost at some time by sinning, or indeed by seeking the peace lost because of persecution, since when one of a pair of opposites is not detestable, the other is not desirable, and because one is not detested, the remaining one is not desired. “I speak of these,” says Fishacre, “neither of which is possessed.” The blessed can love the

good which he has without detesting the evil which is opposed to it. To love is not properly speaking to desire.

Likewise, since reward follows upon merit, it seems that whoever seeks more merit, seeks greater reward as well. But the blessed does not seek greater reward, as has been demonstrated. Therefore, neither does it seek greater merit. And therefore since past grace would have been its own merit, the blessed does not seek more of the grace which has passed than that which he already has. It seems therefore that he would not want more glory than he has, nor to have had more grace than he had, nor to have done more good deeds than he in fact performed. This is to speak of desire in the absolute sense, for perhaps he may well wish to have more glory under the condition that he had merited more; and to merit more under the condition that he had been predestined for a greater grace.

To these reflections Fishacre offers three contrary arguments. First, it seems that the blessed could be sorry for past sins, because to do penance is a good action, and a mortal man is not less capable (than one in the state of blessedness). But the blessed possess more power than mortals on their earthly pilgrimage. It would seem then much more powerful to bemoan one's sins there in paradise than here below.

The master's analysis in response to this first argument is linguistic in nature. Sorrowing and repenting are not "actions" but rather "passions." Thus no good action, but rather a passion, is removed from the glorified person when he ceases to grieve and repent. However, if sorrowing and detesting were actions, then they could be spoken of in two ways. In the first way, they are the same actions as loving and seeking, "just as to approach and to withdraw are the same movement, differing only with respect to relations." In this case, since the blessed does not grieve for past sins nor detest them, there will not be removed from such a one any action which he had previously done, but merely a certain mode or rule of such an action. For a favorable disposition remains by which that individual was previously moved between evil and good. Removed from the subject will be certain patterns of behavior directed toward evil, and there will remain tendencies to the good in a most perfect mode, because such a person will now adhere to the good.

To pick up the set of alternatives, the second contrary argument notes that just as the good attached to knowing (*aspectus*) is knowledge (*scientia*), so the good of loving (*affectus*) is good affection (*affectio*). But

for the glorified spirit, transitioning from this life, no knowledge is removed but rather augmented. Therefore neither is there anything redolent of good affections abrogated for him, but rather augmented. But a favorable disposition is good, according to which for someone both here and there sin is detested. Thus such a disposition will survive bodily death.

The response to this objection is obvious: nothing resembling goodwill (*affectio*) which may befit the state of glory will be removed. Rather, it will be made more perfect, as will knowledge (*scientia*). The evil of fault and suffering, which belongs to this state in *affectio*, will there be entirely lifted.

The third objection stands as follows: when one sins mortally, never will that person be restored to such merit as he could have had, if he would have persevered, even though perhaps someone may be restored to *more* than he would have had, if he would have persevered. Therefore, he reached as great a reward as he could have had, if he had stood firm. Therefore, that person when he reaches his reward will not have such a great one as he could have had, if he had persevered, and indeed he suffers loss from past sin. But that loss, since it is evil and now present in reality, cannot not be hated. Such a person therefore, although happier than that one, hates and detests that loss, and consequently the sin which he had committed.

To this objection, Fishacre is again attentive to the language: it has to be said that properly speaking here is no loss (*damnum*), if what is not obtained is worse than what is in fact obtained. When therefore someone has sinned, he has damned himself with respect to the grace he has lost, and properly speaking not in the reward which could have led to that grace, if he would have persisted, because nothing is owed to one falling from grace. And thus although now such a person would not have as much reward as he could have obtained, if he would have persevered, nevertheless this is now a loss for him. But neither is the past loss of grace now an injury, but it was before he would have arisen, and thus is not a cause of suffering now. However, if anyone argues that a loss may even be called a want of something that could have been obtained, then it has to be said that not *every* loss is an evil, for if there be evil, it would be the evil of punishment. In the current dispensation, however, the lack

of a greater reward is not a punishment for the blessed, because such a one does not want more than he has, as has been shown.

A new and dramatically foreshortened question breaks off with the announcement of the question, namely whether the blessed are affected by the good or evil that befall us who still exist here below. Whatever conclusions the master reached are lost to us, they clearly belong thematically to the three questions (2, 3, and 4) that preceded, and would have been not without theological interest.

P Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France lat. 15754, fol. 65rb–vb

⟨1. De corpore caelesti quoad liberum arbitrium⟩

⟨1⟩ Quod corpus caeleste videtur per motum suum dominari super liberum arbitrium hominis. Omnis forma naturalis transmutabilis est subiecta corporibus caelestibus et eorum motibus. Liberum arbitrium est forma naturalis transmutabilis. Ergo etc. Maior sic ostenditur: prima transmutatio, a qua est omnis alia causaliter secundum Philosophum, est motus localis caeli,¹ et ipsi sive tali etiam omnia transmutabilia sunt subiecta. Ergo etc. Minor sic: voluntas sive liberum arbitrium est forma naturalis, quia est de perfectione humanae naturae et ex parte formae. Item,² est transmutabile, quia mutatur a contraria dispositione in contrariam tam in aspectu quam in affectu.

⟨2⟩ Item, sicut se habet apprehensiva sensitiva ad apprehensivam intellectivam, sic appetitiva ad appetitivam. Sed sic se habent apprehensivae quod sensitiva apprehendente, apprehendit necessario intellectiva velit nolit. Ergo sic se habent appetitivae quod appetitiva sensitiva mota et appetente, necesse est appetitivam intellectivam moveri et appetere. Maior patet ex permutata proportione; minor per se, quia cum pervenerit species ad intimum sensus communis cum perceptione eiusdem, non potest homo non intelligere, immo velit nolit apprehendit intellectiva. Deinde est ex diversis passionibus corporis naturaliter et necessario movetur appetitiva sensitiva, quia cum nimis calescit corpus, appetit refrigerationem sensitivam et non potest non appetere hoc. Sed diversae passiones causantur in corporibus nostris ex corporibus caelestibus et eorum motibus, quia cum approximant nobis stellae calidae, aestuant corpora. Cum vero removentur et appropiant frigidae, frigescunt, et sic de aliis passionibus secundum diversitatem humorum in corpore et diversum situm stellarum ad nos. Ergo appetitus humanae sensitivae naturaliter et necessario movetur et appetit hoc agentibus corporibus caelestibus et eorum motibus. Ex duabus proximis conclusionibus argue sic: motus appetitivae sensitivae naturaliter et necessario causatur ex motibus caelestium corporum. Sed mota appetitiva sensitiva et appetente, necesse est moveri appetitivam intellectivam et appetere naturaliter. Ergo motus et appetitus intellectivae naturaliter et necessario causa-

¹ Arist., *De caelo et mundo* 2.4 (287a23). Cf. *Auctoritates Aristotelis*, n. 55 (ed. Hamesse, 163).

² Although generally speaking *item* marks the beginning of a new argument, here the paragraph sign is missing.

35 tur ex motibus caelestium corporum. Et hoc est propositum: “haec enim appetitiva idem est quod voluntas sive liberum arbitrium.” Ergo etc.

40 〈3〉 Item, supposito cum Philosopho quod corpora caelestia sunt viva:³ sicut ergo se habet corpus humanum ad corpus caeleste, sic motor huius ad motorem illius. Hoc patet ex permutata proportione. Sed corpus corpori subicitur et movetur ab ipso omnino et eius motu naturaliter et necessario. Ergo similiter erit in motoribus corporum illorum. Sed motor humani corporis est ratio, cuius est voluntas et liberum arbitrium. Ergo etc.

45 〈4〉 Item, “idem natum est idem facere,”⁴ et idem secundum speciem. Sed voluntas sive liberum arbitrium est idem secundum speciem in omnibus hominibus. Cum ergo agat tot diversa et contraria, scilicet in isto bonum, in illo malum; et in eodem secundum diversa tempora nunc bonum, nunc malum, unde erit hoc nisi ex variis et contrariis dispositionibus corporis. Sed illae, ut ostensum est, causantur ex corporibus caelestibus et eorum motibus. Ergo, ut prius.

50 Ad primum potest dici quod maior non est vera, nisi de forma naturali corporali. Sed contra: ratio sive voluntas humana quodammodo forma corporalis est, scilicet quatenus est actus corporis, et sic erit eatenus subdita corporibus caelestibus. Et dicendum quod ratio sive voluntas humana et natura est et voluntas; et quatenus natura est, attingit ad ipsam
55 actio corporum caelestium per mutationem factam in eius corpore. Sed quatenus voluntas est, non. Dicendum igitur quod duplex est appetitus rationis sive voluntatis: unus naturalis, quo oblato delectabili vel tristabili statim movetur ad appetendum vel detestandum—et quoad istum motum sive appetitum aliquo modo subdita est corporibus caelestibus,
60 non tamen secundum naturam primo institutam, sed secundum naturam iam corruptam, quia merito peccati facta est in anima quaedam necessitas concupiscendi concupiscente sensualitate. Alius est eius appetitus voluntarius, quo scilicet facta deliberatione circa appetitum eius naturalem, cum convertit se super ipsum, sponte consentit vel dissentit. Huius appetitus causa nullo modo potest esse corpus caeleste. Liberum enim est
65

43 idem secundum speciem *iter. P*

³ Arist., *Metaph.* 12.7 (1072b26–27).

⁴ Arist., *De gen. et corr.* 2.10 (336a27–28); cf. *Auctoritates Aristotelis*, n. 43 (ed. Hamesse, 170).

arbitrium vel amplectendi vel renuntiandi quod oblatum est. Et iste appetitus est cum meremur vel demeremur.

70 Ad secundum. Iam patet, mota enim appetitiva sensitiva necesse est moveri appetitivam rationalem quatenus natura est. Et appetitus eius naturalis dico secundum naturam corruptam, sed non quatenus voluntas est et appetitus eius voluntarius.

75 Ad tertium. Dicendum quod non est proportio universaliter vera; non enim sicut corpus caeleste per suam actionem et elongationem et approximationem generat et corrumpit corpus humanum, sic est de spiritu motore caeli et anima rationali, et ideo non tenet. Verumtamen spiritus movens caelum: si tamen spiritus movet ipsum mediante corpore quod movet, transmutat corpus humanum et per diversas dispositiones quas efficit in ipso attingit ad provocandum appetitum sensitivae et ipsum appetitum voluntatis naturalem, ut dictum est, sed non voluntarium.

80 Ad⁵ quartum. Dicendum quod illa regula “idem in quantum idem” et cetera intelligenda est de virtute activa naturali, non de voluntaria, quia voluntaria manens eadem est sufficiens causa oppositorum; naturalis autem secundum quod talis non potest nisi unum contrariorum tantum. Vel si debet illa prima intelligi de utroque causa activa, scilicet naturali
85 et voluntaria, dicendum quod quantum ad primum et per se actum sive primam et per se actionem, idem semper facit voluntas, sicut et natura. Voluntas enim non potest nisi velle et nolle, et hoc est primum et per se actum ab ea, vel prima et per se actio eius. Et illud reducitur ad velle, sicut ad radicem.

90 Item, voluntas per se sine gratia non potest nisi velle malum vel saltem forte indifferens; voluntas autem adiuta gratia secundum quod talis non potest nisi bonum velle. Sed dicet aliquis: in his oppositis quorum utrumque potest sine gratia, ut loquimur: verbi gratia modo ambulare, modo quiescere, quomodo eadem manens omnino diversa agit? Et potest dici
95 quod adhuc invenitur secundum voluntatem diversitas, saltem secundum rationem, penes diversos fines intentos, propter quos agit tam diversas actiones. Sed cum velle vel intendere finem sit aliquod velle, et aliqua actio, unde causatur in ea tam diversum velle, scilicet diversorum finium? “Idem enim in quantum idem semper natum”⁶ etc.

⁵ A second hand begins here.

⁶ Arist., *De gen. et corr.* 2.10 (336a27–28); cf. *Auctoritates Aristotelis*, n. 43 (ed. Hamesse, 170).

100 Propterea dicendum, ut in principio dictum est, quod illa regula intel-
ligenda est de principio activo quod est natura, non de illo quod est vo-
luntas. Vel si de utroque intelligenda est, oportet intelligi de prima et per
se actione voluntatis quod est velle. Sicut enim ignis quandam materiam
constringit, quandam | liquefacit, utrobique tamen est actio una secun- 65va
105 dum substantiam quod est calere, sic cum voluntas intendit modo unum
oppositorum modo aliud, una est actio, scilicet velle, sed ad diversa
obiecta terminatum. Sed cum ignis est eiusdem materiae, non possit
facere diversa, quia non modo constringit, non modo liquefacit eandem.
Videtur adhuc esse dissimile de voluntate, quia quod voluntas modo
110 vult, iam illud idem noleret, et sic respectu eiusdem obiecti modo habet
velle, modo nolle. Et dum manet velle, est plena potentia ad nolendum,
et econtrario. Non sic est de igne nec de aliqua potentia naturali activa.
Propterea forte oportet omnino dicere quod praedicta regula non est
intelligenda nisi in potentiis naturalibus activis, ut dictum est.

115 <De beatis et quomodo afficiuntur>

<2. Utrum aliquis vellet habere gradum maiorem beatitudinis quam habet>

De beatis spiritibus vel hominibus glorificatis quaeritur—quantum ad
affectiones quas habent ad ea quae ad se ipsos spectant—primo, utrum
aliquis eorum vellet habere gradum superiorem beatitudinis quam habet:
120 verbi gratia, sint *a* et *b* gradus beatitudinis maior et minor, et aliquis
adeptus sit *b*, quaeritur utrum confirmatus in *b* vellet habere *a*. Videtur
quod non, quia non haberet quicquid vellet et ita non esset “beatus.”

Item, beatus nihil male vult, sed iste aliquid male vellet appetendo
quem non meruit.

125 Item, nihil potest appeti, nisi quod speratur posse obtineri. Sed iste non
sperat posse obtinere *a*, quia confirmatus est in *b*, et non est ei tempus
amplius merendi. Ergo non potest appetere *a*. Prima patet per
Augustinum libro 13 *De Trinitate*, dicentem quod omnes vellent
immortalitatem, si sperarent se posse obtinere eam.⁷ Nunc autem si quis
130 dicit quod non appetit eam, hoc non est nisi quia non sperat se posse
obtinere eam. Igitur secundum eum spes obtinendi praecedit appetitum.

Item, quod appetitur concipitur quantum tamquam quod potest esse
finis actionis. Quod non speratur posse obtineri, tamquam id quod non
potest esse finis actionis. Si igitur idem posset appeti et desiderari, tamen

⁷ Aug., *De Trin.* 13.8 (CCL 50A:396).

135 idem posset simul et semel concipi, tamquam quod posset esse finis actionis et quod non etc., quod est impossibile.

Item, “appetere *a*” non est appetere quod *a* sit vel quod alius habeat *a*, sed quod ipse appetens habeat *a*. Igitur “appetere *a*” est “appetere habere *a*.” Sed hoc nequit appeti a confirmato in *b*, quia quod solum est in
 140 aspectu mentis et nullo modo extra, neque secundum rem neque secundum aestimationem, non potest movere affectum. Bonum enim et malum sunt motiva affectus, eo quod sunt in rebus secundum Aristotelem.⁸ Sed hoc quod est istum confirmatum in *b* habere *a*, non est in re extra aspectum mentis—neque secundum rem neque secundum aestimationem.
 145 Ergo non potest appeti ab eo.

Ex hoc sequetur quod neque tristetur pro carentia *a* neque queat tris-
 tari, quia cum praesentia eius non appetitur nec appeti potest, eius ab-
 sentia non tristet neque tristare potest, quia tristitia in absentia non est,
 nisi quia desideratur praesentia.

150 Contra. Omnis natura secundum quod talis se maxime amat. Ergo appetit sibi bonum. Sed habere *a* esset bonum huic qui habet *b*. Ergo appetit *a*.

Responsio. Rationalis natura appetit sibi bonum, unde natura est; non
 tamen speret posse illud obtinere, et item si iusta est. Tunc unde voluntas
 155 est super naturam, appetit quod putat ad se pertinere et sibi deberi, alio-
 quin non. Et ideo non sequitur quod si appetit bonum, quod appetat
 quodcumque sive qualecumque bonum.

⟨3. Utrum habens gradum minorem afficitur aliqua detestatione⟩

Deinde⁹ quaeritur de eodem confirmato in *b*. Cum *b* habeat oppositum
 160 contrarie et privative, ut tantumdem de miseria, quantum *b* est gaudii vel
 carentia gaudii *b*, utrum habens *b* afficitur ad tale oppositum ipsi *b* aliqua
 detestatione vel odio. Et videtur quod non, quia beatus habet quicquid
 vult. Et talis non haberet quicquid vellet, haberet enim aliquam poenalem
 affectionem. Et poena nequit amari per se.

153 Rationalis] creatura *add. sed del. P* 157 bonum videtur quod ista argu-
 menta concludunt quod parvuli nonbaptizati non appetunt videre Deum *add. in*
marg. P

⁸ Cf. Arist., *Eth. Nic.* 1.2 (1094a18–25).

⁹ Possibly a new hand.

165 Item, beatus nihil male vult. Sed talis aliquid male vellet, ex quo enim
omnis amor Deo debetur. Voluntas se potens totaliter in Deum conver-
tere, si aliquid sui alias convertit, peccat. Sed confirmata in gloria potest
se totam in Deum convertere. Et si convertit se affectu odii vel detesta-
tionis ad oppositum *b*, alias se convertit quam ad Deum, ut videtur. Ergo
170 aliquid male vult.

Item, sicut se habet in corporalibus possibilitas materiae ad formam,
ita in spiritualibus vertibilitas voluntatis ad appetibile. Sed ibi est ita
quod materia nanta formam, quae totam eius possibilitatem implet,
numquam se convertit ad aliam formam. Nec etiam patet. Ergo voluntas
175 nanta appetibile quod totum eius implet desiderium, numquam ad aliud
per affectionem se convertet. Sed oppositum *b* est aliquid aliud quam
illud bonum quod possidetur in *b*. Et illud bonum implet totum eius de-
siderium, quia est summum bonum. Ergo ad illud oppositum *b* non se
convertet.

180 Item, glorificati iam confirmati sunt et stabiliti in affectionibus suis. Si
igitur habent aliquam affectionem poenalem, ut odium vel detestatio-
nem, semper eam habebunt. Ergo semper simul miseri et beati, si dicis
quod non est necesse quod semper habeant talem affectionem, sed pos-
sunt habere.

185 Contra. “In perpetuis non differt esse et posse.”¹⁰

Item, bonum solum vel malum, verum vel apparens potest movere. Sed
bonum et malum sunt in rebus, sicut verum et falsum in cogitatione se-
cundum Aristotelem.¹¹ Ergo quae movent affectum sunt in rebus vere
vel apparenter. Sed oppositum gradui *b* neutro modo est in re; ergo non
190 movet affectionem.

Item, sicut differunt condiciones et triumpho, sic huiusmodi vitae et
beatae. Sed in tempore belli motus est inter duo, scilicet bonum et
malum, pacem et inquietudinem quae triumpho tantummodo adhaesio
cum pace obtenta. Ergo in proposito sic est quod in praesenti est motus

165 quo *add. interlin. P*

¹⁰ Arist., *Phys.* 3.3 (203b30). Cf. *Auctoritates Aristotelis*, n. 103 (ed. Hamesse, 148)

¹¹ Arist., *Metaph.* 6.4 (1027b25–27). Cf. *Auctoritates Aristotelis*, n. 153 (ed. Hamesse, 128)

195 a malo in bonum. Sed in futuro tantum adhaesio cum bono.

Item, dum movetur aliquid localiter, movetur a termino ad terminum. Sed postquam motum est, non iam movetur a termino ad terminum, sed tantum in termino quiescit. Et causa est, quia totaliter est in termino ad quem. Sed sic est spiritualiter quod in hac vita movetur affectio ad bonum et malum sive inter haec. In patria quando motum est, quiescitur in bono obtento tantum. Ergo ibi non est motus a malo, sed tantum adhaesio cum bono.

Istae rationes videntur satis probabiles omnes praeter secundam et tertiam.

205 Contra haec obici posset quod quantum amat quis bonum, tantum detestatur eius contrarium vel privative oppositum.

Sed solutum est ex iam dictis, quia tantummodo verum est, dum malum bono amato oppositum est aut secundum rem aut possibiliter secundum aestimationem aut, quod verius est, istud est simpliciter falsum: 210 “quantum amatur bonum” etc., nisi forte sic: “quantum amatur dum habetur, tantum oditur malum ei oppositum quando illud habetur.” Hoc dico: si steterit amor prius, habitus ad illud bonum et non diminuatur.

⟨4. Quomodo afficiuntur beati ad mala vel bona sua praeterita⟩

Consequenter quaeritur quomodo afficiuntur beati iam ad mala vel 215 bona sua praeterita. Primo, utrum moveantur aliquo odio vel detestatione ad mala sua praeterita, scilicet culpas et poenas, et videtur quod non omnibus rationibus iam nuper positis in proxima praesenti quaestione.¹² Insuper causa tali: beatus habet omne quod vult, ita quod nihil extra appetit.

Item, certus est se semper habiturum omnia quae vult, alioquin non 220 haberet omne quod vellet. Omnis enim qui bonum habet vellet se habere securitatem de habendo ipsum semper. Ex primo igitur sequitur quod qui beatus est, nullum malum habeat secundum veritatem; ex secundo quod nullum secundum apparentiam vel aestimationem. Et ita numquam movebitur aliquo motu irascibili, sed neque dolore neque timore neque 225 odio neque detestatione. Inde etiam sequitur quod non afficiatur appetendo ad gratiam, quam aliquando peccando amisit; vel ad pacem quam persecutione, quia cum unum oppositorum non sit detestabile, nec relinquit appetibile; et quia non detestatur unum, reliquum non appetit. Dico de his quorum iam neutrum habetur. Potest enim amare bonum quod

¹² Resp. q. 3 insuper.

230 habet non detestando malum ei oppositum, ut patet ex dictis. Sed amare non est appetere proprie.

Item, cum ad meritum sequatur praemium, videtur quod qui appetit plus de merito, appetat et plus de praemio. Sed beatus non appetit plus de praemio, ut praecostensum est. Ergo nec de merito. Ergo cum gratia
235 praeterita suum meritum fuerit, non appetit plus de gratia quae praeteriit quam habuerit. Videtur igitur quod beatus non desideret plus gloriae quam habet, neque plus habuisse gratiae quam habuerit, neque plura bona fecisse quam fecit. Et hoc dico absoluto desiderio. Forte enim bene vellet habere plus gloriae sub hac condicione, si plus meruisset; et plus
240 meruisse sub hac condicione, si ad maiorem gratiam praeordinatus fuisset.

Sed contra. <1> Videtur quod beatus possit dolere pro peccatis suis praeteritis, quia cum paenitere sit actio bona, et homo non est minus potens. Sed potentior beatus quam hic mortalis. Videtur quod multo fortius
245 possit ibi dolere pro peccato quam hic.

<2> Item, sicut bonum aspectus est scientia, sic bonum affectus est bona affectio. Sed spiritui glorificato de hac vita transeunti nihil tollitur de scientia, sed potius augetur. Ergo nec aliquid ei tollitur de bonis affectionibus, sed potius augentur. Sed bona est affectio, qua quis hic detestatur peccatum et ibi. Ideo non transibit.
250

<3> Item, cum quis mortaliter peccat, numquam reparabitur ad tantum meritum quantum potuit habuisse, si stetisset, licet forte reparetur aliquis ad plus quam habuisset, si stetisset. Numquid igitur pervenit ad tantum praemium quantum potuit habuisse, si stetisset. Iste igitur cum pervenit
255 ad praemium, nec habet tantum quantum potuit obtinuisse, damnum habet ex praeterito peccato. Sed damnum, cum sit malum et iam praesens secundum rem, non potest non odiri. Talis igitur, licet beatius illo, odit illud damnum et detestatur, et per consequens peccatum quod commiserat.

260 Responsio <ad primum>: dicit vel quod dolere et paenitere non sunt actiones, sed potius passiones, et ideo nulla bona actio tollitur glorificato, cum desinit dolere et paenitere, sed potius passio. Vel quod dolere et detestari actiones sunt, et tunc potest dici dupliciter, scilicet aut quod sunt actiones eadem cum amare vel appetere, sicut idem motus est accessus

262 sed] pol add. sed del. P

265 et recessus solum differens relationibus. Et tunc cum beatus non doleat
 pro peccatis praeteritis nec detestetur ea, non ei aliqua actio quam prius
 habuerit, sed modus quidam vel respectus eius. Affectio enim manet qua
 movebatur prius inter malum et bonum. Sed tollitur ei respectus quantum
 habuerit ad malum et manet respectus ad bonum perfectissimo modo,
 270 quia adhaeret bono.

Aut si quis vult dicere quod diversae sint actiones facere, amare scilicet
 “concupiscibilis,” et fugere sive detestari “irascibilis,” dicendum
 quod licet tollatur beatis aliqua actio bona quam hic habuerunt, non
 tamen sunt et minus potentes, sed potentiores. Quaedam enim sunt ac-
 275 tiones hic necessariae propter imperfectionem praesentis status, quae ibi
 evacuabuntur propter illius status perfectionem: verbi gratia, hic vesti-
 mur, pascimur, potamur; et huius quorum nihil ibi erit, quia infirmitatis
 sunt. Nec erit imperfectio his carere, sed potius perfectio postquam ve-
 nerimus ad statum perfectionis nostrae. Sic est de his actionibus animae:
 280 dolere, detestari, paenitere, quae proprie respiciunt praesens sive prae-
 sentia vel praeterita, quia hic sunt mala et motus a malo et fuga ad bo-
 num. Ibi autem evacuabitur omne malum et erit perfecta adhaesio cum
 bono. Et non erit spiritus impotentior tunc, quia ipsa potentia quae hic
 agit tales actiones ibi erit, sed infirmitatis occasio qua hic aguntur non
 285 erit.

Ex hoc patet responsio ad secundum. Nihil enim bonae affectionis ibi
 tolletur quod deceat illum statum. Sed magis perficietur ibi affectio bona,
 sicut et scientia. Malum autem poenae et culpae, quod est hic in affec-
 tione, penitus ibi tolletur.

290 Ad tertium. Dicendum quod non est proprie damnum, si non obtineatur
 quod peius fuit obtineri, sed si amittitur quod habetur vel de iure debet
 haberi. Quando igitur quis peccavit, damnificavit se in gratia quam per-
 didit, et non proprie in praemio quod potuit consequi ad illam gratiam, si
 perstitisset, quia nec illud nec adhuc ei aliquo iure debebatur cadenti a
 295 gratia. Et ideo licet modo non habeat tantum de praemio quantum potuit
 obtinuisse, si stetisset, hoc tamen non est ei damnum modo. Sed nec
 amissio gratiae praeterita est damnum modo, sed fuit antequam re-
 surgeret, et ideo non est causa dolendi modo. Si quis autem contendat
 quod damnum dicatur etiam carentia rei quae posset obtineri, tunc dicen-

279 statum] naturae *add. sed del. P*

300 dum quod non omne damnum est malum. Si enim esset malum, esset malum poenae. Nunc autem carentia maioris praemii non est poenalis beato, quia non desiderat plus quam habet, ut ostensum est.

⟨5.⟩ Deinde quaeri potest quomodo afficiuntur beati ad nostra bona vel mala qui adhuc sumus. . . .

301 carentia] carentie MS

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